US v. Jones

Decision Date25 June 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-2905.,00-2905.
Citation275 F.3d 673
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Marcus Deangelo JONES, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Cyril Mehrle Hendricks, argued, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.

Anthony P. Gonzalez, argued, Jefferson City, MO, for appellee.

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and TUNHEIM,1 District Judge.

TUNHEIM, District Judge.

Marcus Deangelo Jones was found guilty by a jury on April 26, 2000, of four counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal Jones argues that the district court2 erred in denying his motion to suppress and erred in admitting certain evidence at trial. Jones also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the conspiracy conviction. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the summer of 1999, the Columbia Police Department was conducting an investigation of Jones for possible involvement in illegal narcotics activity. The investigation included at least four arranged purchases of crack cocaine by undercover police detective Candy Cornman. In her undercover role, Detective Cornman had a number of meetings and telephone conversations with Jones. Each of the meetings was recorded on audio tape and all but one videotaped. After each meeting with Jones during which she bought crack cocaine, a field test and chemical analysis was conducted and the substance sent to the laboratory for further testing. The result of the investigation was the arrest, subsequent trial and conviction of Jones on distribution, possession, and conspiracy charges.

On July 16, 1999, Detective Cornman spoke with Jones by phone and arranged to purchase 1/8 ounce of crack cocaine from him. Later that day, she met Jones in a supermarket parking lot in Columbia, Missouri. After Cornman arrived, Jones drove up to her in a gray four-door Chevrolet Celebrity with a Missouri license plate, 140-KHL. Jones sold Cornman 1/8 ounce of crack cocaine for $200. At that time, the two discussed future transactions and Jones quoted Cornman a price list for different amounts of crack cocaine.

On July 20, 1999, Cornman again made arrangements to buy crack cocaine from Jones. This time the two met in the parking lot of a different Columbia supermarket. Jones again arrived in the Chevrolet Celebrity, but this time with four other people. He was seated in the front passenger seat and motioned Cornman over to the vehicle. Jones proceeded to sell Cornman 1/4 ounce of crack cocaine for $275. After the transaction was completed, Jones got back into the vehicle and was driven to a different area of the parking lot where another individual appeared to be waiting for him. That person got out of his vehicle and approached Jones's vehicle. Cornman witnessed what appeared to be a transaction between the two.

On July 30, 1999, Cornman again communicated with Jones and this time he agreed to sell her 1/2 ounce of crack cocaine. When Jones arrived at the agreed upon location, he was driving a Chevrolet Monte Carlo with the same license plate as the one on the Chevrolet Celebrity, which Jones had used in the previous two sales. Cornman purchased 1/2 ounce of crack cocaine from Jones for $560. After the transaction, Cornman again witnessed Jones approach the same vehicle that he had approached after the July 20, 1999 transaction.

Earlier in the day on July 30, 1999, Sergeant Brian Piester, who was in charge of the Columbia Narcotics Unit, told Officer Christopher Kelley that an undercover detective would be meeting an individual near Officer Kelley's patrol area. Sgt. Piester told Officer Kelley that he would radio Kelley after the meeting and that Kelley should follow the vehicle and attempt to find probable cause to stop the vehicle and identify the driver. Shortly before 5:30 p.m. that evening, Kelley received a radio call from Piester, telling him that Jones's vehicle was leaving the meeting with Cornman. Officer Kelley followed the car and ran the license plate number through his on-board computer. The computer search revealed that the license plate was registered to a four-door, rather than two-door Chevrolet. Concluding that the vehicle was improperly registered, Kelley stopped Jones. Officer Kelley asked Jones for identification and Jones gave him a Missouri driver's license that identified him as "Marcus D. Jones." After writing down the identification information, Kelley issued Jones a warning for improper registration and for not producing proof of insurance. The identification information obtained by Kelley confirmed that defendant had used different names at different times, a fact that the on-going narcotics investigation apparently had not yet confirmed.

