U.S. v. Stanley, No. 90-1239

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
Writing for the CourtBefore CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and SELYA; LEVIN H. CAMPBELL
Citation915 F.2d 54
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Dennis G. STANLEY, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
Docket NumberNo. 90-1239
Decision Date31 July 1990

Page 54

915 F.2d 54
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Dennis G. STANLEY, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 90-1239.
United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.
Heard July 31, 1990.
Decided Oct. 4, 1990.

Charles P. McGinty, Federal Defender Office, for defendant, appellant.

Duane J. Deskins, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Wayne A. Budd, U.S. Atty., was on brief, for U.S.

Before CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, and SELYA, Circuit Judge.

LEVIN H. CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Stanley appeals from his conviction in the district court. Stanley entered a conditional plea of guilty to a two count indictment charging him with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), and with possessing an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(d). Having pleaded guilty, he reserved his right to appeal issues related to his initial stop and arrest on July 2, 1988. Stanley contends that the officers lacked the requisite articulable suspicion required by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to justify the stop and that the scope of the officer's actions was not reasonable under the circumstances. Because the district court's fact-finding was not clearly erroneous and the record supports its conclusion that the officers' actions met the Terry standards, we affirm the conviction.

BACKGROUND

On Saturday, July 2, 1988, Officers Barry D. Souza and Mark A. Delaney, undercover agents with the Barnstable Police Department, were on patrol in an unmarked cruiser in the town of Hyannis, Massachusetts. At approximately 12:15 a.m., they proceeded to a parking lot abutting

Page 55

a free-standing bar. The parking lot is situated between the rear parking lot of a Sheraton Hotel and an auto parts store. Driving through the parking area, which was full of cars, Officer Souza noticed a grey Ford Thunderbird parked between two other cars. He observed the sole occupant, later identified as defendant Stanley, sitting in the driver's seat in a crouched position, "leaning towards the console, towards the passenger's seat, head down." Officer Souza also saw a faint light coming from the center console area of the vehicle. These observations, in addition to his knowledge that the area was a high-crime area, led Souza to suspect that the occupant of the car might be engaged in drug-related activity.

The detectives stopped their cruiser twenty feet behind and to the side of Stanley's car. As Officer Souza left the cruiser and approached the defendant's car, he saw the defendant turn his head towards the rear of the car and then lean towards the passenger seat. The officer suspected that Stanley had seen him approaching and was trying to hide narcotics. Officer Souza walked to the driver's side of the car and, while shining a flashlight on Stanley, shouted, "Police, freeze." The defendant recoiled from the officer and quickly reached back toward the passenger seat. Officer Souza testified later that he knew from experience that persons engaged in narcotics activities often carry firearms and that he feared that the defendant was attempting to reach one. When Stanley lunged to his right, Officer Souza opened the door on the driver's side and pulled defendant from the vehicle. As he did so, he saw a shotgun lying across the passenger seat.

After Stanley was secured, the officers noticed a red plastic cup of water positioned on the car's center console, and the protective cap of a hypodermic syringe needle on the passenger seat. They also found a folded paper containing a small amount of cocaine. Stanley was arrested for possession of a loaded sawed-off shotgun, drug paraphernalia and cocaine.

Stanley moved to suppress, as fruit of the allegedly unlawful search and seizure, the items seized from his person and motor vehicle by the arresting officers, as well as certain statements he made to them thereafter. The district court denied the motion.

ANALYSIS

The constitutionality of the officers' stop and search must be evaluated according to the now familiar two-prong test articulated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. Determining that the Fourth Amendment regulates but does not prohibit temporary detentions that fall short of a full-scale arrest, the Court in Terry held that such encounters must be justified by reasonable suspicion proportional to the degree of intrusion. Thus, in reviewing the reasonableness of a Terry stop, the court must first consider whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and, second, whether the action taken was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889). The circumstances "are not to be dissected and viewed singly; rather they must be considered as a whole." United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 111 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3191, 96 L.Ed.2d 679 (1987).

A. The Original Investigation.

Before applying the two-prong Terry test, we must...

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61 practice notes
  • U.S. v. Ramos, Cr. No. 04-10198-MLW.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • 29 Agosto 2008
    ...the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 55 (1st Cir.1990). "This means ... that [any] stop must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity." Unite......
  • Aldrich v. Town of Milton, Civil Action No. 09–11282–JLT.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • 24 Julio 2012
    ...uncommon in police work, nor is it violative of any statutory or constitutional restrictions on police power. See, e.g., U.S. v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 55 (1 Cir., 1990) (“The Fourth Amendment, of course, does not prevent police from engaging in investigatory activities, including observatio......
  • Flowers v. Fiore, No. 03-1170.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • 25 Febrero 2004
    ...circumstances justifying the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 55 (1st Cir.1990). The Supreme Court has explained that the question of reasonableness requires a court to "balance[] the nature and qualit......
  • U.S. v. Paleo, Nos. 90-1598
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • 18 Agosto 1992
    ..."clandestine transaction," assessed in light of officer's experience and training, justified Terry search); United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 56-57 (1st Cir.1990) (similar); United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir.1988) (similar), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 8......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
61 cases
  • U.S. v. Ramos, Cr. No. 04-10198-MLW.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • 29 Agosto 2008
    ...the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 55 (1st Cir.1990). "This means ... that [any] stop must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity." Unite......
  • Flowers v. Fiore, No. 03-1170.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • 25 Febrero 2004
    ...circumstances justifying the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 55 (1st Cir.1990). The Supreme Court has explained that the question of reasonableness requires a court to "balance[] the nature and qualit......
  • Aldrich v. Town of Milton, Civil Action No. 09–11282–JLT.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Massachusetts
    • 24 Julio 2012
    ...uncommon in police work, nor is it violative of any statutory or constitutional restrictions on police power. See, e.g., U.S. v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 55 (1 Cir., 1990) (“The Fourth Amendment, of course, does not prevent police from engaging in investigatory activities, including observatio......
  • U.S. v. Paleo, Nos. 90-1598
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • 18 Agosto 1992
    ..."clandestine transaction," assessed in light of officer's experience and training, justified Terry search); United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 56-57 (1st Cir.1990) (similar); United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir.1988) (similar), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 8......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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