U.S. v. Teta, 89-3797

• Decision Date: 28 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-3797,89-3797
• Citation: 918 F.2d 1329
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel P. TETA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1329

918 F.2d 1329

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel P. TETA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89-3797.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 14, 1990.

Decided Nov. 28, 1990.

John W. Vaudreuil and Grant C. Johnson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Office of the U.S. Atty., Madison, Wis., for plaintiff-appellee.

Ralph A. Kalal, Kalal & Habermehl, Madison, Wis., for defendant-appellant.

Before CUMMINGS and MANION, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. ^*

GRANT, Senior District Judge.

Before this court is an appeal from the district court's upward adjustment of a sentence imposed under Sec. 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines following a guilty plea. Defendant-appellant Daniel Teta objects to the court's finding that he willfully obstructed justice pursuant to Guideline Sec. 3C1.1 by failing to appear for arraignment. Because we find that the district court properly applied Sec. 3C1.1 in this case, we affirm the sentence.

Background

Daniel Teta [Teta] was indicted in Wisconsin on four counts of wire fraud and three counts of transporting money taken by fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1343 and 2314. After his initial appearance before a magistrate in Illinois, he was released on bail and ordered to appear before Magistrate James Groh in the Western District of Wisconsin on August 1, 1989 for arraignment. Because the defendant traveled to Milwaukee instead of Madison for the court proceeding, the arraignment was rescheduled for August 4, 1989. However, when the defendant again failed to appear on August 4, a bench warrant was issued. He was later arrested and indicted for failure to appear, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3146(a)(1). Ultimately, Teta entered a guilty plea on one count of wire fraud; the plea agreement called for the dismissal of the remaining counts in this case and the single count indictment for failure to appear.

Teta was sentenced on December 15, 1989 to a period of 27 months in custody. ¹ That sentence included an enhancement for obstruction of justice under Guideline Sec. 3C1.1, based on defendant's nonappearance for arraignment, and a denial of defendant's request that the sentence be reduced for acceptance of responsibility under Guideline Sec. 3E1.1.

Teta does not contest the validity of the underlying conviction, but challenges the upward adjustment of the sentence under Guideline Sec. 3C1.1. That provision instructs the court to increase the offense level by two levels if the defendant "willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct [,] the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense." The focus of the sentencing hearing, held on December 15, 1989 before Judge John C. Shabaz, was the court's consideration of that Sec. 3C1.1 upward departure caused by the defendant's failure to appear at the arraignment.

The record reveals facts that were for the most part undisputed. Teta was not present on the initial date set for arraignment, August 1, 1989; however, he telephoned the office of the Clerk of Court to explain that he had understood he should appear in Milwaukee rather than Madison. ² Attempting to reschedule the matter, the deputy clerk suggested times later on August 1, or on August 2 or 3, but Teta rejected those dates. At this point there is a dispute concerning the alternate date set. The deputy clerk asserted that they had clearly agreed to a rescheduled appearance on August 4, 1989 at 11:30 a.m. However, Teta thought the date was a week later, on August 11, 1989. When he did not appear at the August 4 arraignment, the court issued a bench warrant. Teta was arrested in Missouri en route to the airport while providing a ride to a friend.

In his findings concerning the issue of adjustment for obstruction of justice, Judge Shabaz found the deputy clerk's statement to be the more credible evidence:

Without any equivocation, [the clerk's] testimony is clear and convincing, and the Court is of the opinion from the statement submitted from the FBI report that the Defendant fully understood that he was to appear as an alternate date on August 4, 1989. He did not appear and was subsequently arrested pursuant to a bench warrant.

Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 20. Considering next whether Teta, by failing to appear, willfully obstructed justice, the court turned to the "willful" definition found in instruction 6.03 of the Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit for examples of willful conduct:

An act is done willfully if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with the purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.

