U.S. v. Wicker, s. 87-2526
| Decision Date | 06 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | 87-2527,Nos. 87-2526,s. 87-2526 |
| Citation | 848 F.2d 1059 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tony Ray WICKER and Vickie Siler, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
David N. Williams, Asst. U.S. Atty. for the District of New Mexico (William L. Lutz, U.S. Atty. for the District of New Mexico, with him on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Peter Schoenburg, Federal Public Defender Office, Albuquerque, N.M., for defendant-appellee Wicker.
James Rawley of James Rawley and Associate (Joy Christenberry of James Rawley and Associate, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, N.M., for defendant-appellee Siler.
Before McKAY and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BOHANON, District Judge *.
The issue presented in this case is whether the district court abused its discretion in suppressing the testimony and laboratory report of a government expert as a sanction for the government's failure to comply with a discovery order.
On August 5, 1987, Tony Ray Wicker and Vickie Siler were charged in a four-count superseding indictment with violating 21 U.S.C. Sec. 856 (Supp. IV 1986); 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) (1982); 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1982), and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (1982) by (1) renting a room for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, and using methamphetamine; (2) manufacturing methamphetamine; (3) possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture phenylacetone; and (4) possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute.
On August 21, 1987, the district court granted defendants' request, made under Rule 16(a)(1)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the government be required to produce a laboratory and scientific report reflecting the results of tests performed on materials confiscated from the defendants' room. The district court ordered the government to produce the report by September 18, 1987, so the defendants would have sufficient time to review the report and prepare for trial. 1 The government did not produce the report before the deadline. Instead, it was not until October 2, 1987, that Mr. Wicker's counsel received the report and not until October 5, 1987, that Ms. Siler's counsel received the report.
On October 6, 1987, Mr. Wicker filed a motion in limine to prevent the government from introducing into evidence the report or the testimony of the expert who prepared the report. Mr. Wicker claimed that the government's delayed production did not give Mr. Wicker's counsel sufficient time to analyze and rebut either the report or testimony before the trial date. On October 7, 1987, Ms. Siler filed a similar motion to exclude the government's evidence. The district court conducted a hearing by telephone on October 7, 1987, to determine whether the requested sanctions were justified. At the conclusion of this conference, the district court found the sanctions to be warranted and granted defendants' motions. The government now brings an interlocutory appeal to contest the exclusion of the report and the testimonial evidence.
Rule 16(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the district court broad discretion in imposing sanctions on a party who fails to comply with a discovery order:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. The court may specify the time, place and manner of making the discovery and inspection and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(2); see also United States v. Evans & Associates Construction Co., 839 F.2d 656, 660 (10th Cir.1988) (); United States v. Fernandez, 780 F.2d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir.1986) (). Despite this broad grant of power, the district court's exercise of discretion should be guided by several factors; and if a sanction is imposed, it should be the "least severe sanction that will accomplish ... prompt and full compliance with the court's discovery orders." Fernandez, 780 F.2d at 1576 (quoting United States v. Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)).
When the government fails to comply with a discovery order, the factors the district court should consider in determining if a sanction is appropriate are (1) the reasons the government delayed producing the requested materials, including whether or not the government acted in bad faith when it failed to comply with the discovery order; (2) the extent of prejudice to the defendant as a result of the government's delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing the prejudice with a continuance. United States v. Euceda-Hernandez, 768 F.2d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir.1985); Fernandez, 780 F.2d at 1576.
We note that these three factors should merely guide the district court in its consideration of sanctions; they are not intended to dictate the bounds of the court's discretion. "[A] comprehensive set of standards to guide the exercise of discretion in every possible case" is "neither necessary nor appropriate." Taylor v. Illinois, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 646, 655, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). On occasion the district court may need to suppress evidence that did not comply with discovery orders to maintain the integrity and schedule of the court even though the defendant may not be prejudiced. See United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir.1979) (); see also United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 603 (10th Cir.1986) ().
Review of the record reveals that the district court considered each of the Euceda-Hernandez factors in exercising its discretion to...
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