U.S. v. Straub

• Decision Date: 29 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-14354.,06-14354.
• Citation: 508 F.3d 1003
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Glenn F. STRAUB, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

508 F.3d 1003

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Glenn F. STRAUB, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-14354.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

November 29, 2007.

Jay A. Gayoso, Miami, FL, for Straub.

Emily M. Smachetti, Anne R. Schultz, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kathleen M. Salyer, Miami, FL, for U.S.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before ANDERSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and VINING,^* District Judge.

PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

Glenn Straub appeals his conviction of criminal contempt for violating a court order that prohibited his presence on the premises of Broward Yachts while an unfinished hull that belonged to Seagrove Trading, Inc., was removed from the premises. See 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). Straub argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because the order was not lawful and reasonably specific and any violation of the order was not willful. Before reaching the merits, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction over the charge of criminal contempt even though the court that issued the order lacked maritime jurisdiction over the underlying controversy about the unfinished hull. We reject Straub's arguments on the merits, because the evidence that he refused to leave the premises after a deputy marshal read to Straub the relevant portion of the order was sufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Glenn Straub was the president of Broward Yachts, Inc., which provided dockage, storage, and haul-out services for a partially completed yacht known as Destiny Hull that was owned by Seagrove Trading, Inc. Broward Yachts filed an in rem action against the hull to recover unpaid fees. On June 23, 2003, the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the unfinished hull did not qualify as a vessel for the purpose of invoking maritime jurisdiction, and we affirmed. Broward Yachts v. Vessel Known as Destiny Hull, 107 Fed.Appx. 183 (11th Cir.2004) (unpublished table decision).

On March 6, 2003, before the district court dismissed the suit, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the hull. On March 19, 2003, the district court ordered the release of the hull in return for a bond posted by Seagrove. Because the parties could not agree on the terms and logistics of the transfer, the district court issued a series of orders clarifying the obligations of the parties. On April 15, 2003, the district court issued an order that outlined the procedure for the transfer and prohibited Straub's presence on the premises during the removal:

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Broward shall make the Travelift available to Seagrove's Contractors, at such time as they can again be mobilized, for use in moving Hull No. 4 from Broward's shed into the water. Seagrove may also use cranes, trucks or other equipment necessary to assist in the removal of the hull, engines, and any of its other property still located on Broward's premises, and Broward shall provide Seagrove's Contractors full access to its premises, including the launching facilities, for such purposes. Upon placement of Hull No. 4 in the water, Seagrove will be responsible for towing Hull No. 4 to another location of its choosing. Seagrove will provide Mega Marine and Broward twenty four hours' written notice of its intent to use the Travelift.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal is hereby directed to use such force as may be necessary to ensure that Seagrove's Contractors have the unobstructed use of the Travelift and have unobstructed access to Broward's premises and the launching facilities as ordered herein until Hull No. 4, the engines, and Seagrove's other property are removed from Broward's premises, and to prevent any party, third party, or other person or entity from interfering with, or otherwise obstructing or preventing the move from taking place when Seagrove's Contractors are mobilized.

. . . .

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Glenn Straub shall not interfere in any manner with the removal of Hull No. 4 and Seagrove's other property, and shall not be present on Broward's premises during the removal.

The hull was removed from Broward's property on April 18, 2003. While the hull was in the water secured to a slip, Straub arrived at the facility. Deputy United States Marshal Jerome Retto read to Straub the relevant portions of the order that prohibited Straub's presence on the premises. Retto told Straub that he would be held in contempt if he remained on the property and that, if he was arrested, he could not bring personal property with him. Straub then entered the Broward Yachts building to leave his personal effects. When Straub returned, Retto told Straub that he could avoid arrest if he waited in the parking lot. Straub refused to leave and was arrested.

After a bench trial before a magistrate judge, Straub was convicted of criminal contempt. Straub appealed the judgment to the district court, and the district court affirmed. The district court concluded that (1) Straub had failed to preserve for appeal his arguments about (a) the lawfulness of the underlying order and the applicability of the collateral bar rule and (b) the specificity of the term "premises"; (2) the order was reasonably specific; and (3) Straub violated the order willfully.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

To review the sufficiency of the evidence that supports an order of criminal contempt, we determine whether the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the government, permits a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1281-82 (11th Cir.2001). When the defendant does not preserve an argument for appeal, we review for plain error, United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1221-22 (11th Cir.2007), which requires the petitioner to establish (1) that there was error (2) that was plain; (3) that affected his substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding. Brough v. Imperial Sterling Ltd., 297 F.3d 1172, 1180 (11th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Humphrey, 164 F.3d 585, 588 n. 3 (11th Cir.1999)). An error is plain if it is "clear" or "obvious." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).

III. DISCUSSION

Our discussion is divided in two parts. First, we consider sua sponte whether the district court had jurisdiction over the charge of criminal contempt even though the court that issued the order lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy. We hold that the district court had jurisdiction over the charge of criminal contempt. Second, we consider Straub's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the government did not establish that the order was lawful and reasonably specific and that he willfully violated the order. We conclude that Straub's arguments fail, and we affirm.

A. The District Court Had Jurisdiction over the Charge of Criminal Contempt.

Before we consider the merits of the appeal, we address sua sponte whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a charge of criminal contempt based on the violation of an order issued by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy. See Eagerton v. Valuations, Inc., 698 F.2d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir.1983). At our request, the parties addressed this issue in their oral arguments. We conclude that, notwithstanding the ultimate dismissal of the underlying controversy for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court had jurisdiction over the charge of criminal contempt.

The Supreme Court has held that a district court may impose sanctions, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, for conduct that occurred during a proceeding in which the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992), and the two-fold reasoning of that decision is instructive. First, the Willy Court explained that, because the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions did not require an assessment of the legal merits of the complaint, the district court did not adjudicate a controversy over which it lacked jurisdiction when it imposed the sanctions. Id. at 138, 112 S.Ct. at 1080-81. Second, the Court distinguished Rule 11 sanctions from civil contempt, which requires subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy. Id. at 138-39, 112 S.Ct. at 1081; see also U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76-80, 108 S.Ct. 2268, 2270-73 (1988). Civil contempt is remedial and aims to force compliance with an order of the court. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498 (1911). The punishment for civil contempt continues until the contemnor chooses to comply with the order. Id. at 442, 31 S.Ct. at 498. Rule 11 sanctions, in contrast, are punitive. Willy, 503 U.S. at 139, 112 S.Ct. at 1081. Their purpose is to punish a party who has already violated the rules of the court. Id.

The difference in purpose between a sanction for civil contempt and a punitive sanction under Rule 11 determines whether the absence of subject matter jurisdiction in the underlying proceeding affects the validity of the sanction. The interest of the court in levying sanctions for civil contempt disappears if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because the purpose of civil contempt is to force compliance with an order. Id. The interest of the court in imposing punitive sanctions under Rule 11 does not disappear if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because the court retains an interest in parties' obedience to its authority. Id.

Both aspects of the reasoning of Willy apply to Straub's conviction for criminal contempt. First, as with Rule 11 sanctions, the...