U.S. v. Ventura-Cruel
| Decision Date | 22 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-1538.,02-1538. |
| Citation | 356 F.3d 55 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ignacio VENTURA-CRUEL Defendant, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, Juan M. Perez-Giminez, J G. Richard Strafer, with whom G. Richard Strafer, P.A., was on brief for appellant.
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom H.S. Garcia, United States Attorney and Sonia I. Torres-Pabón, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, were on brief, for appellee.
Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, BALDOCK,* Senior Circuit Judge, and HOWARD, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-appellant Ignacio Ventura-Cruel appeals from his convictions for participating in a cocaine conspiracy. To resolve this appeal, we must consider whether, in the circumstances of this case, the district court lacked the authority to reject Ventura-Cruel's guilty plea and whether admissions that he made in a letter of confession written pursuant to his plea agreement were properly admitted against him at trial. On this second issue, we vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial.
On December 30, 1998, a grand jury returned a four-count indictment against numerous defendants describing an alleged cocaine smuggling and distribution conspiracy operating out of Puerto Rico. The indictment charged Ventura-Cruel with two counts, participating in a conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The government included in the indictment a compilation of overt acts which evidenced the existence of the conspiracy. Concerning Ventura-Cruel, the indictment alleged that on April 23, 1998, at the behest of other conspiracy members, he traveled to an airport in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands with $4,000 and a "travel ticket" to deliver to Juan Carlos Pion, one of the leaders of the conspiracy. However, "due to operational difficulties," he was unable to make the delivery.
On the morning of February 7, 2000, the day his trial was scheduled to begin, Ventura-Cruel reached a plea bargain with the government. Under the agreement, Ventura-Cruel agreed to plead guilty to the first count of the indictment. The government in turn agreed that it would move to dismiss the second count. The government also agreed that it would provide the court with a sentencing recommendation of fifty-four months of incarceration if Ventura-Cruel qualified for a reduction under the safety-valve. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.1
As an addendum to the agreement, Ventura-Cruel admitted certain facts demonstrating his involvement in the conspiracy. The addendum contained the same facts that were alleged in the indictment. On the same afternoon that Ventura-Cruel accepted the plea bargain, he appeared before the district court for a change of plea hearing. At that hearing, the court conducted the colloquy mandated by Fed. R.Crim.P. 11. The court reviewed the terms of the plea agreement with Ventura-Cruel. It stressed to him that the agreement did not bind the court to impose the sentence recommended by the government. It then proceeded to describe the rights that Ventura-Cruel would relinquish by accepting the plea bargain and to question him to assure that his waiver of these rights was knowing and voluntary. Following this discussion, the court summarized the facts in the addendum, and the government described the facts that it would have proved if there had been a trial. Ventura-Cruel acknowledged that these facts accurately summarized his involvement in the conspiracy. At that point, the court ruled that "a basis in fact for the plea exists, and therefore, a judgment of guilty shall be entered as to count one." The court then concluded the hearing by requesting the preparation of a presentence report and by scheduling a sentencing hearing. The sentencing hearing was scheduled for June 23, 2000.
A few weeks after the change of plea hearing, beginning on February 25, 2000, Ventura-Cruel met for several debriefings with Special Agents Jose Roman and Aramis Quinones of the Drug Enforcement Agency (the "DEA").2 The purpose of the debriefings was for Ventura-Cruel to provide the government with the information that he possessed about the conspiracy so that he could qualify for the safety-valve reduction.
At the sentencing hearing, on June 23, 2000, the government opposed Ventura-Cruel's eligibility for the safety-valve reduction because, in its estimation, Ventura-Cruel had not been truthful in the debriefings. Based on the government's representation, the district court decided that it could not pronounce sentence until it determined if, in fact, Ventura-Cruel was eligible for the safety-valve reduction.3
On February 12, 2001, the district court convened an evidentiary hearing to consider Ventura-Cruel's safety-valve eligibility. Ventura-Cruel maintained the burden of proving that he had been completely forthcoming. See United States v. Marquez, 280 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir.2002). To meet this burden, he introduced the DEA agents' report memorializing the debriefing conversations. The government responded by introducing the testimony of Agent Roman. Agent Roman testified that Ventura-Cruel told him that when he brought the $4,000 to Pion, "he didn't have any knowledge they [sic] were involved in drug trafficking." Agent Roman also testified that Ventura-Cruel told him that "he has never been involved in drug trafficking, what he did [on April 23, 1998] was a favor for a friend," and that he was unaware that Pion was involved in drug smuggling until the date of his arrest.
The government also offered the testimony of DEA Agent Hector Colon, another agent involved in the investigation of the conspiracy. Agent Colon testified that he had interviewed Pion as part of his investigation, and that Pion had stated that Ventura-Cruel was extensively involved in the conspiracy. Pion also stated that Ventura-Cruel had provided the vessels used for the drug smuggling. During the examination of Agent Colon, the government asked whether there was evidence showing that Ventura-Cruel was a drug smuggler just like Pion. The defense counsel immediately objected to the question, stating "the evidence is that he is not." The district court understood the defense counsel's objection to be an assertion that Ventura-Cruel was not involved in drug smuggling. Combining this understanding with Agent Roman's earlier testimony that Ventura-Cruel had claimed not to know that he was involved in a drug conspiracy, the court determined that there was no longer a factual basis for accepting Ventura-Cruel's guilty plea. The court, by its own motion, withdrew "the plea of guilty entered by [the defendant because it could not] allow him to retain a plea of guilty when he didn't know that what was going on were drugs."
After rejecting the plea, the district court reinstated the indictment against Ventura-Cruel and set a trial date. The evidence introduced at trial showed that Ventura-Cruel was an active participant in the drug conspiracy headed by Pion. Ventura-Cruel's role was to organize the maritime transport of the drugs from Colombia to St. Croix, St. Thomas or St. Maarten for storage. Once the drugs were stored on of one these islands, Ventura-Cruel coordinated with Pion to transport the drugs to Puerto Rico. The government relied primarily on testimony from Miguel Couvertier, a paid informant, and Ruben Gomez, one of Ventura-Cruel's co-conspirators, who testified pursuant to a cooperation provision in his plea agreement. In addition to this testimony, the government called Alma Martinez, Ventura-Cruel's probation officer. Through this witness, the government introduced a letter which Ventura-Cruel had written implicating himself in the conspiracy. The jury convicted Ventura-Cruel on both counts. The district court subsequently sentenced Ventura-Cruel to life in prison, and he timely appealed.
We address two primary issues. First, we consider whether the district court maintained authority under the Rules of Criminal Procedure to reject Ventura-Cruel's guilty plea after having accepted it over a year earlier. Second, we consider whether the district court erred by admitting at trial the letter that Ventura-Cruel wrote to his probation officer confessing his involvement in the conspiracy.
Ventura-Cruel claims that the district court acted without authority in rejecting his guilty plea after having previously accepted it. Specifically, he claims that Fed. R.Crim.P. 11 did not provide the district court with the power to reject his plea.4
It is well settled that a defendant does not have an absolute right to plead guilty. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). The Supreme Court has stressed that the plea "phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances." Id. Rule 11 provides a defendant with these essential safeguards.
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must address the defendant personally to assure that he understands, inter alia, the charge against him, the possible punishment, that he has a right to an attorney, that he has the right to plead not guilty, that he has a right to a jury trial, and that if he pleads guilty, he waives the right to a trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c). In addition, the district court must determine that the defendant's plea is voluntary and not the result of force, threats, or promises. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d).
Under Rule 11, the district court must also determine whether there is a factual basis for the defendant's...
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