US v. State of Miss., Civ. A. No. 4706

• Decision Date: 27 July 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4706,H87-0245(L).
• Citation: 719 F. Supp. 1364
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiffs, and Laurel-Jones County Branch of the NAACP, et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors, v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, et al. (Laurel Municipal Separate School District, et al.), Defendants. CITY OF LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LAUREL SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants, and Laurel Jones County Branch of the NAACP, et al., Defendant-Intervenors.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

719 F. Supp. 1364

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiffs, and Laurel-Jones County Branch of the NAACP, et al., Plaintiff-Intervenors, v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, et al. (Laurel Municipal Separate School District, et al.), Defendants.

CITY OF LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LAUREL SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants, and Laurel Jones County Branch of the NAACP, et al., Defendant-Intervenors.

Civ. A. Nos. 4706, H87-0245(L).

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

July 27, 1989.

Michael Adelman, Alison Steiner, Hattiesburg, Miss., for Laurel-Jones County Branch of NAACP, et al.

Salliann S.M. Daugherty and Diane S. Cohen, Sr. Trial Atty., Educational Opportunities Litigation Sec., Civil Rights Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Charles Victor McTeer, amicus curiae, Greenville, Miss., for Miss. Educ. Ass'n.

Moran M. Pope III, Hattiesburg, Miss., for the AEA.

Sarah E. Deloach, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, Miss.

Terry L. Caves, Laurel, Miss., for Jones County, Laurel City School.

Richard L. Yoder, Laurel, Miss., for Laurel Municipal Sep. School Dist.

Perry Sansing, Brunini, Grantham, Jackson, Miss., for Jones School Dist.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TOM S. LEE, District Judge.

Historically, the Jones County School District and the Laurel Municipal Separate School District (hereinafter Laurel School District) have been maintained as separate public school districts within Jones County, Mississippi. Since 1970, the Laurel School District and the Jones County School District have operated under separate desegregation plans. The Laurel School District has been governed by a court-imposed plan which was adopted in 1970 following the commencement by the United States of Civil Action No. 4706 against the State of Mississippi alleging that certain school districts in the state, including the Laurel School District, had failed to eliminate the dual system of public schools. Initially, the Laurel order adopted a desegregation plan only for the junior and senior high school levels in the Laurel School District. Subsequently, in May 1978, a court-ordered desegregation plan for the elementary schools of the Laurel School District was adopted by this court. Although the Jones County School District was not a defendant in Civil Action No. 4706, that district in 1970 adopted a voluntary desegregation plan pursuant to a determination by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), now the United States Department of Education, that the Jones County schools were not in compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Both the Laurel desegregation order and Jones County's desegregation plan include identical Singleton¹ interdistrict transfer provisions, as follows:

If the school district grants transfers to students living in the district for their attendance at public schools outside the district, or if it permits transfers into the district of students who live outside the district, it will continue to do so on a non-discriminatory basis, except that it shall not consent to transfers where the cumulative effect will reduce desegregation in either district or reinforce the dual school system.

In December of 1987, the City of Laurel filed a petition for annexation in the Jones County Chancery Court alleging, inter alia, that the Jones County School District and the Laurel School District had permitted and encouraged illegal guardianships for school purposes which negatively impacted desegregation in both districts. The city requested that the court adjudicate a constitutional system of public education for all the children of Laurel and Jones County, Mississippi. The case was removed to federal court as Civil Action No. H87-0245(R) upon petition of the Laurel School District in response to which the Jones County Board of Education moved to remand the action to state court.

On August 25, 1988, the United States Magistrate entered an order denying the motion to remand. That order went further, however, and dissolved the Laurel School District and "merged" or consolidated the Laurel district with the Jones County School District. Though none of the parties to that litigation appealed the magistrate's order,² on September 1, 1988, the Laurel-Jones County Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed a motion to intervene in the action, seeking to set aside, alter or amend the magistrate's order. Additionally, the United States filed a motion for a status conference before this court to determine the propriety of the magistrate's order; the government expressed concern that the magistrate had, in disregard of Civil Action No. 4706, dissolved the Laurel School District in a separate action in which neither the United States nor the State of Mississippi were made parties.

Following a February 10, 1989 status conference before this court,³ an agreed order was entered consolidating Civil Action No. H87-0245(R) under the state-wide desegregation case, Civil Action No. 4706; the Jones County School District, both in its former capacity and as the consolidated school district, was joined as a party defendant in Civil Action No. 4706, and the Laurel-Jones County Branch of the NAACP was permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, this court granted permissive intervention to the Association for Excellence In Education (AEE), a Laurel-Jones County nonprofit organization of parents, community and business leaders whose purpose is to promote quality education in Jones County.

Although the court had, after the February status conference, established a schedule for the parties' submission of proposed desegregation plans for the consolidated school district, the court subsequently determined, following a conference with the parties, that the magistrate's order contained insufficient findings upon which to base court-ordered school district consolidation. The court thereafter conducted a liability hearing for the purpose of determining whether there exists a factual and legal basis for the court to order consolidation of the two public school districts in Jones County, the Laurel School District and the Jones County School District.

THE CONTROVERSY

At the time of its 1970 desegregation order, the Laurel School District had a student enrollment of 6073 of which 2833 or 46% were black and 3270 or 54% were white. At the time of the Jones County School District's HEW consent agreement, with an enrollment of 8279, the student ratio in the county district was 79% white and 21% black. While student enrollment and the student ratio in the Jones County School District have remained relatively stable over the years and as of the 1988-89 school year was 8478, 81% white and 19% black,⁴ student enrollment in the Laurel School District has decreased dramatically, from 6073 to 3215, and the percentage ratio differential of whites to blacks in the Laurel schools has steadily widened; as of the 1988-89 school year, 75% of the students enrolled were black and 25% were white.⁵ These figures demonstrate that while the Jones County School District has been racially identifiable as a white district since the time a desegregation plan was adopted in 1970, the Laurel School District has, over time, become increasingly black and is now clearly perceived as a black school district. The question for the court's consideration at this stage is whether the decrease in white enrollment in the city system is attributable to any unconstitutional governmental action and, if so, to what extent such action has impacted desegregation or contributed to segregation between the districts and, based on that determination, whether an interdistrict remedy is appropriate.

Several of the parties to this action, and in particular the City of Laurel, the AEE, the Mississippi Association of Educators (MAE),⁶ and the United States, have expressed their unqualified support for consolidation of the two school districts.⁷ In support of their contention that consolidation is an appropriate remedy, these parties assert that the school districts have in the past and continue in the present to permit, explicitly or implicitly, interdistrict transfers which adversely affect desegregation and contribute to the racial identifiability of schools in both districts. They assert that the continuing decline in white student enrollment in the city schools has resulted from the fact that white students residing in the city attended and continue to attend the county schools, predominantly through the improper use of school guardianships, though also by using false county addresses or by simply enrolling in the county schools. They argue that the districts have evidenced a tacit approval of such improper transfers through their failure to monitor and police transfers into and out of the districts and have perhaps even encouraged improper interdistrict transfers. Conversely, those who oppose consolidation, the Jones County School District and the NAACP, urge that while the districts may have violated their Singleton transfer provisions, the cumulative effect on desegregation has been de minimus and therefore does not support the imposition by this court of an interdistrict remedy; these parties urge that a remedy less intrusive than consolidation is appropriate for any violation which the court may find.

THE REQUISITE SHOWING

Federal remedial power in school desegregation cases may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation; the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Because the remedy requested in this case, consolidation, requires crossing district lines, this court's analysis of the propriety of that remedy is dictated by Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,...