U.S. v. Williams, 02-12234.

• Decision Date: 05 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-12234.,02-12234.
• Citation: 340 F.3d 1231
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee, v. Jermaine C. WILLIAMS, a.k.a. Jermaine Williams, Petitioner-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

340 F.3d 1231

UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee, v. Jermaine C. WILLIAMS, a.k.a. Jermaine Williams, Petitioner-Appellant.

No. 02-12234.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

DECIDED: August 5, 2003.

Kathleen M. Williams and Daryl E. Wilcox, Fed. Pub. Defenders, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Phillip DiRosa, Anne R. Schultz, Carol E. Herman, Miami, FL, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and CUDAHY^*, Circuit Judges.

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background

On October 20, 2000, Jermaine Williams and Lowen Espinueva attempted to rob an armored car in Coral Springs, Florida. As the armored car's drivers (Frank Granja and Eshaman Ruiz) were restocking an ATM with cash, Williams and Espinueva drove up and started shooting at them. Espinueva used a 12-gauge shotgun, while Williams was firing a 9-millimeter pistol both guards were seriously wounded. When the guards returned fire, Williams and Espinueva fled without stealing any money.

Williams and Espinueva were later arrested and indicted on three counts: conspiring to obstruct interstate commerce through robbery (Count I),¹ attempting to obstruct interstate commerce through robbery (Count II),² and discharging a firearm in connection with a crime of violence (Count III).³ Williams pled guilty to all three counts and was sentenced to 200 months in prison by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.⁴ This includes 80 months for Counts I and II, and a mandatory consecutive 120-month sentence for Count III.⁵ This appeal concerns Williams's prison sentence for Counts I and II.

B. Williams's Sentence

Under the sentencing guidelines, the various charges of which a defendant is convicted are sorted into different "groups" based on the rules set forth in United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3D (Nov.2002). In general, related charges are supposed to be grouped together, while charges arising from separate incidents are supposed to be grouped apart from each other. "In essence, counts that are grouped together are treated as constituting a single offense for purposes of the guidelines." Id., ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. (2002). Each group is assigned a numerical "offense level," which is determined by the most serious offense in that group. See id. § 3D1.3(a). Based on the number of groups the defendant has, as well as each group's offense level, the defendant is assigned a "combined offense level," which is used to determine his sentence. See id. § 3D1.4. As a result of this system, a defendant will receive a much higher sentence if two crimes are grouped separately than if they are grouped together.⁶ Section 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines states that multiple offenses may be grouped together only "[w]hen counts involve the same victim and the same act or transaction," U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a), or "[w]hen counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan," id. § 3D1.2(b).⁷

The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report ("PSI") completed by Williams's probation officer recommended that Counts I and II be assessed separately under the guidelines rather than grouped together. The report claimed, "Counts One and Two represent separate harms and are specifically excluded from grouping rules in § 3D1.2. . . . Group One will represent the harm caused to Frank Granja and Group Two will represent the harm caused to Eshaman Ruiz." Williams filed an objection to the report, stating "Counts One and Two of the indictment, which charge a conspiracy to commit a robbery and an attempt to commit a robbery, are part of a single criminal episode and should be grouped together, pursuant to § 3D1.2(b)." The probation officer again declined to group Counts I and II together, emphasizing that "[t]he counts cannot be grouped under either § 3D1.2(a) or (b) since neither count involved the same `victim.'"

