U.S. v. Williams, 97-1204

• Citation: 136 F.3d 547
• Decision Date: 18 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1204,97-1204
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terrick Alfred WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 547

136 F.3d 547

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terrick Alfred WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-1204.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 11, 1997.

Decided Feb. 10, 1998.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied March

18, 1998.

D. Warren Hoff, Jr., St. Louis, MO, argued, for Defendant-Appellant.

Stephen R. Welby, Asst.U.S.Atty., St. Louis, MO, argued (Richard L. Poehling, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before HANSEN, ROSS, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Terrick Williams appeals his convictions on counts of carjacking, using a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the admissibility of his confession. We affirm the district court. ¹

I. Factual Background

Williams' convictions arose from two incidents. In the first incident, the evidence offered showed that Edith Cooper and her three-year-old son were waiting in Cooper's parked 1989 Mercury Cougar while Cooper's friend shopped. A man approached Cooper's car and opened its unlocked door. Upon seeing Cooper and her son inside the car, the man said "excuse me," and closed the door. The man then opened the door again, pointed a gun at the child, said "a few choice dirty words" to Cooper, and ordered the two out of the car. (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 109.) Cooper complied with the order by grabbing her son and running into the store. The man drove away in Cooper's car.

The second incident began the next morning when Dr. Jill O'Har drove into the parking lot of the hospital where she worked. O'Har parked her BMW, exited the vehicle and was retrieving items from the passenger side of her car when a man grabbed her from behind and pushed her down towards the interior of her car. The man ordered O'Har not to say anything. Initially, O'Har thought someone was joking with her, but the man continued to push O'Har down toward the passenger seat while pressing his body against her. When O'Har turned she saw the man's face. Fearing she would be killed if she was forced into her car, O'Har began to scream and put her hands on top of the car to resist being pushed into the vehicle. As O'Har continued to scream, the man backed away and grabbed her briefcase from the front seat of the car. O'Har then saw that the man had a revolver in his hand. When another car pulled into the parking lot the man ran to a 1989 Mercury Cougar and drove away. The police later recovered Cooper's 1989 Mercury Cougar parked on a nearby street.

Erin McDonough witnessed the incident involving O'Har from a distance of about 30 feet. She was able to see the man and O'Har during the struggle and saw the man's face as he drove away in the Mercury. Later, both McDonough and O'Har each identified Williams as the man in a police photo array.

Shortly after the incident involving O'Har, the police received an anonymous telephone call stating Williams was responsible for the incident. The caller also gave the police two addresses that Williams allegedly frequented. Following the positive identifications by McDonough and O'Har in the photo array, the police went to one of these addresses and obtained written permission from an occupant to search the premises. The police found Williams during this search, took him into custody, and read him his Miranda rights. Williams stated he understood his rights. The police also recovered a .38 revolver with Williams' fingerprints on it. The officers did not question Williams after his arrest or while transporting him to the police station. Williams also did not assert his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. At the police station, both McDonough and O'Har identified Williams in a lineup. When an officer informed Williams that he had been identified in the lineup, Williams indicated that he wanted to talk with the officer. The officer again advised Williams of his Miranda rights, and Williams again said he understood his rights. After waiving his rights, Williams confessed that he had "jacked a lady for her car" in a store parking lot and had "jacked a lady by a car ... when she started screaming. I took her briefcase and ran back to the car." (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 281.)

The police later went to the second address given by the anonymous caller. After receiving written permission from an occupant to search the premises, the police seized items that the occupant said were not hers. Ms. Cooper identified these items as property that had been in her car before it was stolen. Although Ms. Cooper was unable to identify Williams as the man who stole her car, Williams' fingerprints were found on a telescope that was in the trunk of Cooper's car.

Williams was charged with two counts of carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994), two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A jury convicted him of all charges, and the district court sentenced him to 450 months of imprisonment. Williams appeals his convictions.

II. Analysis

A. Intent Required for Carjacking

Williams first argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of carjacking in either incident, because the government failed to prove that he had a specific intent to cause death or serious bodily harm as required by the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Williams claims the government is required to prove that he possessed an unconditional intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, regardless of whether the victim relinquishes his or her car. The government argues that an intent to cause death or serious bodily harm if the victim does not comply with the defendant's demands is sufficient to satisfy the statute's specific intent requirement. The government asserts there is sufficient evidence to support the jury finding that Williams possessed this conditional intent.

We must interpret the carjacking statute to resolve these conflicting claims. We review the district court's interpretation of the statute de novo. See Loehrer v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 98 F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir.1996). In interpreting a statute "we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1555, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (internal quotations omitted).

The carjacking statute provides as follows:

Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall--

(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,

(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and

(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death.

18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).

Thus, a carjacking conviction requires proof of three basic elements. First, the defendant must have taken or attempted to take a motor vehicle from a "person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation." Id. Second, the defendant must have acted "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Id. Third, the motor vehicle involved must have been "transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce." Id.

At least four of our sister circuits have been confronted with the issue we face here: whether a conditional intent to cause death or serious bodily harm if the victim does not relinquish his or her car satisfies the intent element. The Ninth Circuit answered the question in the negative, holding "[t]he mere conditional intent to harm a victim if she resists is simply not enough to satisfy § 2119's new specific intent requirement." United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir.1996). The court found that the defendant's threat to harm the victim if she did not relinquish her car satisfied the intimidation part of the first element, but was insufficient to show the defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily harm where his accomplices impulsively and independently assaulted the victim. Id. The court reasoned that "to construe a threat to satisfy § 2119's intent element as well as its 'taking' element would be to make surplusage of the intent element." Id. at 665 n. 6. Such an interpretation, the Ninth Circuit concluded would "eliminate" the government's burden to prove "that additional intent element." Id. at 665.

We respectfully disagree with this reasoning. It is very likely, in our view, that the same actions which satisfy the taking by force or intimidation element may also serve to indicate an intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. Consistent with our view, the Tenth Circuit has rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, explaining that the carjacking statute's taking and intent elements do not constitute two separate and distinct "intent requirements." United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1338 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1310, 140 L.Ed.2d 474 (1998). "Instead, the plain language of the statute indicates that the 'tak[ing] ... by force or intimidation' element comprises the actus reus of the crime and the 'intent to cause death or serious bodily harm' element constitutes the mens rea of the crime." Id. at 1338-39 (alterations in original).

In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's rejection of conditional intent, the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits have all held that conditional intent is sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement of § 2119. See United States v. Arnold, 126 F.3d...