On August 18, 1999, Detective Cornman again met Jones in a supermarket parking lot, this time to purchase one ounce of crack cocaine. Jones arrived in a dark blue Nissan Maxima with another person, who Jones introduced as "Lil' Mex." Cornman had brought a scale with her to ensure that she received the proper amount of cocaine. When she weighed the cocaine, she found that it weighed under an ounce and paid Jones $700 rather than the $1200 that they had earlier agreed upon. During the transaction, "Lil' Mex" handed the crack cocaine to Cornman across the passenger side of the vehicle and also told Cornman during the transaction that the weight of the crack was correct. "Lil' Mex" later said to Jones, after Cornman had discovered the weight of the crack was less than one ounce, "Just knock some off. Let's go."

Cornman talked to Jones again on September 9, 1999, to set up another crack purchase. During their conversation, Jones told Cornman that he wanted to know who the two knew in common because he had heard that secret indictments were going to come down. The next day the two met and Jones sold Cornman crack cocaine for $1000.

Jones was arrested at an Amoco Quick Store in Columbia, Missouri on December 21, 1999, by Officer Benjamin White. Jones was not immediately read his Miranda3 rights, but was transported to the police station in a squad car. While riding in the police car, the officers testified that Jones was very talkative and asked a number of questions. During the ride to the police station, and before the officers read him his Miranda rights, Jones explained to the officers his use of two different names. He told the officers that he was unable to obtain a driver's license after being released from prison in Tennessee, so he used his mother's name, "Jones," from his Tennessee birth certificate. Jones also explained that his prior felony convictions were under the name "Lee" in Tennessee. Officer White testified that Jones never requested an attorney and did not ask that the questioning cease. None of the statements obtained on the ride to the police station were used at trial.

Upon arriving at the police station, Officer White testified that Jones was processed and booked and read his Miranda rights. Officer White stated that he recited Jones his Miranda rights from memory rather than reading them from a card. White testified that Jones then agreed to answer some questions and told the police that he had used the name "Marcus Jones" to purchase a handgun from a pawn shop and that he had used the last names "Jones" and "Lee." He also told the police that he had changed his name from "Lee" to "Jones" after getting out of prison, that he had applied for and received a gun permit, but that his gun had been seized by the police in an earlier incident. Jones admitted that he knew that he wasn't supposed to have a gun, but that "the handgun was the least of his worries." Defendant claims that he was not read his Miranda rights until his questioning at the police station was almost completed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A federal grand jury returned a six count indictment on November 19, 1999, charging Jones with four counts of distribution of cocaine base and one count each of attempt to distribute cocaine base and conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base. Defendant entered a not guilty plea on December 23, 1999. A superseding indictment was returned on January 21, 2000, realleging the same six counts, and adding one count for carrying a firearm in relation to a controlled substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Jones filed motions to suppress evidence and statements. On April 17, 2000, a suppression hearing was held before a magistrate judge. Jones claimed that the July 30, 1999 stop violated his Fourth Amendment Rights. He also moved to suppress the statements he made to police during his ride to the police station as well as the statements made at the police station on December 21, 1999, because he had not been given his Miranda rights. The district court denied both motions and the case proceeded to trial.

During the trial, the district court admitted over defendant's objection, a video tape of the July 20, 1999, transaction between Cornman and Jones. The video also showed Jones's car driving to another vehicle in the parking lot and making some kind of exchange with the person in that vehicle. Officer Cornman was also permitted to testify at trial, over defendant's objection, that Jones told her that he was concerned about secret indictments that had recently come down.

On April 26, 2000, a jury found Jones guilty on four counts of distributing cocaine base and on one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. Jones was found not guilty of attempt to distribute cocaine base.4 The district court sentenced Jones to 327 months in prison for counts one, three, and six of the indictment, and to 120 months for counts four and five, the sentences to run concurrently. Jones filed this timely...

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