Williams then filed an objection to the amended report with the district court, arguing yet again that Counts I and II (conspiracy to commit robbery and the attempted robbery) should have been grouped together. The district court, without explanation, overruled Williams's objection and adopted the recommendation of the PSI, putting each charge in a separate group in calculating Williams's sentence. Because Counts I and II were grouped separately, Williams's sentencing range for these counts was 78-97 months; the judge sentenced him to 80 months (plus a mandatory consecutive 120-month sentence for Count III). Had Counts I and II been grouped together, Williams would be eligible for a sentence of between 63-78 months, in addition to his mandatory sentence for Count III.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Before turning to the substance of Williams's claims, it is first necessary to determine the appropriate standard of review. Federal law states, "The court of appeals ... shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and, ... shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). Our precedent clearly follows the first part of this statute, requiring us to review district courts' factual findings under a "clear error" (or "clearly erroneous") standard.⁸ See United States v. Maung, 267 F.3d 1113, 1118 (11th Cir.2001) ("When a defendant challenges the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines, we review the district court's underlying findings of fact for clear error. . . ."). For example, "[a] district judge's attribution of drugs to a particular defendant under the Sentencing Guidelines is subject to clearly erroneous review." United States v. Alred, 144 F.3d 1405, 1416 (11th Cir.1998). Similarly, "[p]ossession of a firearm for sentencing purposes is a factual finding ... reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard." United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448, 452 (11th Cir.1996). The proper standard of review for a district court's application of the sentencing guidelines to the facts of a particular case, also referred to as "mixed questions of fact and law" involving the guidelines, is much less settled. Section 3742's "due deference" language has proven to be a source of great ambiguity within this circuit, and our caselaw is, to say the least, muddled. Subpart A begins by explaining the various approaches this circuit has taken in considering this matter. Subpart B goes on to explain how "due deference" should not be interpreted as establishing a fixed quantum of review, but instead requires varying degrees of deference to the lower courts based on the precise nature of the guideline provision at issue. Subpart C applies these principles to determine the appropriate standard of review in the instant case.

A. Prior Interpretations of § 3742(e)'s "Due Deference" Language

18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) requires the court of appeals to accord "due deference" to a district court's ruling on how the sentencing guidelines should be applied to the facts before it. Our precedents have not implemented this provision in a wholly consistent manner. This subpart attempts to explain our circuit's various interpretations of the proper standard of review for guidelines cases.

1. Ignoring 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) — We have characterized "question[s] about whether a particular guideline applies to a given set of facts" both as questions of law, see United States v. Shriver, 967 F.2d 572, 574 (11th Cir.1992), and (more appropriately) as mixed questions of fact and law, see United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1206 n. 5 (11th Cir.1989). In general, de novo review is appropriate for both types of issues. See, e.g., Parker v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corrs., 331 F.3d 764, 765 (11th Cir.2003) ("We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.").

It is possible that prior panels simply applied these general principles and, as a result, overlooked § 3742(e) and its "due deference" standard. Consequently, many of our cases simply state, "This court reviews the district court's sentencing hearing findings of fact for clear error and its application of the sentencing guidelines to those facts de novo." United States v. Renick, 273 F.3d 1009, 1021 (11th Cir. 2001); accord United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1302 (11th Cir.2001); Maung, 267 F.3d at 1118; United States v. Jamieson, 202 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Gallo, 195 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir.1999); United States v. Herrera, 931 F.2d 761, 762 (11th Cir.1991). Even if, in these cases, § 3742's due deference standard was interpreted to mean de novo review, it is both confusing and improper for a court of appeals, or the parties appearing before it, to fail to cite this statute (or a case interpreting this statute) in a sentencing guidelines appeal.

By its very terms, § 3742 clearly applies to sentencing guidelines cases. Moreover, we reject the notion that Congress intended § 3742's due deference standard to leave undisturbed our general de novo standard for reviewing issues concerning the application of the law to particular sets of facts. This "due deference" language was undoubtedly intended to require, at least in some cases, greater respect for district court holdings than is traditionally accorded under de novo review. See United States v. Malone, 78 F.3d 518, 520-21 n. 2 (11th Cir.1996) ("The `due deference' standard in 18 U.S.C. § 3742 `serves as an additional caution against overly intense judicial review.'" (quoting United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 868 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir.1989))).

2. "Due deference" always means de novo review — Many of our cases, despite quoting the due deference standard from § 3742(e), nevertheless...