Transcript at 20. Using that jury instruction as a guide, the court made the determination that the defendant's failure to appear was willful, ³ and concluded that an upward departure for obstruction of justice under Sec. 3C1.1 was appropriate.

Standard of Review

Our review of a sentence imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines is limited by statute. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(d). When considering a petitioner's challenge of a Sec. 3C1.1 sentence enhancement, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error, and are required to affirm the sentence if we determine that it "was not imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, and is not unreasonable." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e). "The result is that we will affirm the district court if it correctly applied the Guidelines to findings of fact that do not leave us 'with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 972 (7th Cir.1989), quoting United States v. Herrera, 878 F.2d 997, 1000 (7th Cir.1989).

The sentencing court's determination that a defendant obstructed justice is a finding of fact to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Brown, 900 F.2d 1098, 1103 (7th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir.1989)). However, the interpretation of a term of the Sentencing Guidelines, like statutory interpretation, is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. See United States v. Goolsby, 908 F.2d 861, 863 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Thomas-Hamilton, 907 F.2d 282, 285 (2nd Cir.1990); United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1496, 108 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990).

Obstruction of Justice, Sec. 3C1.1

The commentary to Sec. 3C1.1 states:

This section provides a sentence enhancement for a defendant who engages in conduct calculated to mislead or deceive authorities or those involved in a judicial proceeding, or otherwise to willfully interfere with the disposition of criminal charges, in respect to the instant offense.

Teta argues that his failure to appear was simply a mistake; hence it was not a "willful" impediment to the administration of justice. Moreover, he asserts that his nonappearance merely delayed the proceedings, but did not jeopardize the truth-finding function of the court; hence his conduct did not materially affect the outcome of the litigation.

A. "Willfulness" under Sec. 3C1.1.

Teta contends that Sec. 3C1.1 of the Guidelines requires a willful impediment of the administration of justice. Since he intended neither to be absent from the court proceeding nor to obstruct justice, Teta asserts his conduct was not of the type proscribed in Sec. 3C1.1. The defendant recommends that we reject the jury instruction definition of "willful" followed by the district court and instead adopt the Second Circuit's requirement:

As written, Guidelines Sec. 3C1.1 contains a clear mens rea requirement that limits its scope to those who "willfully" obstruct or attempt to obstruct the administration of justice.... [T]he word "willfully," as used in section 3C1.1, requires that the defendant consciously act with the purpose of obstructing justice.

United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 507 (2nd Cir.1990). By not requiring a conscious purpose to obstruct justice, insists Teta, the district court erred in its interpretation of Sec. 3C1.1.

We note, first, that the Stroud decision was issued almost a month after this district court's sentencing hearing; hence that definition by the Second Circuit was not available for Judge Shabaz's consideration. However, when we compare the Stroud criteria for "willfulness" with the Seventh Circuit jury instruction definition that guided the district court below, we note numerous similarities. The Stroud court mandates that the conduct at issue be an act done consciously and performed with the purpose of obstructing justice; the district court below insisted that the conduct be an act done voluntarily and intentionally with the purpose of disobeying or disregarding the law. Both tests require that the defendant acted deliberately and with the intent to hinder justice, whether by disobeying or disregarding the law. Hence we find that the meaning of "willful" is substantially similar under those sets of criteria, and the intent requirement found in Sec. 3C1.1 of the Guidelines has been met under both definitions.

It is noteworthy, however, that the Second Circuit acknowledged the meaning of "willful" to be determined by its context. Id. at 507. In Stroud, where the issue was whether flight from an arresting officer constituted "obstruction of justice," the appellate court drew a distinction between flight to avoid arrest and flight later in the proceedings that would impede the investigation or prosecution, thereby obstructing justice. Stroud held that

... mere flight in the immediate aftermath of a crime, without more, is insufficient to justify a section 3C1.1 obstruction of justice enhancement.

Id. Therefore, in order to adjust a sentence upward under Sec. 3C1.1 for a defendant's flight, under Stroud it must be a...