U.S. v. Stevens
| Decision Date | 30 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. SC07-1074.,SC07-1074. |
| Citation | 994 So.2d 1062 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, et al., Appellants, v. Maureen STEVENS, etc., Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has certified the following question of Florida law that is determinative of a cause pending in that court and for which there appears to be no controlling precedent:
Under Florida law, does a laboratory that manufactures, grows, tests or handles ultra-hazardous materials owe a duty of reasonable care to members of the general public to avoid an unauthorized interception and dissemination of the materials, and, if not, is a duty created where a reasonable response is not made where there is a history of such dangerous materials going missing or being stolen?
Stevens v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., 488 F.3d 896, 904 (11th Cir.2007). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we answer the first part of the certified question in the affirmative, and therefore, we need not address the second part.
The Eleventh Circuit outlined the plaintiff's injuries and allegations:
In the fall of 2001, an unknown group or individual mailed letters containing Bacillus Anthracis ("anthrax") to recipients in Florida, New York, and Washington, D.C. One such letter was mailed to American Media, Inc. ("American Media") in Boca Raton, Florida where Robert Stevens ("Mr. Stevens") worked. Mr. Stevens became ill and died after inhaling the anthrax. As a result, two wrongful death suits were brought by Maureen Stevens, his wife, individually, as a personal representative of the estate of Mr. Stevens, and on behalf of their three children (collectively "Stevens"). Stevens sued the United States in federal court and Battelle Memorial Institute ("Battelle"), a private research facility, in state court, alleging that they were the source of the anthrax that killed Mr. Stevens. Battelle removed the state case to federal court and the two suits were consolidated for discovery purposes.
The complaint against the United States, brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq., alleged that the origin of the strain of anthrax that killed Mr. Stevens could be traced to the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases ("USAMRIID") at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The suit alleged further that the government knew it was utilizing an "ultra-hazardous" material requiring the highest degree of care in its handling, storage, use, and possession, and that, as early as 1992, samples of anthrax were missing from USAMRIID. The complaint stated that despite this knowledge, the government failed to provide adequate security for the handling or shipping of the materials, and, as a result, sometime before October 2001 anthrax was improperly intercepted either from USAMRIID or from another research facility to which the materials had been sent. The complaint does not describe the relationship between the government and the person who initially intercepted the anthrax or between the government and the person who eventually mailed the anthrax to American Media.
The complaint against Battelle alleged that Battelle breached its duty of care to Mr. Stevens by failing to implement adequate security procedures at its facility. The suit alleged, inter alia, that Battelle failed to properly maintain the anthrax it was using for research, monitor employees who had access to the anthrax, or secure the facility from unauthorized access. The complaint also alleged that Battelle was negligent in its hiring practices because it failed to conduct background investigations prior to hiring individuals who would have access to anthrax. Finally, the complaint alleged negligent supervision of employees working with anthrax. As a result of these failings, the complaint alleged that anthrax was obtained and sent to American Media.
Stevens, 488 F.3d at 898-99 (footnote omitted).1
The government moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
it could not be liable for any third party criminal activity allegedly occasioned by negligent security practices because it owed no duty of protection to Mr. Stevens, a stranger, and did not have a duty or ability to control the unidentified third party tortfeasor or tortfeasors responsible for intercepting and mailing the anthrax. Reiterating this argument, Battelle moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). Battelle also argued that Stevens could not satisfy the element of proximate cause. Stevens responded to these motions by arguing that the complaint did not allege a claim of failure to control or prevent the mailing of the anthrax by a third party criminal, but, rather, a claim of duty of care "whenever a human endeavor creates a generalized and foreseeable risk of harming others."
Id. at 899. The federal district court denied the government's and Battelle's motions, describing Stevens' claim as falling under Florida's "foreseeable zone of risk" theory and citing this Court's decisions in McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500 (Fla. 1992), and Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 735 (Fla.1989). Stevens, 488 F.3d at 899. The district court examined this theory within the context of the "unreasonable risk of harm by affirmative act" rule embodied in sections 302, 302A, and 302B of the Restatement of the Law of Torts and the special relationship requirement embodied in section 315 of the Restatement. Id. The district court found that the allegations of negligent security sufficiently stated a claim under either section 302B or section 315 of the Restatement to allow the claim to proceed. Id. at 900-01.
The government moved for leave to seek reconsideration, which the district court denied. Stevens, 488 F.3d at 901-02. The court, however, granted the government's request for certification of the order denying the motion to dismiss for interlocutory appeal, certifying a question similar to the one the Eleventh Circuit certified to this Court. Id. at 902. On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the court noted that "[t]he central issue here is what duties exist under Florida law to protect members of the public where an organization creates a significant risk by using anthrax or another ultra-hazardous material." Id. at 903. The court certified the instant question of Florida law to this Court, while observing that Florida case law imposes limits on negligence liability, but "it fails to fit neatly into the complex factual pattern at hand." Id.
Preliminarily, we note that this case involves a claim of negligence, which we have explained consists of four components:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the [defendant] to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on the [defendant's] part to conform to the standard required: a breach of the duty....
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury. This is what is commonly known as "legal cause," or "proximate cause," and which includes the notion of cause in fact.
4. Actual loss or damage....
Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So.2d 1182, 1185 (Fla.2004) (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, at 164-65 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed.1984)). In certifying a question to this Court, the court of appeals has asked us to focus on the duty component of our negligence analysis as it may apply to allegations set out in the federal complaint.2
In McCain, this Court explained that the duty element ordinarily arises from four potential sources: "(1) legislative enactments or administration regulations; (2) judicial interpretations of such enactments or regulations; (3) other judicial precedent; and (4) a duty arising from the general facts of the case." 593 So.2d at 503 n. 2 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 285 (1965)).
In this case, it appears that the claimant is asserting that a duty arises from the general facts of the claim as alleged in the complaint. In McCain, we explained that the determination of the existence of a common law duty flowing from the general facts of the case depends upon an evaluation and application of the concept of foreseeability of harm to the circumstances alleged, which is a threshold question of law. See id. at 502-04. We have explained, where a person's conduct is such that it creates a "foreseeable zone of risk" posing a general threat of harm to others, a legal duty will ordinarily be recognized to ensure that the underlying threatening conduct is carried out reasonably. Id. at 503. We have also explained that as a general proposition the greater the risk of harm to others that is created by a person's chosen activity, the greater the burden or duty to avoid injury to others becomes. "Thus, as the risk grows greater, so does the duty, because the risk to be perceived defines the duty that must be undertaken." Id. at 503 (citing J.G. Christopher...
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