U.S. v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 29 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-3020.,06-3020.
• Citation: 486 F.3d 458
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ricardo WATKINS, also known as Mac, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

486 F.3d 458

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ricardo WATKINS, also known as Mac, Appellant.

No. 06-3020.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: January 8, 2007.

Filed: May 29, 2007.

Wallace L. Taylor, argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, for appellant.

Daniel C. Tvedt, Asst. U.S. Atty., argued, Cedar Rapids, IA, for appellee.

Before COLLOTON and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG, Judge.¹

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Ricardo Watkins guilty of conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) and 846 as well as distributing less than five grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court² sentenced him to life in prison after denying his motion for a new trial. Watkins appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial and his sentence. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

From at least 1996 through the fall of 1999, Watkins regularly purchased crack cocaine from several different people in Illinois and arranged for it to be transported to and sold in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Watkins purchased distribution quantities of crack cocaine at intervals varying from twice per month to twice per week, depending upon demand. During this time, Watkins used more than ten different people to help him cut, package, transport and sell the drugs. Christopher Winters testified that he sold crack cocaine to Watkins several times in 1996 and regularly between the fall of 1997 and the fall of 1999. He testified that he sold between 2.25 and 4.5 ounces of crack cocaine to Watkins on each occasion and once sold him 9 ounces of crack cocaine. Alvin Davis testified that from the fall of 1997 into 1998 and again in 1999, he and Watkins bought crack cocaine in Chicago and transported it to Cedar Rapids, where they would provide the crack cocaine to others for sale on their behalf. Davis testified that during this time period, Watkins would travel to Chicago usually twice each week to buy 4.5 ounces of crack cocaine on each trip. Willie Herron, Dewayne Shears and Jessica Martley all testified that they had transported crack cocaine from Chicago to Cedar Rapids for Watkins and Davis, and Herron and Shears both sold crack cocaine in Cedar Rapids for Watkins and Davis. In March 1998, a confidential informant working with police in the Cedar Rapids area purchased a "rock" of crack cocaine directly from Watkins and Davis for $100 ("the controlled purchase").

In August 1998, fearing that he was under investigation, Watkins executed a proffer agreement with the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois ("the 1998 proffer agreement"). Watkins did not have legal counsel at the time. The agreement allowed the Government to use Watkins's proffered statements against him if he "should subsequently testify contrary to the substance of the proffer, or otherwise present a position inconsistent with the proffer." Pursuant to the agreement, Watkins provided incriminating information about his crack cocaine distribution in Cedar Rapids.

An Iowa federal grand jury indicted Watkins in October 1999 on the instant charges, and he was arrested in March 2005 in Illinois. The district court appointed counsel to represent Watkins. In June 2005, Watkins entered into a proffer agreement with the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Iowa through his counsel ("the 2005 proffer agreement"), under the terms of which he again provided incriminating information regarding his distribution of crack cocaine in Cedar Rapids. Watkins's counsel believed that the 2005 proffer agreement only allowed the Government to use the proffered statements to impeach Watkins if he were to testify. However, the agreement actually provided that the information received during the proffer could be used, "to impeach your client's credibility and to focus questioning during cross-examination; for use in a rebuttal case against your client; to develop leads from the information provided; and for all other non-evidentiary purposes."

After a jury found him guilty on both counts, Watkins filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and that his counsel was ineffective. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and created a substantial record on the ineffective assistance claims. In a lengthy, detailed opinion, the district court denied Watkins's motion for a new trial. Subsequently, the district court used the United States Sentencing Guidelines to determine an advisory sentence of life in prison based on an offense level of 43 and criminal history category of III. The district court sentenced Watkins to life in prison. Watkins appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial and several sentencing issues.

II. DISCUSSION

A. New Trial

1. Weight of the Evidence

We review a district court's disposition of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Peters, 462 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.2006). Where the motion asserts that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, "the court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, but may instead weigh the evidence and evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses." United States v. Huerta-Orozco, 272 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). The district court should grant the motion only if the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Id. "Absent a clear and manifest abuse of discretion, we uphold the district court's ruling on a motion for a new trial." Peters, 462 F.3d at 957 (internal quotation omitted).

Watkins's argument that his convictions were contrary to the weight of the evidence focuses largely on the credibility of co-conspirator Alvin Davis's testimony. Davis testified pursuant to a plea agreement, hoping to receive a reduction in his own sentence. Davis testified that from late 1997 into 1998 and again for a period in 1999, he and Watkins purchased crack cocaine in Illinois, transported it to Cedar Rapids, and sold it there.³ Watkins provides three examples illustrating his claim that Davis's testimony is unreliable. First, Davis testified that he and Watkins sold two rocks of crack cocaine to the confidential informant for $100 in the controlled purchase. (His testimony established that he and Watkins typically sold 0.5 gram rocks of crack cocaine for $50 each.) However, the officer involved with the controlled purchase testified that the confidential informant purchased a single rock of crack for $100. The confidential informant did not testify. Second, although Davis testified to the details of the controlled purchase at Watkins's trial in 2005, Davis claimed that he could not recall details of the controlled purchase at his own plea hearing in 1999. Finally, Davis testified at Watkins's trial that he and Watkins made $1,500 to $2,000 per week selling crack cocaine, but in a proffer statement that he made in 2000, Davis asserted that they made $1,000 to $1,500 per week. In addition, Watkins attacks the credibility of the other co-conspirator witnesses who testified pursuant to agreements with the Government, urging that such testimony is generally unreliable.

While there may be some discrepancies and inconsistencies in Davis's testimony, these examples fall short of establishing that Watkins's convictions were contrary to the weight of the evidence. The testimony of seven witnesses corroborated Davis's central story that he and Watkins purchased significant quantities of crack cocaine in Chicago and directed sales of crack cocaine in Cedar Rapids. The record also demonstrates that Watkins's counsel cross-examined all of the cooperating witnesses, exposing details of relevant cooperation and plea agreements, and attempted to impeach them with prior criminal convictions. See United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 988 (8th Cir.2004) ("Testimony does not become legally unsubstantial because the witness stands to gain by lying; the defendant is entitled to cross-examine such witnesses to expose their motivations, and it is up to the jury to decide whether the witness is telling the truth despite incentives to lie."); United States v. Baker, 367 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir.2004) ("The fact that these witnesses testified in exchange for the possibility of reduced sentences does not categorically make their testimony infirm or require that their testimony be corroborated in order to support a conviction."). Further, in its detailed ruling on Watkins's motion for a new trial, the district court cited Davis's testimony and that of the other cooperating witnesses, implicitly finding the testimony credible. See United States v. Johnson, 462 F.3d 815, 820 (8th Cir. 2006). We have previously declined to second-guess a district court's credibility assessment in similar circumstances. See United States v. Judon, 472 F.3d 575, 583 (8th Cir.2006). Consequently, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in crediting the testimony of these witnesses. The evidence adduced at trial does not weigh so heavily against the verdict that we believe that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred, see Huerta-Orozco, 272 F.3d at 565, and we affirm the district court's denial of Watkins's motion for a new trial.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Although ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims typically are best raised in collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, disposition on direct appeal is appropriate "[w]hen the claim does not turn on information outside of the district court record." United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir.2005). In this case, the district court conducted a full hearing on the ineffective assistance claims raised by Watkins in his motion for a new trial, which included testimony...