USA v. Tiran Rodez Casteel
| Decision Date | 07 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:08-cr-00053.,1:08-cr-00053. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Tiran Rodez CASTEEL and Devan Rodez Casteel, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
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Chad Douglas Primmer, Primmer Law, Council Bluffs, IA, James F. Whalen, Federal Public Defenders Office, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
Clifford D. Wendel, U.S. Attorney's Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Before the Court are numerous post trial motions filed by Tiran Casteel and Devan Casteel (collectively “Defendants”). Devan Casteel filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial on November 27, 2009. Clerk's No. 266. One month later, on December 29, 2009, Devan Casteel filed an Amended Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and New Trial. Clerk's No. 283. Tiran Casteel, likewise, filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and Conditional Motion for New Trial on February 12, 2010. Clerk's No. 304. The Government filed a combined resistance on March 4, 2010. Clerk's No. 310. The Government filed a supplemental resistance on March 31, 2010. Clerk's No. 314. Tiran Casteel filed a reply on April 28, 2010. Clerk's No. 320. Despite Tiran Casteel's request for a hearing, the Court does not believe one is necessary in light of the trial record. The matters are full submitted.
On November 20, 2009, a jury returned guilty verdicts against Defendants on four counts relating to the armed robbery of Darlene Eitzen (“Eitzen”) and the unsuccessful attempt to kill her prior to trial. Clerk's No. 259. More specifically, the jury found both Defendants guilty of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and using or carrying a firearm in relation to a violent crime, namely the carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924. Additionally, the jury found Tiran Casteel guilty of obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and tampering with a witness by attempting to kill, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512. During trial, each Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, both at the close of the Government's case-in-chief and at the close of the evidence. The Court denied Defendants' motions. Tr. at 549, 551.
Defendants now renew their Motions for Judgments of Acquittal. Each Defendant argues that the carjacking conviction is fatally flawed because the conduct of the robbers cannot satisfy the presence or intent requirements of the statute. Devan Casteel's Am. Br. at 12-13; Tiran Casteel's Br. at 12-15. Defendants also implicitly assert that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that they were the individuals who robbed Eitzen's house and stole her vehicle. Defendants, likewise, argue that the convictions for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a violent crime must be dismissed because the predicate carjacking offense is defective. Devan Casteel's Am. Mot. ¶ 4; Tiran Casteel's Br. at 15-16. Tiran Casteel also argues that the Court should grant a judgment of acquittal on the obstruction of justice conviction because the Government presented insufficient evidence of either a “threat” or “endeavor.” Tiran Casteel's Br. at 16-17. Finally, Tiran Casteel argues that the Court should dismiss the witness tampering charge because the Government never proved that Tiran Casteel went beyond “mere preparation” to a “substantial step.” Id. at 18. In the alternative, both Defendants request a new trial in the interest of justice, citing insufficient evidence, various erroneous evidentiary rulings, and improper joinder of Defendants for trial. Devan Casteel's Am. Br. at 14-17; Tiran Casteel's Br. at 19-26.
This Court must enter a judgment of acquittal if the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a); United States v. Water, 413 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir.2005). “This standard is ‘very strict’ and a jury's verdict should not be overturned lightly.” United States v. Boesen, 491 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Ellefson, 419 F.3d 859, 862 (8th Cir.2005)). Although Rule 29 contemplates the occurrence, it is well-settled that “[j]ury verdicts are not lightly overturned.” 1 United States v. Hood, 51 F.3d 128, 129 (8th Cir.1995). Therefore, “[a] motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted only if there is no interpretation of the evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Cacioppo, 460 F.3d 1012, 1021 (8th Cir.2006); accord United States v. Moore, 108 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir.1997) ().
In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, the Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, giving the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence.” United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1310 (8th Cir.1997). The Court can overturn the jury's verdict only if “ ‘a reasonable fact-finder must have entertained a reasonable doubt about the government's proof’ ” on one or more of the essential elements of the crime charged. United States v. Kinshaw, 71 F.3d 268, 271 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Nunn, 940 F.2d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir.1991)). “This standard applies even in cases where a confession dominates the government's proof at trial.” United States v. Kirk, 528 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence presented to the jury, it is important to note that “ ‘[t]he evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt.’ ” United States v. Baker, 98 F.3d 330, 338 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Erdman, 953 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir.1992)). Finally, it is not the Court's role to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses, as these tasks belong to the jury alone. See United States v. Ireland, 62 F.3d 227, 230 (8th Cir.1995) ().
In order to sustain a conviction under the carjacking statute, the Government must have proven beyond a reasonable doubt three elements:
(1) the defendant took or attempted to take a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation; (2) the defendant acted with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm; and (3) the motor vehicle involved has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce.
United States v. Wright, 246 F.3d 1123, 1125 (8th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir.1998)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2119. Defendants stipulated to the third element of the offense, and do not contest the well proven fact that Eitzen's vehicle was taken from her by force or intimidation within the meaning of the statute. Ex. 46. The Court, thus, need only resolve whether the Government presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants did, in fact, take Eitzen's vehicle; that Defendants did so from the “person or presence of another”; and that Defendants “acted with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.”
a. The circumstantial evidence supporting the carjacking conviction.
In their more specific challenges to the presence and intent elements of the offense, Defendants implicitly argue that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that they stole Eitzen's vehicle. See Devan Casteel's Am. Br. at 12-13 (); Tiran Casteel's Br. at 12, 14 (similar). The Court disagrees, however, because of the volume of incriminating circumstantial evidence in this case.
The jury heard evidence that on the night of September 11, 2008, two armed men forcibly entered the home of Eitzen, ordered her to sit in a chair after pointing their weapons at her, and proceeded to steal part of her late husband's coin collection before surreptitiously severing her phone line, destroying her cell phone, and stealing her car. Tr. at 152-64. The jury also heard evidence that a large number of collectable coins, including some in packages containing Eitzen's late husband's handwriting, were found in a vehicle linked to Tiran Casteel and in his residence on September 12, 2008. 2 Id. at 84-90, 101, 106-114. The jury additionally heard evidence that the Government found a recently used four-wheeler with a customized muffler that enabled it to run more quietly, a map roughly depicting a cross country route to Eitzen's residence, and other burglary tools during the search of Tiran Casteel's residence. Id. at 120-21, 128-29, 313-19, 373-74. The jury further heard forensic evidence indicating that, prior to the robbery, the computer in Tiran Casteel's residence was used to search the internet for information on Eitzen and her late husband and that, approximately an hour after the robbery had ended, it was used to research certain collectible coins. Exs. 4-1 to 4-169 (); 8 (showing internet searches for “Eitzen”); 40 (showing the internet searches on the morning of September 12, 2008). Finally, the jury heard evidence from Tiran Casteel's paramour that Tiran and Devan Casteel left on a four-wheeler about an hour prior to the robbery on September 11, 2008 and that Tiran Casteel called her later asking if the police had arrived at his residence. Tr. at 491-92. While each piece of circumstantial evidence could have an innocent explanation, as discussed infra, the collective strength of this...
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