U.S. v. Tavares
Citation | 100 F.3d 995,321 U.S. App. D.C. 381 |
Decision Date | 26 November 1996 |
Docket Number | Nos. 92-3095,94-3022 and 95-3053,s. 92-3095 |
Parties | United States of America, Appellee v. Ronald Michael Tavares, Appellant |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 91cr00486-01)
L. Barrett Boss, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause, for appellant. A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, was on brief. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Washington DC, entered an appearance.
Anne E. Pings, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause, for appellee. Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief. Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, DC, entered an appearance.
Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Rogers, Circuit Judges.
Ronald Tavares appeals his conviction on one count of possessing lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section(s) 841(a)(1), and the district court's denial of his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 2255 to vacate his resulting sentence. He does not challenge his conviction on a second count involving a smaller amount of LSD. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in that his trial counsel failed to take the proper steps to preserve his right to testify in his own defense, which right he relinquished due to his poor health during the trial. The district court applied the analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and concluded that Tavares was not prejudiced by his failure to testify. We affirm.
On June 12, 1991, in his Washington, D.C. apartment, Tavares sold 1,000 doses of LSD to William Denford (Denford), an undercover detective, for $1,000. Tavares and Denford subsequently agreed to a second transaction, in which Tavares was to give Denford cash and more LSD in exchange for marijuana, to take place the following week.
On June 21, Tavares and Denford met at a restaurant in Baltimore. During the course of their conversation, which was captured on audiotape, Tavares stated "I got plenty" of doses of LSD and "you get the lightning bolts and then there's more of the green ying-yangs [sic] .... green yangs just came in .... they laid a thousand at a time." Tavares's accomplice, Hans Howarth (Howarth), went outside with Denford and, at Tavares's direction, gave the detective $3,750 and 100 doses of LSD in exchange for 17 pounds of marijuana. Denford and his fellow agents promptly arrested Tavares and Howarth.
Denford and the other agents then returned to Washington to execute a search warrant for Tavares's apartment. They discovered 141 doses of LSD configured in a "bug design" in Tavares's bedroom and 8,440 doses in a yin-yang design hidden in a record album cover in the living room. Tavares was ultimately indicted by superseding indictment on one count of LSD distribution (for the June 12 sale) and one count of LSD possession with intent to distribute (for the LSD found in his apartment on June 21).1
Problems developed with his appointed counsel, Robert Werdig (Werdig), almost immediately. As a result of Werdig's failure to meet with him, Tavares asked for new counsel but withdrew that request after Werdig finally arranged a brief meeting. According to Tavares, he and Werdig agreed that he would testify but did not discuss his testimony. Werdig apparently attempted to build a selective prosecution defense but also put on some evidence of a straightforward exculpatory nature. For example, the only defense witness-Tavares's girlfriend, Denise Helou (Helou)-testified that she had never seen record albums or a record player in Tavares's apartment before and that Tavares's younger brother and another man, Joe Johnson (Johnson), had unrestricted access to the apartment.
Before calling Helou, Werdig informed the court that Tavares "might wish to take the stand but that he could not do it today, that his state of physical well-being is not such that he feels strong enough to commence his testimony at this time."2 App. 73. The court recessed for the day after Helou's testimony. Tavares's health grew worse overnight and by morning he felt physically unable to testify. Before court reconvened that morning, Werdig advised Tavares not to testify but did not advise him that he could seek a continuance until his health improved. Tavares agreed.
Werdig then informed the court that Tavares had decided not to testify and rested his case. Tavares was convicted on both counts. Tavares's health continued to decline, requiring him to go to the hospital two days later. He suffered from a variety of symptoms and was diagnosed with an inflammation, and possible abscess, of his hip muscles. His doctor stated in an affidavit that in his opinion Tavares "would not have been well enough to focus and participate effectively" in his trial. App. 236.
Tavares argues that his counsel's failure to take appropriate measures in light of his health problems effectively deprived him of his right to testify. As the district court correctly noted, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides the appropriate framework for assessing such a claim. See, e.g., Payne v. United States, 78 F.3d 343, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1996); Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1993); Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1992).
Applying Strickland's two-part analysis, Tavares argues that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard and there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different absent the deficiency. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. With regard to his counsel's performance, Tavares points to Werdig's initial failure to arrange a meeting, Werdig's failure to discuss Tavares's testimony when they finally did meet and the brevity (15 minutes) of that meeting. He emphasizes Werdig's failure to seek a continuance or take other appropriate action when it should have been obvious that Tavares was physically unable to testify as well as Werdig's flawed advice regarding the scope and impact of his cross-examination.3 Although it does not expressly concede that Werdig's performance was inadequate, the government does not contest Tavares's arguments on this point.4 The only question before us thus is whether Tavares was prejudiced by his counsel's actions-specifically by Werdig's failure to ensure that Tavares had an opportunity to testify.
Although not speaking in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the defendant's testimony in his own defense. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961) ( ); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (). The defendant's testimony gives the jury the opportunity to assess his demeanor and credibility. See Nichols, 953 F.2d at 1553; United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985). And in a case where the fact of the crime is conceded but the defendant's involvement is the disputed issue, the defendant's testimony "must be considered of prime importance."5 Walker, 772 F.2d at 1179; see also Nichols, 953 F.2d at 1553.
We believe, however, that it would be unwise to adopt, as Tavares urges upon us, a rule under which defense counsel's performance resulting in the denial of the defendant's right to testify constitutes prejudice per se. In some cases, the defendant's testimony would have no impact, or even a negative impact, on the result of his trial. See, e.g., Payne, 78 F.3d at 346 ( ); see also Ortega v. O'Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 262 (7th Cir.) (, )cert. denied, 488 U.S. 841 (1988); Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971, 974 (5th Cir. 1977) (, )aff'd en banc, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978). But see United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145, 1148 (D. Me. 1986) ( ). A more reasonable approach, and one in keeping with Strickland's two-part test, is to continue to assign special significance to the defendant's precluded right to testify and at the same time to inquire whether it is reasonably probable that the defendant's testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial in his favor.
To assess whether prejudice occurred in this case, we assume (as the district court's order and the government's brief do) that absent his counsel's actions Tavares would have testified and that his testimony would have been as he describes in the affidavit accompanying his reply to the government's opposition to his section 2255 motion. See United States v. Green, 680 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210 (1983). Tavares states that he would have denied ownership (and knowledge) of the record albums found in his...
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