U.S. v. Washington
| Decision Date | 01 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-1220.,06-1220. |
| Citation | 455 F.3d 824 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy W. WASHINGTON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Jennifer L. Gilg, argued, Omaha, NE, for appellant.
Russell X. Mayer, argued, Omaha, NE, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Timothy Washington entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the district court sentenced him to 21 months' imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised release. He appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after police officers stopped the vehicle he was riding in for having a cracked windshield. The government concedes that having a cracked windshield does not violate Nebraska law, and Washington argues that the investigating officer therefore did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop the vehicle. We reverse the district court's order and vacate Washington's plea and sentence.
On March 2, 2005, Officer Scott Antoniak was conducting traffic patrol with another officer in Omaha, Nebraska. He noticed that a 1993 Buick Regal in front of them had a horizontal crack in the windshield that "went all the way across the windshield at about eye level with little spider veins that come off the main crack." The officers decided to stop the car on the basis of the "vision obstruction" caused by the crack. They ran a data check on the driver, Kevin Wynn, which revealed that his license was suspended, so the officers handcuffed him and escorted the passenger, Washington, out of the car. Antoniak searched the car and discovered a loaded .22 caliber revolver under the passenger seat. Antoniak said that when he began to question Wynn about the gun, Washington blurted out, "[I]t's mine and I carry it for protection."
Washington was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress both the firearm and his statement, arguing that they were the fruit of an unconstitutional traffic stop, as no state statute or local ordinance prohibited driving with a cracked windshield. At the suppression hearing, Officer Antoniak testified to the above facts and stated that in his three and a half years as a police officer he had stopped some 100 cars for having cracked windshields. He explained that when he made such stops, he would issue a citation for "vision obstruction" and agreed that in this case the cracked windshield was the only basis he had for stopping the Buick.
In its brief to the magistrate judge, the government conceded that Officer Antoniak made a mistake of law in believing that a cracked windshield violated the vision obstruction statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,256. That section is entitled "Objects placed or hung to obstruct or interfere with view of operator; unlawful; penalty" and states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle with any object placed or hung in or upon such vehicle, except required or permitted equipment of the vehicle, in such a manner as to obstruct or interfere with the view of the operator through the windshield or to prevent the operator from having a clear and full view of the road and condition of traffic behind such vehicle.
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,256 (2005). The government acknowledged that no other provision of Nebraska law prohibits driving with a cracked windshield.
The magistrate judge concluded that although Officer Antoniak was mistaken in believing that cracked windshields violated Nebraska traffic law, his mistake of law was objectively reasonable given his training and past experience and "It is further reasonable to believe it would be a violation of traffic laws to operate a motor vehicle with a vision obstruction, be it a cracked windshield or a totally obliterated windshield." The district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge in its entirety and denied Washington's motion to suppress. The court found that Antoniak misunderstood the Nebraska motor vehicle statutes but that the misunderstanding was reasonable in light of the vision obstruction statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,256, as well as the view to rear statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,254.
We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions about probable cause and reasonable suspicion de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Under the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop is reasonable if it is supported by either probable cause or an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2921, 162 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005). It is well-established that "any traffic violation, regardless of its perceived severity, provides an officer with probable cause to stop the driver." United States v. Jones, 275 F.3d 673, 680 (8th Cir.2001). Nonetheless, the police must "objectively ha[ve] a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law." United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir.1996).
We are persuaded that Officer Antoniak made a mistake of law when he stopped the Buick for having a cracked windshield. It is clear from the plain language of the vision obstruction provision he relied on that he was mistaken in believing that it prohibited cracked windshields as it only applies to physical objects that obstruct a driver's view. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,256. Furthermore, the view to rear statute mentioned by the district court is similarly inapplicable to the facts of this case as it addresses only obstructions that affect a driver's ability to see what is behind the vehicle. See Neb. Rev.Stat. § 60-6,254 (2005). Finally, the government concedes that no other Nebraska law or Omaha city ordinance exists which bans driving with a cracked windshield.
In our circuit, if an officer makes a traffic stop based on a mistake of law, the legal determination of whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion existed for the stop is judged by whether the mistake of law was an "objectively reasonable one."1 Smart, 393 F.3d at 770. Therefore, the constitutionality of the traffic stop in this case depends on whether Officer Antoniak's belief that a state law was violated was objectively reasonable. His subjective good faith belief about the content of the law is irrelevant to our inquiry, "for officers have an obligation to understand the laws that they are entrusted with enforcing, at least to...
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