U.S. v. Williams
| Decision Date | 02 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:09cr169 (JCC).,1:09cr169 (JCC). |
| Citation | 629 F.Supp.2d 539 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Courtney WILLIAMS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Christian B. Nagel, U.S. Attorney Office, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.
Kevin Brehm, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, VA, for Defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Courtney Williams's ("Defendant's") Rule 58(g)(2)(B) appeal from the judgment of conviction entered after a trial in the magistrate court and his appeal of the magistrate judge's denial of motions to dismiss and to suppress. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the appeal and dismiss Count I of the criminal information, vacate the judgment of conviction as to Count I, and dismiss the appeal of the suppression ruling as moot.
The following facts, drawn largely from Defendant's brief, were stipulated to by the Government at the suppression hearing. At approximately 10:45 p.m. on September 9, 2008, a military police officer ("M.P.") pulled over the vehicle driven by Defendant on Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia (the "Base"). Defendant allegedly had failed to stop at a posted stop sign and was driving 41 miles per hour in a 35 miles per hour zone. The M.P. claims that, after making contact with Defendant, he detected a "strong odor of an alcoholic beverage" coming from the breath and person of Defendant. The M.P. also alleges that Defendant became "belligerent and argumentative" and identified himself as active-duty military only partway through the interview. (Def.'s Br. 2.)
The M.P. then removed Defendant from the vehicle, placed him in handcuffs, and took him to another location. There, he removed the handcuffs and directed Defendant to perform certain "field sobriety tests," which he claims that Defendant performed "unsatisfactorily." Defendant was then presented with an "Implied Consent Advisement Form and Declaration of Refusal." He signed the "Declaration of Refusal" section of the form, which indicated that he would not provide a sample of his breath for analysis. Defendant made several other statements to the military police, was given several citations, and was then released from custody. (Def.'s Br. 2.)
On October 29, 2008, a five-count criminal information charged Defendant with unlawfully: refusing to consent to a breathalyzer test after he was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3118 (Count I); operating a motor vehicle on the Base, which falls within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13, assimilating Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266(ii) (Count II); operating a motor vehicle upon the Base so as to endanger the life, limb, and property of any person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13, assimilating Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-852 (Count III); obstructing a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13, assimilating Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460 (Count IV); and disregarding a posted stop sign, in violation of 32 C.F.R. § 634.25(f), adopting Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-830 (Count V).
Defendant moved to suppress the field sobriety tests he took and any statements of "refusal" to take a breathalyzer test that were obtained as a result of what he claimed was an unlawful arrest. He also moved to dismiss Count I. After oral argument, the magistrate judge ("Magistrate") denied the motion to dismiss and the motion to suppress.
A jury trial began on March 3, 2009. After the trial, Defendant was pronounced guilty as to Counts I and V, and not guilty as to Counts II, III, and IV. The Court sentenced Defendant on Counts I and V immediately after the trial, and judgment was executed on March 6, 2009. Defendant appealed the judgment of conviction on Count I and the denial of his motions to dismiss and suppress to this Court on March 10, 2009.
Defendant properly appealed within the ten day time-limit specified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(g)(2)(B). His appeal is before the Court.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(g)(2)(D) provides that "[t]he scope of an appeal [from a magistrate judge's order or judgment to a district judge] is the same as in an appeal to the court of appeal from a judgment entered by a district judge." "A district judge should therefore affirm a sentence imposed by a magistrate judge unless it is unreasonable or resulted from a significant procedural error." United States v. Lambert, 594 F.Supp.2d 676, 680 (W.D.Va.2009) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)); see United States v. Steinert, 470 F.Supp.2d 627, 630 (E.D.Va.2007).
Defendant argues that the Magistrate should have dismissed Count I, which charged him, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3118(b), with unlawfully refusing to consent to a breathalyzer test after he was arrested for driving under the influence. He asserts that § 3118(b) is not a criminal statute and does not create a criminal offense.
It will be helpful to quote § 3118 in full. The statute, which appears in the federal criminal code (Title 18), is entitled "Implied consent for certain tests":
(a) Consent.—Whoever operates a motor vehicle in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States consents thereby to a chemical test or tests of such person's blood, breath, or urine, if arrested for any offense arising from such person's driving while under the influence of a drug or alcohol in such jurisdiction. The test or tests shall be administered upon the request of a police officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person arrested to have been driving a motor vehicle upon the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States while under the influence of drugs or alcohol in violation of the laws of a State, territory, possession, or district.
(b) Effect of Refusal.—Whoever, having consented to a test or tests by reason of subsection (a), refuses to submit to such a test or tests, after having first been advised of the consequences of such a refusal, shall be denied the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States during the period of a year commencing on the date of arrest upon which such test or tests was refused, and such refusal may be admitted into evidence in any case arising from such person's driving while under the influence of a drug or alcohol in such jurisdiction. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States after having been denied such privilege under this subsection shall be treated for the purposes of any civil or criminal proceedings arising out of such operation as operating such vehicle without a license to do so.
18 U.S.C. § 3118. Defendant argues that the law, which does not contain phrases typical of other criminal statutes—like, for example, "is guilty of" or "shall be fined under this title or imprisoned"—sets out only an administrative sanction and an evidentiary basis for admissibility, not a criminal punishment.
The Government suggests that § 3118 defines prohibited behavior and provides a clear sanction for those who violate it— namely, the denial of driving privileges for one year. It further argues that statutes do not need to include language such as "is guilty of" to establish criminal offenses. The Government cites two examples of statutes that do not include the language that Defendant suggests is indicative of criminal laws: 18 U.S.C. § 641 () and 81 (arson). Both statutes, however, provide for a term of imprisonment as a potential sanction for their violation. Sections 641 and 81 clearly prohibit crimes. It is not obvious that § 3118 does so.
Both the Government and the Magistrate cite this Court's decision in United States v. Jerge, 738 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.Va. 1990), as having constrained them to treat § 3118 as creating a chargeable criminal offense. In Jerge, the Court considered the earlier codification of the consent-to-test law, which, between its enactment in 1988 and re-numbering in 1990, appeared at 18 U.S.C. § 3117. See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3574, 104 Stat. 4929 (1990); Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6477(b)(1), 102 Stat. 4381 (1988). En route to interpreting the statutory language as requiring a person suspected of driving under the influence "to submit to any or all of the tests listed," the Court noted that, "[a]s a criminal statute, [the law] should be strictly construed." 738 F.Supp. at 183 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that "[s]trict construction of a penal statute, however, must not prevent the court from applying the statute in a reasonable manner." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court agrees that a plausible reading of this language in Jerge may suggest that the present-day § 3118 defines a crime. Indeed, that is what the court in United States v. Love, 141 F.R.D. 315 (D.Colo.1992), understood the case to imply. The Love court disagreed with both Jerge's interpretation of the statute and its perceived assumption that the law created a criminal offense. 141 F.R.D. at 319.
The Court, however, does not read Jerge to require the Government to charge violations of § 3118 as federal crimes. If the case did imply such a requirement, the Court finds that it did so in error. First, the language at issue in Jerge concerned only the standard of construction that the Court applied to the statute. The Court, erring on the side of caution in interpreting a law contained in Title 18, stated that it would strictly...
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United States v. Butler
...driving privileges for one year "commenc[es] on the date of arrest upon which such test or tests was refused."United States v. Williams, 629 F.Supp.2d 539, 543 (E.D. Va. 2009) (quoting, in part, 18 U.S.C. § 3118). Williams also reasoned:Section 3118 also differs from most criminal statutes ......