U.S. v. Simmons

• Decision Date: 14 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-2295,98-2295
• Citation: 172 F.3d 775
• Parties: 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 717 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bobby Gene SIMMONS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 775

172 F.3d 775

12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 717

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bobby Gene SIMMONS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 98-2295.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 14, 1999.

Ronald J. Tenpas, David Rhodes, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Donald E. Horrox, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, MARCUS, Circuit Judge, and KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

A federal grand jury indicted Bobby Gene Simmons on charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Simmons moved to suppress some thirty bags of cocaine and a firearm, both of which police officers discovered in his automobile following a traffic stop for running a stop sign. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court suppressed both the gun and the cocaine as the fruits of a "prolonged" detention that violated the Fourth Amendment. The government has taken this interlocutory appeal from the suppression order, arguing that the relatively short additional delay occasioned by the officers' investigation during the traffic stop--attempting to verify whether the detainee was the "Bobby Simmons" who was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant--was a valid detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). ¹ We agree and reverse.

I.

The facts are straightforward and we recount them as they were found by the district court, crediting the officers' testimony. On June 9, 1997, at 6:14 p.m., Tampa Bay police officers Dale Frix and Alexander Rahmings stopped Bobby Gene Simmons for running a stop sign while driving a white Pontiac station wagon with dark-tinted windows. ² Before approaching the stopped car, the officers advised their dispatcher that they were on a traffic stop. They told Simmons that he had been stopped for failing to stop at a stop sign and requested his driver's license and registration. They also asked for consent to search the car, but Simmons refused. Four minutes later, at 6:18 p.m., Officer Frix radioed the dispatcher and requested a drug-detecting dog, but was told that narcotics dogs usually were not available until 7:00 p.m. Approximately ten minutes later, Frix again radioed the dispatcher for an update on the availability of a dog. At 6:32 p.m., the dispatcher told Frix that there was still no dog available. Frix asked the dispatcher to contact a supervisor who might know where a canine unit could be located.

While Officer Frix sought a narcotics dog, Officer Rahmings had begun writing a traffic citation for Simmons. He also conducted a routine mobile computer check to ascertain whether there were any outstanding arrest warrants for Simmons. Rahmings learned that Simmons' license and registration were valid, but received a computer report of an outstanding arrest warrant from Brevard County, Florida, for a "Bobby Simmons" on a worthless check charge. The physical description of the subject of the warrant--black male, 5 feet 10 or 11 inches tall, weighing 200 pounds--closely matched that of Simmons, but the birth date was different. The arrest warrant listed the subject's date of birth as October 10, 1957, and Simmons' date of birth was August 23, 1953, making the subject of the warrant approximately 40 years old, while Simmons was approximately 44 years old.

Officer Rahmings radioed the dispatcher to request a teletype be sent to Brevard County to clarify the information, but was put on hold. Rahmings then used his mobile computer to request the teletype to be sent. Rahmings also tried to contact his supervisor for advice on how to proceed. Rahmings' activities occurred within 20 to 30 minutes of the officer's return to the police car to write the traffic citation, or between 6:38 p.m. and 6:48 p.m.

At 6:50 p.m., Officers Frix and Rahmings were notified that a drug-detecting dog had been dispatched to the scene. Six minutes later, Rahmings called his dispatcher to confirm that his request that a teletype be sent to Brevard County had been received, but again was told by the dispatcher to "stand by." At approximately 7:00 p.m., the drug-detecting dog arrived at the scene and gave a positive alert to Simmons' car for the presence of contraband between 7:05 p.m. and 7:10 p.m. Soon thereafter, the officers searched Simmons' car and found thirty small bags of cocaine under the driver's seat and a loaded handgun beneath a sheet of paper on the center console. By 7:12 p.m., Simmons was under arrest. At 7:32 p.m., Brevard County responded to the teletype inquiry, reporting that it had no further information on the "Bobby Simmons" who was the subject of the bad check warrant.

The district court unambiguously found that the police officers had observed Simmons run a stop sign and consequently ruled that the initial traffic stop was lawful, regardless of what the officers' subjective motivations may have been. Notably, the court also determined that the Tampa police officers had acted diligently in attempting to verify whether Simmons was the subject of the Brevard County arrest warrant and found that there had been no undue delay in that endeavor. Further, the court found that the police had acted diligently in procuring a drug-detecting dog and that there had been no unreasonable delay in getting the dog to the scene. ³

Notwithstanding those findings of fact and credibility choices drawn in favor of the police officers, the district court concluded that the detention of Simmons beyond the time it normally takes to write a traffic citation was unconstitutional because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that Simmons was the actual subject of the Brevard County arrest warrant. In addition to what the court regarded as ambiguous information concerning the warrant from the computer check, the court based its ruling on several factors it felt were peculiar to this case: that Simmons lived in the neighborhood where the stop had taken place on the west coast of Florida, and the warrant was issued from a county on the east coast of Florida; that the officers had known of their drug suspicions of Simmons for several months and yet had learned of no outstanding warrants for him; and that the officers easily could have arrested Simmons later if the warrant turned out to be for him. Having concluded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Simmons based on the arrest warrant, the district court determined that evidence found by the police after the time Simmons' traffic stop normally should have been completed had been discovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment. ⁴

II.

We review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error, see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), but we review de novo the application of those facts to the law, see United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 358 (11th Cir.1989). Here, since the government is not contesting any factual finding, we apply the de novo standard.

Under the Fourth Amendment, a decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), and an officer's motive in making the traffic stop does not invalidate what is otherwise "objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment," id. at 812, 116 S.Ct. 1769; see also United States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1431-33 (11th Cir.) (subjective belief of Coast Guard did not invalidate boarding, even where the officers themselves believed they did not have probable cause, where facts objectively supported a finding of probable cause, which is determined by the courts), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S.Ct. 72, 107 L.Ed.2d 38 (1989). The district court found that there was "no question" that the officers had observed Simmons run the stop sign and, therefore, had probable cause to stop Simmons' automobile. There is no basis on this record to question that finding, which was grounded upon credibility choices made by the district court.

The essential question posited by this case then is whether the additional 17 to 26 minutes consumed by Officer Rahmings' attempts to track down more information concerning the Brevard County warrant for a bad check charge rendered the duration of the stop unconstitutional. We hold that it did not. Once the police had validly detained Simmons, plainly they were entitled under the decisional law to conduct a variety of checks on the driver and his car, including questioning the driver about the traffic violation, requesting consent to search the car, and running a computer check for outstanding warrants. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35-36, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (discussing an officer's computer check of driver license and request for consent to search during a traffic stop); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 755, 757 (11th Cir.1988) (relating officers' request for consent to search and check for warrants after traffic stop); see also United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1429 (10th Cir.1997) ("An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may run computer checks on the driver's license, the vehicle registration papers, and on whether the driver has any outstanding warrants or the vehicle has been reported stolen.").

The propriety of the continued detention of Simmons after the "normal time for a traffic stop ended" is governed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny. The detention of Simmons was...