U.S. v. Roy

• Decision Date: 10 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-5230,88-5230
• Citation: 869 F.2d 1427
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert William ROY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1427

869 F.2d 1427

1990 A.M.C. 1518

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert William ROY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 88-5230.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

April 10, 1989.

Dexter W. Lehtinen, U.S. Atty., Allan J. Sullivan, William F. Jung, Mayra Reyler Lichter, Linda Collins Hertz, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

John S. Berk, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., Jon May, Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and MARKEY ^*, Chief Circuit Judge.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge.

Holding that the existence of probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances using an objective rather than a subjective standard, we reverse the district court's order granting a motion to suppress evidence.

FACTS

On August 14, 1987, at approximately 2:30 p.m. a United States Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment Team (LEDT), detected a United States vessel, the TRI-DIVE, while on patrol in international waters traveling approximately forty-five miles off the coast of Jamaica. The TRI-DIVE is a forty-six foot trimaran (three-hull sailboat, symmetrical in design). After identifying the vessel, the LEDT discovered that the TRI-DIVE and its master were on the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) report list. ¹ The LEDT deployed a boarding team. When the team boarded the vessel, Robert William Roy identified himself as master and owner of the vessel. The officer in command, a captain, advised Roy that the boarding team would check the TRI-DIVE's compliance with United States laws and regulations, and examine all man-size compartments pursuant to a security sweep. Roy did not object to the inspection. ²

After two and one-half hours, the LEDT boarding team terminated the security search. Before leaving the TRI-DIVE, the LEDT team gave Roy a completed boarding report stating that the TRI-DIVE complied with applicable United States regulations in all respects, including the absence of illegal contraband. After returning to their vessel, the boarding team members met with their commander for a debriefing. During debriefing, the officers realized that they had overlooked a man-size compartment in the starboard pontoon of the TRI-DIVE. They decided to return to the TRI-DIVE and conduct another inspection.

Approximately two and one-half hours after the first boarding, the Coast Guard officers reboarded the TRI-DIVE to obtain access to the man-size compartment in the starboard pontoon. At the second boarding, Officer Villafane advised Roy that the team would conduct a search to inspect the compartment they had overlooked. Seaman Rathert entered the starboard pontoon, removed the wood panels from the deck, climbed into the compartment, and discovered bales of marijuana. The officers arrested Roy and advised him of his rights.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 26, 1987, a grand jury indicted Roy for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana while on board a United States vessel, in violation of 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(j) (Count I), and possession with intent to distribute at least 100 kilograms of marijuana while on board a United States vessel, in violation of 46 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1903(a) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (Count II). Roy filed a motion to suppress all evidence, contending that the Coast Guard lacked probable cause to conduct the search.

On February 5, 1988, following a two-day suppression hearing, the district court granted Roy's motion to suppress. ³ The district court found that: Roy had standing to contest the search; the first boarding and inspection were proper under 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89(a); the second boarding and search exceeded fourth amendment reasonableness requirements; and Roy did not consent to the second search.

CONTENTIONS

The government contends that the district court erred in granting Roy's motion to suppress. The government argues that the second boarding and search were a continuation of the first document and safety search, pursuant to 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89(a); consequently, it did not require probable cause or suspicion of criminal activity. The government avers that section 89(a) allows the Coast Guard to search United States vessels and does not place any limits on the frequency of such searches.

Alternatively, the government argues that the Coast Guard had probable cause to conduct the second search. The government asserts that prior to reboarding the vessel, the Coast Guard knew: that the TRI-DIVE was a suspected smuggling vessel in a suspected smuggling area; that Roy made suspicious statements; that caulking tubes and both a caulking gun and Phillips-head screwdriver with fresh caulking were found aboard the vessel; that fresh caulking was evident on the panels over the large unaccounted for pontoon spaces; that the Phillips-head screws were filled with fresh caulking on the deck panels; and that the caulking on the deck panels over the pontoon areas had the same consistency as the caulking on the caulking gun and screwdriver.

Roy contends that the district court correctly granted his motion to suppress the evidence. Roy argues that the second boarding and search of the TRI-DIVE were not conducted pursuant to section 89(a), and the Coast Guard needed probable cause to support the search. Because the Coast Guard did not have probable cause to support the search and the seizure, the search was unreasonable and violative of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.

ISSUE

We decide whether the district court erred in granting Roy's motion to suppress the marijuana. ⁴

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

This appeal requires us to independently apply legal principles to the district court's findings of fact, unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Adams v. Balkcom, 688 F.2d 734, 739 (11th Cir.1982). The district court found that the section 89(a) document and safety inspection was concluded after the first boarding. The district court concluded that no reasonable suspicion existed to provide a constitutional justification for the second boarding, search, and seizure of the TRI-DIVE. The district court held, as a matter of law, that the second search exceeded fourth amendment reasonableness requirements.

Absent clear error, we are bound by the district court's findings of fact and credibility choices at the suppression hearing. United States v. Newbern, 731 F.2d 744, 747 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Aldridge, 719 F.2d 368, 373 (11th Cir.1983). We construe all facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party when reviewing the district court's grant of a motion to suppress. United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1514-15 (11th Cir.1986). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Edmondson, at 1515. We review independently the district court's conclusion that the second search exceeded fourth amendment reasonableness requirements.

II. Searches on the High Seas

Title 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89(a) authorizes Coast Guard officers to board vessels and make safety and document inspections without suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Lopez, 761 F.2d 632, 636 (11th Cir.1985). Our case law has delineated two types of searches that occur on the high seas: the limited search and the full "stem to stern" search.

A limited search is permissible on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Lopez, at 636. Although we examine the totality of the circumstances to determine reasonable suspicion, reasonable suspicion must be more than a mere generalized suspicion or hunch. United States v. Pearson, 791 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 991, 107 S.Ct. 590, 93 L.Ed.2d 591 (1986); United States v. Reeh, 780 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir.1986). Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences drawn from those facts, which reasonably warrant suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Law enforcement officers may subjectively assess those facts in light of their expertise. United States v. Pearson, at 870.

A full stem to stern search is permissible on probable cause that a crime has been, or is being, committed. To determine the existence of probable cause, we examine whether the facts and circumstances known to law enforcement officials could have warranted their reasonable belief that a crime had been or was being committed. Alternatively, we examine whether the facts in their totality, together with the synthesis of what the agents collectively heard, knew and observed, considered in light of the agent's individual experience, presented the probability that a crime had been or was being committed. United States v. Lopez, at 636.

With these principles in mind, we must determine whether the district court's findings, that the section 89(a) document and safety inspection concluded after the first boarding and that no reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to provide a constitutional justification for the second boarding, search and seizure of the TRI-DIVE are correct.

III. The Continuation Argument

The district court found that the boarding team's initial safety and document inspection was proper. United States v. Roy, 680 F.Supp. 370, 372-73 (S.D.Fla.1988). The government contends that the second search was merely a continuation of the original section 89(a) search which failed to account for all the space on the vessel.

The government argues that section 89(a) does not limit the frequency of document and safety searches. It cites United States v. Willis, 639 F.2d 1335, 1337 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) to support its argument that reboarding could have been undertaken as a continuation of the section 89(a...