U.S.A v. Velasco-garcia
| Decision Date | 23 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. C-10-910 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. RAMIRO VELASCO-GARCIA. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
On this day came on to be considered Defendant Ramiro Velasco-Garcia's Motion to Suppress Evidence. (D.E. 12.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED.
I. Factual and Procedural Background1
On September 1, 2010, Robstown, Texas Police Officer Eddie Valadez was posted on U.S. Highway 281, observing southbound traffic south of the Falfurrias Border Patrol Checkpoint. Officer Valadez was operating as part of a task force with several federal agencies, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement, whose primary purpose was to search for weapons, drugs, and currency traveling along U.S. Highway 281, a well-known drug corridor. Valadez was instructed to stop cars only for legitimate traffic infractions, though he was not given a citation book, and in fact gave only warnings to individuals whom he stopped. Valadez stopped five vehicles in the three hour period relevant to this case.
While on duty along U.S. Highway 281, Officer Valadez observed a white 1997 Toyota Camry driven by Defendant Ramiro Velasco-Garcia, traveling south behind a red minivan. Believing the Camry to be following the minivan too closely (approximately one car length behind), Officer Valadez followed the car and checked its Illinois license plate. The results indicated that the car belonged to an individual living in Chicago, IL.
Officer Valadez initiated a traffic stop of the Camry on the basis of Texas Transportation Code § 545.062(a), which prohibits tailgating.2 Officer Valadez asked Mr. Velasco to exit his car and spoke with him between his patrol car and the Camry. Officer Valadez asked Defendant for his license and proof of insurance, and advised him of the reason for the traffic stop. Defendant produced a California license, but stated that he did not have insurance papers because the car belonged to a friend. Valadez did not, however, run a computer check on Mr. Velasco's license. (D.E. 17 at 9.)
Upon being informed that he had violated Texas Transportation Code Section 545.062(a), Velasco-Garcia apologized and claimed that he was unfamiliar with the area. Officer Valadez then inquired into Velasco-Garcia's travel plans. Velasco-Garcia stated that he was traveling from Chicago to Penitas, Texas, to visit a friend who owned a tire shop, then to visit family in San Antonio. Velasco-Garcia stated that he did not know the name of the owner of the car he was driving, nor the name of the friend in Penitas whom he was planning to visit. Velasco-Garcia stated that he intended to purchase the vehicle, and was taking it on a test drive. Officer Valadez stated that Mr. Velasco-Garcia appeared nervous during questioning, as evidenced by shaking hands, and he did not find Velasco-Garcia's story to be credible. Valadez testified that Defendant's nervousness indicated to him that "something was not right about the stop."
After asking these questions (approximately six minutes after initiating the stop), Valadez gave Defendant an oral warning for the traffic violation. Valadez did not, however, immediately return Defendant's license. Rather, he asked Velasco several questions regarding the contents of his vehicle, and asked Velasco whether he would consent to a search. At this time, Officer Valadez was alone with Defendant. Velasco consented, and other law enforcement officers soon arrived to conduct the search. Officer Valadez estimated that approximately eight minutes passed from the initiation of the traffic stop to the time that Defendant consented to the search.
During their search of the vehicle, officers noticed only one key in the ignition and found scratched tool markings on one of the seats, which was evidence of tampering. The officers opened a back seat of the vehicle, and found $50,000 in a hidden compartment. Defendant was then placed under arrest. A total of approximately 14 minutes passed between the inception of the traffic stop to the discovery of the currency and Defendant's arrest. (D.E. 15 at 3; D.E. 17 at 3.)
Defendant was indicted on September 22, 2010, for the importation, sale, and distribution of narcotic and dangerous drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and thereafter, performing or attempting to perform an act to distribute the proceeds of this unlawful activity by attempting to make such a delivery to persons in McAllen, Texas, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1). (D.E. 7.)
On October 16, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking to suppress the currency found in the Camry. The Court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress on November 4, 2010. At the hearing, the parties argued their various positions and Police Officer Eddie Valadez testified before the Court.
Defendant originally raised three bases for his motion. First, he contends that the police seizure of Defendant was not justified at the inception of the stop, as there was insufficient evidence that Defendant had violated Section 545.062(a) of the Texas Transportation Code. Second, he contends that the detention exceeded what was reasonable, rendering his consent tainted. Third, he argues that his consent was not voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. (D.E. 12 at 2-3.)
The United States filed a Response on November 2, 2010. (D.E. 15.) The United States argues that (1) the traffic stop was justified at its inception, (2) because Defendant's detention was reasonable, his consent was not tainted, and (3) based on the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's consent was voluntary. (D.E. 15 at 3-5.)
After this Court held a suppression hearing, in which issues arose as to the reasonableness of Defendant's continued detention, Defendant filed a supplemental brief in which he argued that Officer Valadez lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop. (D.E. 17.)
III. Discussion
The stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. U.S. v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1993).
A court must analyze the legality of traffic stops for Fourth Amendment purposes under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under this standard, the Court must make a two-part inquiry. U.S. v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing U.S. v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506-07 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also U.S. v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Fifth Circuit has concluded that as part of a traffic stop an officer may, for example, (1) examine driver's licenses and vehicle registrations, (2) perform computer checks, (3) "ask about the purpose and itinerary of the occupants' trip," and (4) "ask questions on subjects unrelated to the circumstances that caused the stop, so long as these unrelated questions do not extend the duration of the stop." Pack, 612 F.3d at 350. The Fifth Circuit in Pack recently summarized its jurisprudence on traffic stops as follows:
Detention during a valid traffic stop [does not] violate[ ] the detainees' Fourth Amendment rights where it exceeds the amount of time needed to investigate the traffic infraction that initially caused the stop, so long as (1) the facts that emerge during the police officer's investigation of the original offense create reasonable suspicion that additional criminal activity warranting additional present investigation is afoot, (2) the length of the entire detention is reasonable in light of the suspicious facts, and (3) the scope of the additional investigation is reasonable in light of the suspicious facts, meaning that it is reasonable to believe that each crimeinvestigated, if established, would likely explain the suspicious facts that gave rise to the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
612 F.3d at 358. An officer need not have "particularized suspicion" of the occurrence of a specific crime. Id. at 355.
In this case, the first part of the Terry inquiry is easily resolved. The traffic stop was justified at its inception, in light of Officer Valadez's testimony that Defendant was traveling too closely behind another vehicle, in violation of Texas Transportation Code Section 545.062(a). The Court finds Valadez's testimony in this regard credible, and Defendant has not offered any evidence to contradict this testimony. The mere fact that Officer Valadez's ultimate motivation may have been to investigate drug trafficking, rather than enforce traffic laws is irrelevant to the constitutional question. U.S. v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 2003) ( ) (internal citations omitted). The Court thus concludes that...
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