U.S. v. Trujillo

Decision Date28 September 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-10387.,06-10387.
Citation502 F.3d 353
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario TRUJILLO, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Marc Woodson Barta (argued), Dallas, TX, J. Michael Worley, Nancy E. Larson, Asst. U.S. Attys., Fort Worth, TX, for U.S.

Christopher Allen Curtis (argued), Fort Worth, TX, for Trujillo.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before KING, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

OWEN, Circuit Judge:

Mario Trujillo pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) by possessing with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine. Trujillo appeals the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and contends his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm the sentence.

I

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Mario Trujillo pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine. In the presentence report (PSR), Trujillo's base offense level was determined to be 28 pursuant to § 2D1.1(c)(6) of the advisory sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.).1 The PSR recommended a two-level decrease to Trujillo's offense level because Trujillo met the criteria set forth in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a). The PSR recommended a two-level increase for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, because Trujillo told the probation officer during a presentence interview that he was born in Forth Worth, Texas. After reviewing Trujillo's juvenile record, the probation officer learned that Trujillo was actually born in Mexico and was subject to deportation because of the instant federal drug trafficking offense.2 The PSR further concluded that although Trujillo's actions of admitting guilt, expressing remorse, and implicating another individual in the crime normally would "clearly demonstrate acceptance of responsibility," the PSR did not recommend a reduction for acceptance of responsibility because Trujillo had misrepresented his citizenship to the probation officer. Trujillo's total offense level of 28 combined with his criminal history category of I resulted in an advisory Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months of imprisonment.

Trujillo objected to the increase in his offense level for obstruction of justice and the denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Trujillo contended that he did not willfully obstruct justice because he believed that he was born in Fort Worth. Trujillo also objected to the obstruction of justice increase on the ground that his statement to the probation officer was not a material statement. The district court overruled Trujillo's objections after considering testimony from Trujillo's stepfather.

The district court then adopted the findings set forth in the PSR and sentenced Trujillo to 84 months of imprisonment. The district court also imposed a four-year term of supervised release with the condition that, upon completion of his prison term, Trujillo would be surrendered to immigration officials for deportation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Trujillo appeals his sentence.

II

We review the district court's interpretation or application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.3 A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.4 "`Giving due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,' we will deem the district court's factual findings clearly erroneous only if, based `on the entire evidence,' we are `left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'"5

Trujillo first contends that the district court's factual finding that Trujillo intentionally misrepresented his citizenship to the probation officer during the presentence investigation was clearly erroneous. The district court based its application of the obstruction of justice enhancement6 and its denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility7 on this factual finding. Trujillo asserts that he did not willfully give a false statement to the probation officer because, at the time the statement was made, he believed that he was born in Fort Worth.

"The government must prove factors for enhancement of sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence,"8 and "[a] presentencing report generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered as evidence by the sentencing judge in making factual determinations required by the sentencing guidelines."9 The district court "may adopt the facts contained in a [presentence report] without further inquiry if those facts have an adequate evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence or otherwise demonstrate that the information in the PSR is unreliable."10 "The defendant bears the burden of showing that the information in the PSR relied on by the district court is materially untrue."11

Trujillo contends that his stepfather's testimony at the sentencing hearing rebutted the facts set forth in the PSR and proved that he did not willfully give a false statement to the probation officer regarding his citizenship. The PSR stated:

[D]uring the Presentence Report interview, the defendant told this officer that he was born in Fort Worth, Texas. However, this officer, while reviewing the defendant's file contained within the Tarrant County Juvenile Probation Department, discovered the defendant's Mexican birth certificate which indicated he was born in Guanajato, Mexico . . . . The defendant was untruthful in reference to his place of birth . . . .

After Trujillo objected to this finding in the PSR, the probation officer added an addendum to the PSR which stated:

The defendant's information concerning his lack of knowledge about his citizenship is uncorroborated at this point. The issue of whether the 2-level increase of Obstruction of Justice applies and denial of the 3 levels for Acceptance of Responsibility remain in dispute and shall be resolved by the Court at the sentencing hearing.

At the sentencing hearing, Trujillo's stepfather testified that Trujillo was born in Mexico and was not his biological son but that Trujillo did not know his stepfather was not his biological father until this sentencing hearing. His stepfather began raising Trujillo as his son in the United States when Trujillo was three years old. His stepfather also testified that he told Trujillo at age five that Trujillo had been born in Mexico, but later, after "people [] were psychologically damaging him and bothering him about that," he told Trujillo to "tell them that you're from Forth Worth so they don't bother you anymore." At the end of his testimony, Trujillo's stepfather stated that he never discussed the issue with Trujillo again and that Trujillo believed that he was actually born in Forth Worth: "Yes, he believed that. He thought that way, he acted that way, and he lived that way, yes."

The district court rejected the stepfather's conclusion that Trujillo came to believe he was born in Fort Worth, apparently relying on the fact that Trujillo was told he was born in Mexico and was told to lie about his place of birth. The court determined that Trujillo intentionally made a false statement:

I'm satisfied the defendant knew he was born in Mexico. The witness's testimony, though his last answer was calculated to imply otherwise, the witness's testimony makes clear that the defendant knew he was born in Mexico .... The defendant has always known he was born in Mexico, and he intentionally misrepresented his place of birth to the probation officer.

The district court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witness, and based on the deference we must give to that determination and based on the record evidence, the district court's finding is not implausible and was not clearly erroneous.

Trujillo contends that the district court erred in applying the obstruction enhancement because his false statement to the probation officer was not material, asserting "it only affects whether the Court enters an order for the defendant to be turned over to immigration for deportation." The district court rejected this argument stating, "That's pretty material."

"The Guidelines Manual does not define `obstruct,' but the application notes to § 3C1.1 provide some guidance as to the type of conduct to which the obstruction enhancement applies."12 One of the examples listed in the application notes to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 as a type of conduct to which the obstruction enhancement applies is "providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court."13 The enhancement is not appropriate, however, if the defendant "provid[es] incomplete or misleading information, not amounting to a material falsehood, in respect to a presentence investigation."14 "Material" is defined as "information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination."15

Trujillo contends that his false statement regarding his citizenship was not material because it did not affect his advisory Guidelines imprisonment range, his fine range, or the length of his supervised release. He argues that it would only affect whether the district court ordered as a part of supervised release that Trujillo be released to immigration officials for deportation proceedings.16 Trujillo also asserts that even if a provision ordering Trujillo to be released to immigration officials had not been included in his sentence, he nevertheless would have been subjected to deportation upon his release from prison.

Trujillo additionally asserts that the district court erred in applying the obstruction of justice enhancement because his false...

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