U.S. v. Speights
Decision Date | 23 June 2008 |
Docket Number | Criminal No. 97-0031-WS. |
Citation | 561 F.Supp.2d 1277 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Ricardo SPEIGHTS, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Ricardo Speights' Motion for Reduction of Sentence (doc. 255) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), filed by and through retained counsel. Defendant's filing consists of a six-page motion, nearly 40 pages of exhibits, and a 26-page memorandum of law in support of his § 3582(c)(2) request.
Effective November 1, 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission enacted Amendment 706 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. In general, .and with certain exceptions, Amendment 706 (Amendment 711) operates as a downward ratchet on the penalty structure for crack cocaine offenses to reduce the guideline ranges for particular drug quantities, such that the base offense level associated with a given crack cocaine quantity falls by two levels. The Commission has deemed this amendment to apply retroactively, with an effective date of March 3, 2008. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c); Amendments 712 and 713. Through his motion, defendant seeks to avail himself of the modified guidelines scheme for crack cocaine offenses effectuated by Amendment 706. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the Court is empowered to reduce defendant's sentence under these circumstances. See generally United States v. Armstrong, 347 F.3d 905, 909 (11th Cir.2003) ().
After review of defendant's motion and all relevant factors prescribed by § 1 B 1.10 and Application Note 1(B) to same, the Court has determined that a reduction of sentence based on the amended guideline range may be appropriate in this case. Defendant's original guidelines range was 235 to 293 months, and the late District Judge Vollmer imposed a low-end sentence of 235 months. According to the revised guidelines calculation prepared by the United States Probation Office, defendant's new guidelines range is 188 to 235 months after retroactive application of Amendment 706. Imposing a similar low-end sentence in this case would result in a sentence of 188 months, a reduction of 47 months (or fully 20% of the original sentence). Unless either party files a written objection on or before July 23, 2008, the Court will enter an order reducing defendant's term of imprisonment to 188 months.
Speights' voluminous filings seek a much deeper cut in his sentence. Indeed, defendant attempts to parlay the very limited relief authorized by Amendment 706, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 into a reduced sentence of 120 months (a 115-month reduction, or a staggering 49% of the original sentence), which would equate to time served and render him eligible for immediate release. Such an expansive modification is unambiguously proscribed by the applicable statutory scheme.
The law is clear that a sentencing court generally "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 2005) (); United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th Cir.1997) (). By statute, a sentencing court may modify a term of imprisonment only (1) upon motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, (2) to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35, or (3) in certain limited circumstances where a sentencing guidelines range has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also United States v. McGranahan, 168 Fed.Appx. 934, 935-36 (11th Cir.2006) ( ). The first two possibilities do not apply here; therefore, the Court's power to modify Speights' sentence originates exclusively from § 3582(c)(2), which provides in relevant part that "in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission ... the court may reduce the term of imprisonment ... if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added). Simply stated, then, "[a]ny retroactive reduction in sentence subsequent to a motion filed under § 3582(c)(2) must be consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Armstrong, 347 F.3d at 907 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
The applicable Sentencing Commission policy statement in this case is found at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, which provides that retroactive application of Amendment 706 ( ) is available via § 3582(c)(2) motion. But that same policy statement explicitly provides that, in applying Amendment 706, "the court shall substitute only [Amendment 706] for the corresponding guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(l). Furthermore, subject to an exception that is inapplicable here, that policy statement forbids district courts from reducing a sentence below the newly-calculated amended guideline range. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (). After factoring in the two-level reduction permitted by Amendment 706, the minimum of the amended guideline range for Speights is 188 months, which is precisely the sentence that the Court proposes to impose in this case. The Sentencing Commission's policy statements (by which this Court is bound in any sentence modification awarded under § 3582(c)(2)) expressly preclude the undersigned from awarding any further sentence reduction to Speights. In short, the Court is proposing to grant Speights the maximum relief allowed under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), reducing his sentence to the outer limits of its jurisdiction under § 3582(c)(2).
Speights' rejoinder to the foregoing is to ask the Court to strike down U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 as unconstitutional or to construe it as advisory only, notwithstanding the absolute language in § 3582(c)(2) that any sentence reduction must be consistent with the applicable policy statement (in this case, § 1B1.10). Defendant's argument rests on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and particularly that case's determination that the United States Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, rather than mandatory. See United States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir.2008) (). Speights theorizes that the limits on sentence reductions expressed in the Sentencing Commission's applicable policy statements have the effect of rendering the Guidelines mandatory, thereby running afoul of Booker.
After careful consideration of Speights' arguments, the undersigned concludes that § 1B1.10 does not contravene Booker. Four considerations inform this decision. First, and fundamentally, a § 3582(c)(2) sentence modification proceeding is discretionary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) ( )(emphasis added); United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780 (11th Cir.2000) (); United States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756, 760 (11th Cir.1998) (). A court is not required to provide any § 3582(c)(2) modification for even an eligible defendant, but instead must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to assess whether a reduction is warranted and, if so, to what extent. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) ( ); Bravo, 203 F.3d at 781 (). To frame this process (which can only redound to a defendant's benefit and never to his detriment) as some sort of mandatory undertaking that might trigger Sixth Amendment concerns under Booker is inaccurate.
Second, it is well-established that outside, the 7-day window for correcting clear error pursuant to Rule 35(a), Fed. R.Crim.P., "there exists no `inherent authority' for a district court to modify a sentence." United States v. Diaz-Clark, 292 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir.2002). Rather, the Court's power to reduce Speights' sentence is derived exclusively from Congress, which has seen fit to confer such power via 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). But Congress elected not to equip the district courts with unbounded authority to reduce sentences as much as they wish whenever they wish. See Bravo, 203 F.3d at 781 (...
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