U.S. v. Slater
| Decision Date | 28 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-5223,95-5223 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Thomas SLATER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before: MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges; and COHN, District Judge. *
James Thomas Slater appeals his conviction and sentence following a guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and use of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, Slater argues that the warrantless searches of his vehicle and person were unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the evidence seized as a result of those searches should have been suppressed.
Around midnight on November 14, 1993, Officer Alan Gronstrom of the Oak Ridge, Tennessee Police Department pulled Slater over for speeding. Gronstrom believed that Slater's car was the same as or similar to one he had seen before in an area of town known for drug trafficking and violence. After Gronstrom activated his lights and attempted to stop Slater's vehicle at a well-lighted intersection, Slater came to a rolling stop about 200 yards away in an empty and dimly-lit parking lot. Prior to his coming to a complete stop, Gronstrom observed Slater reaching into the rear seat area of his vehicle, although Gronstrom could not see what, if anything, Slater was reaching for.
After Slater stopped, Gronstrom approached the vehicle and asked for a driver's license. Gronstrom recognized Slater as someone he had pulled over approximately one year before, without incident, for running a red light. While examining the license, Gronstrom observed Slater reach down between his legs. As Gronstrom shined his flashlight on Slater, Slater quickly pulled both hands up and stated that he did not have anything and was not doing anything. Gronstrom later testified that Slater appeared tense and rigid at the time, and his chest was beating hard. Although Gronstrom was not "deathly afraid," he was somewhat nervous and, consistent with police department policy, retreated to his patrol car to request a back-up officer. Officer Alan Massengill responded to Gronstrom's request within two to three minutes.
Upon Massengill's arrival on the scene, Gronstrom returned to the driver's side of Slater's car and Massengill approached the passenger side. Gronstrom asked Slater to step out of the vehicle, and told him that he was going to pat him down for weapons. Gronstrom patted Slater down at the back of his vehicle and discovered no weapons. During the patdown, Slater told the officers that he did not have a gun. Gronstrom proceeded to inform Slater that he was going to look for weapons in the vehicle and turned toward the open driver's door. Slater stated at that point that he did have a weapon in the car. Without entering Slater's vehicle, Gronstrom looked into the passenger compartment through the open door and saw a gun on the driver's floorboard.
The officers proceeded to place Slater in custody for the handgun offense and conduct a search of his person incident to his arrest. The search revealed a bag of marijuana, a bag of crack cocaine, a digital pager, and $718.00 in cash. The evidence found during the searches of Slater's vehicle and person led to his conviction on drug and weapon charges.
Slater was indicted on December 7, 1993 for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and a firearms violation. On January 4, 1994, he moved to suppress all evidence seized as the result of allegedly invalid searches of his vehicle and person. At the suppression hearing, Slater argued that, after he was pulled over for speeding and an initial pat-down revealed no weapons on his person, it was unlawful for officers to search his vehicle and then his person a second time. The United States, by contrast, argued that the search of Slater's vehicle following the initial patdown of his person was justified either as a permissible extension of Terry v. Ohio, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), or under the plain view doctrine. The United States further argued that the second search of Slater's person was justified as being incident to his lawful arrest.
Following a suppression hearing presided over by a magistrate judge, the district court accepted a report and recommendation that Slater's motion be denied. On June 22, Slater entered a conditional plea to his indictment, reserving the right to appeal the suppression issue. Slater was sentenced to ten years in prison, and this appeal followed.
We review a district court's decision on a motion to suppress "under two complementary standards." United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir.1995). The district court's "factual findings made in consideration of a motion to suppress evidence are to be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous [while] the district court's conclusions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal." Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1221 (6th Cir.)). The appellate court reviews the evidence "in the light most likely to support the district court's decision." Id.
In his report and recommendation to the district court, the magistrate judge credited the government's presentation of the facts. We hold that those factual findings, adopted by the district judge, were neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. We next review the district court's ruling that the police conduct during Slater's stop was reasonable de novo.
Police officers may stop a speeding vehicle, approach it for investigation, and ask the driver to step out of the car. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 54 L.Ed.2d 331, 337 (1977). It is uncontested that Gronstrom had probable cause to believe that a traffic offense had occurred, and lawfully stopped Slater's vehicle after he observed Slater speeding. See United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 130 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994). Because Gronstrom had a legitimate basis for the traffic stop, it was permissible for him to detain Slater briefly for investigation.
When an individual is subject to a lawful investigative detention, an officer may conduct a limited frisk or patdown of that person for weapons if the officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Terry, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909. In determining whether an officer's suspicion of danger and subsequent conduct were reasonable, "due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' but to specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Id. We hold that, under the circumstances of this stop, Gronstrom was justified in asking Slater to step out of his vehicle and in conducting a limited patdown search for weapons. 1
The rationale of Terry has been extended to permit limited searches of vehicles where an officer has a safety concern based upon an actual suspicion that a weapon is present in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (). The "patdown" of a vehicle need not be predicated on the discovery of a weapon on a suspect's person. See United States v. Holifield, 956 F.2d 665, 668-69 (7th Cir.1992).
We find that the same factors that justified the initial patdown of Slater, combined with the fact that Slater himself allegedly admitted to the presence of a gun in his vehicle before Gronstrom searched the car, supplied reasonable suspicion that Slater was armed and dangerous and justified Gronstrom's search of Slater's vehicle. The fact that Slater was temporarily under the officers' control behind his car does not detract from the fact that he may have been able to access a weapon in his vehicle readily. Because Slater would have been permitted to reenter his vehicle if he had not been arrested, and would have had immediate access to any weapons inside, it was reasonable for Gronstrom to check Slater's vehicle for weapons even though a patdown revealed none on his person. Long, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1221.
Moreover, seizure of the gun from Slater's vehicle was also justified under the plain view doctrine. To seize evidence in plain view without a warrant, an officer must not have violated the Fourth Amendment "in arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed." Horton v. California, 110 L.Ed.2d 112, 123 (1990). In addition, the incriminating nature of the evidence must be immediately apparent. Id. After Slater's car was legitimately stopped and Slater was removed from his vehicle for a justified patdown, the car door was left open. Thereafter, both prongs of the plain view test were satisfied when Gronstrom seized the weapon from Slater's vehicle after viewing it from the street through the open car door.
Once the gun was seized from the vehicle and Slater was lawfully arrested, both he and his car could be subjected to a complete search incident to arrest for both weapons and evidence. New York v. Belton, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, 773 (1981); Chimel v. California, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969).
Because the searches of Slater's person and vehicle were not in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence seized as a result of those searches was properly admitted by the district court. AFFIRMED.
The majority holds that there was reasonable justification for the police to conduct a warrantless search of Slater's vehicle. I disagree with that...
To continue reading
Request your trial