U.S. v. State of Miss., LAUREL-JONES
| Decision Date | 22 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | 90-1353,LAUREL-JONES,Nos. 90-1184,s. 90-1184 |
| Citation | 921 F.2d 604 |
| Parties | 64 Ed. Law Rep. 1020 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, et al., Defendants-Appellees. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, and Laurel-Jones County Branch of the N.A.A.C.P., Manuel Jones, Jr., Felicia Wheeler, Kelly Anderson and Tabitha Anderson, Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASSOCIATION FOR EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, et al., Defendants. CITY OF LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF LAUREL SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION and Jones County School Board of Education, Defendants-Appellees, v.COUNTY BRANCH OF the NAACP, Manuel Jones, Jr., Felicia Wheeler, Kelly Anderson and Tabitha Anderson, Intervening Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Miriam S. Eisenstein, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Richard L. Yoder and W.M. Deavors, Laurel, Miss., for Laurel Mun.
Dalton McBee, Jr. and Anita C. Clinton, Asst. Attys. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss., for State of Miss.
Michael Adelman, Adelman & Steiner, Hattiesburg, Miss. and Joyce Knox, Gen. Counsel, NAACP, Baltimore, Md., for Laurel-Jones County Branch of NAACP, et als.
Terry L. Caves, Caves & Caves, Laurel, Miss., for Jones County School Dist.
Franklin C. McKenzie, Jr., Laurel, Miss., for City of Laurel, Miss.
Richard L. Yoder, Laurel, Miss., for Laurel School Dist.
Moran M. Pope, III, Hattiesburg, Miss., for Ass'n for Excellence in Educ.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Before WISDOM, GEE, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
Today we address two cases consolidated on appeal. In the first, the United States demands interdistrict relief to remedy the allegedly segregative effect of various actions taken by the State of Mississippi and by two school districts. We conclude that the district court's findings are not clearly erroneous and that they provide a sufficient basis for us to review the district court's decision; thus, we must affirm the district court's denial of interdistrict relief.
In the second case, the NAACP seeks the attorney fees denied it by the district court. We conclude that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the district court did not abuse its discretion; accordingly, we affirm its denial of attorney fees.
This appeal involves several state-created entities--the City of Laurel, Mississippi; Jones County, Mississippi; the Laurel School District; and the Jones County School District. Territorially, the Laurel School District coincides with the City of Laurel. Laurel, in turn, is surrounded by Jones County and the Jones County School District. Both school districts are subject to ordered or agreed desegregation plans stemming from a 1970 desegregation action filed by the United States against the State of Mississippi (No. 4706 S.D.Miss.). Both desegregation plans contained a Singleton provision. 1 Generally speaking, the Singleton provisions prohibit transfers to or from either district on a discriminatory basis, as well as transfers that have the cumulative effect of separating the races or reinforcing a dual school system.
This factual story commences in December 1987, when the City of Laurel filed an annexation petition that would have effectively transferred territory and students from the Jones County School District to the Laurel School District. The Laurel School District removed the action to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 2 After a disputed hearing--one of which we have no transcript and (allegedly) to which neither the United States nor the State of Mississippi were parties--the United States Magistrate ordered that the Laurel and Jones County school districts be consolidated.
On motion by the United States, Judge Tom S. Lee combined the annexation petition proceeding with the original desegregation suit. Judge Lee allowed the NAACP and the Association for Excellence in Education to intervene and joined the Jones County Board of Education. Judge Lee then considered de novo the matter of consolidating the Jones County and Laurel school districts.
Realizing that consolidation was appropriate only if the United States could show an interdistrict violation, Judge Lee held a liability trial in June 1989. The United States, the Association for Excellence in Education, the City of Laurel, and the Laurel School District sought consolidation of the districts. The State of Mississippi, the NAACP, and the Jones County School District opposed consolidation. The hearing concluded, Judge Lee found no interdistrict violation and vacated the consolidation order. 719 F.Supp. 1364. The United States appeals.
On appeal, the United States contends that the district court abused its discretion by not entering specific findings respecting the segregative effect and intent of certain legislative and political actions taken by the State of Mississippi: The United States points to three instances of alleged discriminatory legislative and political action (1) amending state law specifically to impede any attempt to expand the Laurel School District by annexation; (2) abandoning a plan to consolidate school districts after the Education Finance Commission recommended consolidating the Laurel and Jones County districts; and (3) issuing an attorney general's opinion authorizing any student to attend school in any district where his guardian resides. 3 The United States does not contest the adequacy of the district court's finding that the allegedly fraudulent transfer of students between the Laurel and Jones County districts caused no significant segregative effect. Thus, as briefed, the sole issue before us on the United States' appeal from denial of inter-district relief is the sufficiency of the district court's findings respecting the State of Mississippi's legislative and political actions.
We review the correctness of findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2781, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 498 & n. 4 (5th Cir.1987) Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Respecting sufficiency of findings, we have noted that the findings "must be expressed with sufficient particularity to allow us to determine rather than speculate that the law has been correctly applied." Hydrospace-Challenger, Inc. v. Tracor/MAS, Inc., 520 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir.1975); see also Otto Candies, Inc. v. M/V Madeline D, 721 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir.1983).
The federal courts may impose a desegregation remedy only if a constitutional violation is shown, and then the remedy is limited by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). The United States has requested interdistrict relief; therefore, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974), supplies the applicable standard. In Milliken, the Supreme Court explained:
Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent school district or where the district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. In such circumstances an interdistrict remedy would be appropriate to eliminate the interdistrict segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation. Conversely, without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.
Id. at 744-45, 94 S.Ct. at 3126-28; see also Lee v. Lee County Board of Education, 639 F.2d 1243, 1261 (5th Cir.1981). Milliken imposes a two step analysis (1) effect--has the complained of state or local act had a segregative effect across district lines; and (2) intent--was the complained of act done with segregative intent. Both prongs of the test must be met to justify interdistrict relief.
After hearing five days of testimony, which is transcribed in more than one thousand pages of the record, Judge Lee entered his findings and vacated the magistrate's consolidation order. Among these were findings that
[a]t the time of its 1970 desegregation order, the Laurel School district had a student enrollment of 6073 of which 2833 or 46% were black and 3270 or 54% were white.... [S]tudent enrollment in the Laurel School District has decreased dramatically, from 6073 to 3215, and the percentage ratio differential of whites to blacks in the Laurel schools has steadily widened; as of the 1988-89 school year, 75% of the students enrolled were black and 25% were white.
and
[a]t the time of the Jones County School District's HEW consent agreement, with an enrollment of 8279, the student ratio in the county district was 79% white and 21% black.... [S]tudent enrollment and student ratio in the Jones County School District have remained relatively stable over the years and as of the 1988-89 school year was 8478, 81% white and 19% black.
In addition to his general findings respecting the...
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