U.S. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 14 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-20080.,05-20080. |
| Citation | 400 F.3d 277 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Tyrone Mapletoft WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
James Lee Turner, Asst. U.S. Atty., Tony Ray Roberts, Houston, TX, for U.S.
Craig A. Washington, Houston, TX, for Williams.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before JONES, BARKSDALE and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
This federal death penalty case returns to this court for the second time in less than a month. We have jurisdiction under either the collateral order doctrine or, alternatively, in mandamus. We have expedited the consideration of this case to enforce our previous mandamus order that this case should proceed expeditiously to trial. Because the district court has improvised a procedure at odds with the Federal Death Penalty Act, we VACATE the order of the district court that the case proceed to trial with a non-death-penalty-qualified jury, and re-order that the case proceed promptly to trial.
A detailed explanation of the background of this case is available in our earlier mandamus opinion, In re United States, 397 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.2005).
Pertinent to the matter now before us, this court granted the government's petition for mandamus only a month ago to prevent the district court from giving an unauthorized jury instruction, harmful to the government, as a sanction for its refusal to comply with the court's also-unauthorized discovery orders. This court vacated the discovery orders and ordered the district court to proceed immediately to trial. Moreover, our order indicated that it should be read to
include[] using the current [death penalty qualified] jury pool, each member of which has obeyed his civic duty and gone through the laborious process of completing the questionnaires submitted by counsel. If trial is not commenced within thirty days, the Government may seek further mandamus relief to that end.
Id., 397 F.3d at 282, 2005 WL 57969 *5, n. 8. On January 21, 2005, Williams's petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc were denied and the mandate issued.
Back in the district court, however, the case did not proceed to trial. The district court agreed to stay the trial while Williams sought certiorari review in the Supreme Court of the United States. When informed of the delay this would cause, the judge stated that if the government took longer than a week to respond to Williams's certiorari petition, she was "letting the jury go." Hr'g Tr., Jan. 24, 2005, at 49. The judge told the parties that she was presiding over another criminal trial scheduled to begin April 1, 2005, and which was expected to last over four months, and that if that case began first, the parties would need to "get in line." Id. at 52. Concerned about the possibility that the district court would release the 250-person venire pool, and thus violate the explicit order of this court, the government moved to commence jury selection and requested a status conference.
Williams filed a response opposing the government's motion to commence jury selection, in which he reasserted a motion, previously denied, that requested the court to empanel a non-death penalty-qualified jury to hear the guilt/innocence phase of trial. At the status conference on Friday, February 4, 2005, the district court revisited this motion and granted it. In so doing the district court asserted that "good cause" existed under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)(2)(C) (discussed infra) to proceed to trial the following Monday with a non-death penalty-qualified jury. The district court ruled that the "good cause" consisted of "[t]he case management problems that have arisen in this case because of the government's interlocutory appeal of this court's discovery rulings." Status Conf. Tr. at 19.
The United States objected to this ruling as inconsistent with the Federal Death Penalty Act. The district court rejected this objection and declined to enter a stay. The United States filed a timely notice of appeal and requested a stay from this court February 4, 2005. We granted that stay on February 5 to review the instant appeal.
This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule or, alternatively, as a matter of mandamus.1
"An appealable collateral order is an order that conclusively resolves an issue separate from the merits of the controversy, is effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment, and is too important to be denied review." Arnold v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 277 F.3d 772, 776-77 (5th Cir.2001) (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1718, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996)). Although use of the collateral order doctrine is ordinarily very limited in criminal cases, interlocutory review may be heard to address "an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial." United States v. Bird, 709 F.2d 388, 391 (5th Cir.1983) (internal citations omitted). Finality of a district court's collateral order exists when it is "made with the expectation that [it] will be the final word on the subject addressed." Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 277, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988).
The district court's decision to order immediate trial before a non-death penalty-qualified jury satisfies all three requirements of the collateral order doctrine. First, the district court's order conclusively resolved that Williams's guilt would be tried before a non-death penalty-qualified jury. Second, the decision involved a key determination made by the district judge concerning the procedure imposed by the Federal Death Penalty Act. That issue, whether a unitary jury is required unless one of four statutorily described circumstances is present, is unrelated to the merits of the case and is likely to recur. Third, the order is effectively unreviewable at the government's instance on appeal if the defendant is not convicted of capital murder, or, if having been convicted of capital murder, he is not sentenced to death.
In the alternative, mandamus is appropriate. Cf. United States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir.2001) (). Under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, three requirements must exist before a writ of mandamus will issue: "(1) the party seeking issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires; (2) the petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable; and (3) even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances." In re United States, 397 F.3d at 282, 2005 WL 57969, at *5 ().
Hence, if jurisdiction does not lie under the collateral order doctrine, mandamus jurisdiction would exist. The district court's bifurcated jury order is essentially unreviewable, and based on our analysis of the Federal Death Penalty Act, the Government has a clear and indisputable right to relief. A writ of mandamus is also appropriate given the seriousness of the issue, the trial court's plainly erroneous interpretation of the statute, and the fact that this court specifically invited the Government to seek further mandamus relief in the event the district court failed to comply with our previous order.
The Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3593, establishes explicit procedures for juries in federal capital cases. A bifurcated procedure is used under which the guilt/innocence phase of trial is separated from the sentencing phase. If a jury trial is conducted during the first phase, the sentencing hearing "shall be conducted — before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt." Id. at § 3593(b)(1) (emphasis added). Only in four limited circumstances may a different or new jury be empaneled solely for sentencing: (A) where the defendant pleads guilty; (B) where "the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court sitting without a jury"; (C) where "the jury that determined the defendant's guilt was discharged for good cause"; or (D) where, after initial imposition of the sentence, reconsideration is necessary. Id. at § 3593(b)(2)(A)-(D).
Last October, the district court denied Williams's motion to empanel a non-death-qualified jury for the guilt/innocence phase. Reversing herself on February 4, she invoked subsection (b)(2)(C) and granted that request to balance the government's desire for a speedy trial with Williams's plea to await the outcome of his certiorari petition. The judge invoked "case management problems" as sufficient "good cause" under this provision. In two ways, this determination violated the plain language of the Federal Death Penalty Act.2 As noted, the law provides in mandatory terms that the same jury shall be empaneled for both phases of the trial. This language aligns practice under the federal death penalty law with the general practice in capital cases, which are ordinarily tried before a unitary jury. As Williams concedes, constitutional challenges by defendants to unitary capital jury procedures have failed.3 The procedure prescribed by the statute is both compelling and compelled.
Second, the court's ruling misinterprets the narrow exception to a unitary jury requirement adopted in § 3593(b)(2)(C). The provision states:
The hearing shall be...
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