U.S. v. Taveras

• Decision Date: 29 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-CR-156 (JBW).,04-CR-156 (JBW).
• Citation: 436 F.Supp.2d 493
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Humberto Pepin TAVERAS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

Page 493

436 F.Supp.2d 493

UNITED STATES of America v. Humberto Pepin TAVERAS, Defendant.

No. 04-CR-156 (JBW).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

June 29, 2006.

United States Attorney's Office, by Lee Freedman, Morris Fodeman, Brooklyn, NY, for United States.

Freeman, Nooter & Ginsberg, by Louis Freeman, Lewis & Fiore by David Lewis, New York, NY, for Defendant.

OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

                I. Introduction ................................................................ 495
                II. Proposed Superceding Indictment Under Title 18 Capital Sentencing
                      Procedures Instead of Former Title 21 Capital Sentencing Procedures        496
                    A. Facts..............................................................       496
                    B. Effect of Repeal of Title 21 Capital Procedures....................       497
                    C. Ex Post Facto Prohibition .........................................       497
                    D. Title 18 Provisions Are Not More Onerous Than Those of Title 21 ...       498
                       1. Jury Sentencing ................................................       499
                       2. Evidentiary Standards ..........................................       501
                       3. Jury Instructions ..............................................       502
                    E. Ruling on Re-Indictment ...........................................       502
                III. Proposed Amendment of Death Notice to Allege Child Endangerment .....       502
                IV.  Reciprocal Discovery and Notice of Mitigating Factors ...............       503
                 V.  Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire ........................................       503
                VI.  Limiting Press Access to Voir Dire ..................................       504
                     A. Distribution of Blank Jury Questionnaires ........................       504
                     B. Presence During Voir Dire ........................................       505
                     C. Presence During Hardship Applications ............................       505
                VII. Prospective Jurors' and Witnesses' Addresses ........................       505
                VIII. Presence at Sidebars ...............................................       508
                IX. Admission of Prior Testimony .........................................       508
                    A. Unavailability ....................................................       508
                    B. Prior Cross-Examination ...........................................       510
                X. Exclusion of Unduly Prejudicial Evidence at Penalty Phase .............       511
                   A. Prejudice and Probative Value: Guilt Phase .........................       513
                   B. Prejudice and Probative Value: Penalty Phase .......................       514
                   C. Exclusion of. Post-Mortem Evidence .................................       515
                XI. Daubert Hearing on Expert Evidence of Future Dangerousness ...........       516
                XII. Conclusion ..........................................................       517
                

I. Introduction

In this action the government seeks a death sentence against defendant for the murder of two of his drug dealing associates committed during their drug conspiracy. At a series of pretrial hearings a number of motions were made by the parties. They are discussed and decided below.

In a matter of first impression, the court first considers the application of the ex post facto clause in capital drug cases following Congress' elimination of special capital drug crime procedures. See Part II, infra.

II. Proposed Superceding Indictment Under Title 18 Capital Case Procedures Instead of Former Title 21 Capital Case Procedures

The original indictment in this prosecution was based upon capital case procedures found in title 21 of the United States Code. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)-(n). Title 21 deals with drug offenses. The government proposes to recharge under title 18 capital case procedures. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591 et seq. Title 18 deals with crimes and criminal procedure generally.

[1] Defendant contends that this shift in procedures would constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Constit. Art. I § 9 cl. 3. As indicated below, defendant's claim is rejected. The government may supercede and prosecute using the general case procedures of title 18.

A. Facts

Count One of the present indictment reads as follows:

On or about September 17, 1992, within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, the defendant HUMBERTO PEPIN TAVERAS, also known as "Tony" and "Luis Rosario," while engaged in an offense punishable under Section 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 of the United States Code, to wit: conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one or more controlled substances, which offense involved (a) five kilograms or more of a substance containing cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, and (b) one kilogram or more of a substance containing heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, did knowingly and intentionally kill and cause the intentional killing of another person, to wit: Jose Rosario, also known as "Barrigita," and such killing did result.

(Title 21, United States Code, Section 848(e)(1)(A); Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3551 et seq.)

Super. Indict. 1-2. Count Three charges defendant with the same conduct in connection with the 1995 murder of Carlos Madrid. Count Two has already been stricken for violation of the ex post facto clause. See United States v. Taveras, 401 F.Supp.2d 304 (E.D.N.Y.2005).

Section 848(e)(1)(A) of title 21—the referent in the indictment—reads:

any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) of this title or section 960(b)(1) of this title who intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death ...

21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). Section 841(b)(1)(A) criminalizes possession with intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin and more than five kilograms of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Conspiracy to possess is punished as actual possession. 21 U.S.C. § 846. Prior to March 9, 2006, a defendant charged with capital murder under section 848(e) was prosecuted under capital case procedures set forth in sections 848(h)-(n) of title 21.

On March 9, 2006 Congress repealed the capital case procedures under section 848 of title 21 (the "Anti-Drug Abuse Act," or "ADAA"). See Pub.L. 109-177, § 221 (repealing subsections 848(g) through (p) (q)(1)-(3), and (r)). Nothing in the legislative history indicates the purpose of the repeal. See H.R.Rep. No. 109-174 (2005) (no mention of changes to death penalty procedures). Yet the purpose of the elimination of special title 21 capital case provisions for drug cases in favor of title 18 procedures applicable to all capital crimes was—it may be safely assumed—to rationalize and simplify federal criminal procedure. A single trans-substantive procedure applying to all capital cases results in easier amendment, more precise and fuller case law development, and more uniform practice in the complex area of capital prosecutions. It is a simplification easily justified and should be welcomed by bench and bar.

After this repeal, sections 3591 et seq. of title 18 (the "Federal Death Penalty Act," or "FDPA") are the only source of capital procedures in the federal code. It is defendant's position that re-indictment and prosecution under title 18 would violate the ex post facto clause because the crimes alleged predate FDPA's enactment and because the change in procedures would impair his substantive rights.

B. Effect of Repeal of Title 21 Capital Procedures

Repeal of the title 21 ADAA capital case procedures does not free defendant from potential liability for the charged crimes. See 1 U.S.C. § 109 ("The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide . ..."). The substantive offense, murder during the course of a drug conspiracy, remains in effect. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). Nor would re-indictment expose defendant to liability for any new crime.

The basic issue posed by the parties is whether the change should be characterized as strictly procedural, not subject to ex post facto objection.

Subsection (a) of section 3591 of title 18 permits the government to seek the execution of a person who has been convicted of: "(1) an offense described in section 794 or section 2381; or (2) any other offense for which a sentence of death is provided . . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a). Clause (1) refers to statutes penalizing delivery of defense information to aid a foreign government, and treason. Clause (2) refers to all other crimes for which a sentence of death is provided, including defendant's alleged drug-related crimes.

The statute under which defendant is now charged, section 848(e) of title 21, provides:

... any person engaging in an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) of this title . . . who intentionally kills .. . or causes the intentional killing of an individual and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death ... .

21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A).

Defendant is charged with committing two murders while engaged in a conspiracy to possess and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, a violation of section 841(b)(1)(A). See Part II.A, supra. By its terms, section 3591 of title 18 dealing with "Sentence of death" generally now applies to the current prosecution, the more specific capital case procedures for drug crimes having been eliminated.

C. ...