U.S. v. Williams, 82-2263

Decision Date15 September 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-2263,82-2263
Citation714 F.2d 777
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Rita L. WILLIAMS, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Christopher C. Iliff, Bruce Campbell, Blackwell, Sanders, Matheny, Weary & Lombardi, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.

Robert G. Ulrich, U.S. Atty., J. Whitfield Moody, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.

American Civil Liberties Union of Western Missouri by Floyd R. Finch, Jr., Blue Springs, Mo., for amicus curiae.

Before HEANEY, McMILLIAN and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Rita Williams appeals from her conviction for aiding and abetting a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 2113(a) & (d). Williams waived her right to a jury trial, and the district court tried the case on the basis of stipulated facts. On October 5, 1982, the district court found Williams guilty and sentenced her to a study sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4205. We affirm the district court's judgment.

I. FACTS

On June 25, 1982, three black males entered the United Missouri Bank South in Kansas City, Missouri, and robbed it of approximately $7,100. The three men fled from the scene of the crime in a red 1970 Ford station wagon containing two other black males.

About one-half hour before the robbery, the Kansas City police radio broadcast reported that a red Ford station wagon had been stolen at gunpoint by two black males wearing dark blue sweat suits. About twenty minutes later, Kansas City Police Officer Francey Chapman, who had heard the stolen vehicle report, noticed a black male and two black females in a 1971 white and gold Buick automobile in a shopping center parking lot approximately eight blocks north of the United Missouri Bank South. Officer Chapman observed that after the male--who was dressed in dark clothing--exited from the Buick, the two women drove away.

Less than ten minutes later, the police radio broadcast reported the United Missouri Bank South robbery and identified the suspect vehicle as a red Ford station wagon. Officer Chapman, who had remained in the shopping center parking lot, immediately began to drive toward the United Missouri Bank South until she spotted the white and gold Buick with two black women proceeding in a direction away from the bank. As the Buick turned east, Officer Chapman began to follow it. The police radio broadcast then reported that the suspect vehicle--the red Ford station wagon--was occupied by five black males. Shortly thereafter, Chapman stopped the Buick. She ordered the two women--Rita Williams, the driver, and Nadine Farris--out of the car and frisked them. Upon feeling a hard object under Farris's blouse, Chapman removed it and discovered a large roll of money. Chapman then searched the vehicle and found two zipped bags. She opened them, and found several handguns in one and a bundle of loose cash in the other. Chapman then directed the backup officer to place the two women under arrest and advise them of their constitutional rights, which he did. Subsequently, Williams confessed her involvement in the bank robbery during a custodial interrogation.

II. DISCUSSION

Prior to her trial, Williams moved to suppress her confession and the evidence seized from her automobile 1 on the ground that Officer Chapman's warrantless search and seizure violated the fourth amendment. The district court denied this motion, and Williams' subsequent motion for reconsideration. We review the district court's factual findings and determinations regarding the existence of circumstances justifying the warrantless seizure and search of Williams under the clearly erroneous standard. E.g., United States v. McGlynn, 671 F.2d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir.1982).

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court first recognized an exception to the requirement that fourth amendment seizures of persons must be based upon probable cause. It is now settled that under certain limited circumstances, law enforcement officers, without a warrant, may stop a motor vehicle for investigative purposes. Such a stop is permissible only when the officers are aware of particularized and articulable objective facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the suspicion that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); United States v. Martin, 706 F.2d 263 at 265 (8th Cir.1983).

The district court found that Officer Chapman's stop of Williams' automobile and her frisk of the occupants was a valid investigatory seizure. Williams argues that the district court erred because the vehicle stop was impermissibly based on the race of the automobile's occupants rather than a reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity. 2 The court below rejected this contention, finding that Chapman did not rely upon the race of Williams and Farris to justify the vehicle stop, and that Chapman's conduct was based upon reasonable suspicion.

In United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157, 159-160 (8th Cir.1981), this Court stated:

Police cannot have grounds for suspicion based solely on the race of the suspect. * * * Although color of skin is an identifying factor, * * * this court has consistently rejected the use of race in combination with other factors to justify investigative searches and seizures. * * * In the case at bar, like Nicholas, "we think that, at best, the police were acting upon a generalized suspicion that any black person ... might be engaged in criminal activity." [Emphasis added; citations and footnote omitted.]

We reaffirm our commitment to these principles. Nonetheless, after carefully reviewing the record here, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding that Officer Chapman did not base her stop of Williams' vehicle on the race of the automobile's occupants. Chapman testified in the proceedings below that it was "rare" for black persons to be in the predominately white neighborhood where the robbery occurred. Read as a whole, however, the record supports the district court's findings that Chapman only considered the race of the automobile occupants as an identifying factor and that she based her conduct upon a reasonable suspicion that Williams and Farris were engaged in criminal activity.

Less than ten minutes before the bank robbery was reported, Officer Chapman observed a parked white and gold Buick occupied by two black women and one black man in a shopping center parking lot. Chapman noticed that the male, who was exiting from the automobile, had black gloves in his back pocket and was wearing dark blue clothing which the officer considered "unusual dress for * * * a June day" because "it was warm and he was dressed very warmly." At this time, Chapman was aware that approximately one-half hour earlier two armed black men, dressed in dark blue sweat suits, had stolen a red Ford station wagon in a park less than five miles from the shopping center.

Shortly after Officer Chapman observed the Buick in the parking lot, the police radio broadcast reported that there had been an armed robbery at the Union Missouri Bank South, and directed police officers to be "[o]n the lookout for a red Ford station wagon." It was reasonable for Chapman to infer that the Ford automobile was the bank robbery getaway car and that it was the same one which had been stolen shortly before by two black men dressed similarly to the black male she had seen exiting from the white and gold Buick. When Chapman heard this report, she began to drive toward the bank, which is located about eight blocks south of the shopping center where she was parked. When Chapman spotted the white and gold Buick traveling in a direction away from the bank, she turned to follow it. Chapman, following the automobile as it turned east and then south, noticed that it contained the two black women but not the black male dressed in dark clothing that she had seen earlier. She also observed that the Buick's driver, Williams, reduced her speed and apparently signaled for a right turn on several occasions without turning: 3 such a turn would have taken the automobile back toward the bank or an area with numerous parking places. Shortly thereafter, the police radio broadcast reported that the suspect vehicle--the red Ford station wagon--was occupied by five black males and that it was the automobile which had been stolen shortly before the bank robbery.

On the basis of these circumstances, Officer Chapman stopped the Williams' vehicle. We agree with the district court that this stop was a valid investigatory seizure based upon particularized and articulable objective facts which reasonably warranted Chapman's suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle were involved in the robbery of the United Missouri Bank South.

Williams alternatively argues that even if she was subjected to a valid investigatory stop, Officer Chapman impermissibly extended that stop by searching the automobile without probable cause after she had frisked Williams and Farris. 4

In Florida v. Royer, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325-1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 238 (1983), the Supreme Court emphasized that

[t]he predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect. * * * [A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. * * * It is the State's...

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