U.S. v. Wilson, 2:03-CR-00882-PGC.
| Decision Date | 13 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:03-CR-00882-PGC.,2:03-CR-00882-PGC. |
| Citation | 350 F.Supp.2d 910 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James Joseph WILSON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Utah |
Barbara Bearnson, Esq., U.S. Attorney's Office, Salt Lake City, UT, for Plaintiff.
Mark S. Kouris, Esq., Utah Federal Defender Office, Scott C. Williams, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION GIVING GREAT WEIGHT TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING APPROPRIATE SENTENCES
Yesterday the Supreme Court handed down its decision in United States v. Booker,1 finding certain provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,2 unconstitutional. The Court first held that the Guidelines violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because they require judges to find facts which in turn increase a defendant's sentence beyond what could be imposed based solely on the jury's verdict. In the second part of the decision, the Court considered whether the unconstitutional portions of the Guidelines could be severed and the rest of the statutory scheme preserved. The Court held that by severing the two provisions in the Act that make the Guidelines mandatory, the rest of the sentencing scheme could be preserved. Specifically, the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), were "incompatible with today's constitutional holding."3 The former provision stated that courts "shall impose a sentence ... within the range" established by the Guidelines.4 The latter provision mandated a de novo standard of review — a standard which, according to the Court, "depends upon the Guidelines' mandatory nature."5 "So modified," the Court continued, "the Federal Sentencing Act ... makes the Guidelines effectively advisory."6
In light of the Supreme Court's holding, this court must now consider just how "advisory" the Guidelines are. The court has before it for sentencing defendant James Joseph Wilson, who has pled guilty to armed bank robbery. In view of his lengthy criminal record and his brandishing of a sawed-off shotgun at several tellers, the Guidelines advise a prison sentence of no less than 188 months. What weight should the court give to this recommended sentence? This issue of the weight to be given to the advisory Guidelines will, of course, recur in all of the court's sentencings unless and until Congress responds to Booker.
Having reviewed the applicable congressional mandates in the Sentencing Reform Act, the court concludes that considerable weight should be given to the Guidelines in determining what sentence to impose. The Sentencing Reform Act requires the court to impose sentences that "reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, [and] protect the public."7 The court must also craft a sentence that "afford[s] adequate deterrence to criminal conduct" and "protect[s] the public from further crimes of the defendant."8 Finally, the court should "avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct."9
Over the last 16 years, the Sentencing Commission has promulgated and honed the Guidelines to achieve these congressional purposes. Congress, too, has approved the Guidelines and indicated its view that Guidelines sentences achieve its purposes. Indeed, with respect to the congressionally-mandated goal of achieving uniformity, the Guidelines are the only way to create consistent sentencing as they are the only uniform standard available to guide the hundreds of district judges around the country. Therefore, in all future sentencings, the court will give heavy weight to the Guidelines in determining an appropriate sentence. In the exercise of its discretion, the court will only depart from those Guidelines in unusual cases for clearly identified and persuasive reasons. In this particular case, the court will follow the Guidelines and give Wilson a sentence of 188 months.
Yesterday's decision in Booker breaks down into two parts. The Court first determined that the Guidelines were unconstitutional because they required judicial fact-finding inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment. This court and a number of others anticipated that outcome six months ago.10 More unexpected was the Court's decision as to the remedy for that constitutional defect. The Court held that, with the exception of two provisions severed from the federal sentencing statutes, the rest of the system remains in place. As Booker explained, Congress would have wanted "to maintain all provisions of the [Sentencing Reform] Act and engraft today's constitutional requirement onto that statutory scheme."11 Thus, the Court severed a provision rendering the Guidelines mandatory — 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) — but left in place the adjoining provision — § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) lists the general purposes of sentencing and directs that the sentencing courts "shall consider" certain factors when imposing sentence. Among the factors listed are "the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established" by the Guidelines.12 This provision, according to Booker, "requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges ... but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well."13 Booker also directs courts to abide by the other provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act:
Without the "mandatory" provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.... The Act ... requires judges to consider the Guidelines sentencing range established for ... the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant, the pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. And the Act ... requires judges to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training and medical care.14
Booker finally held that "the Act continues to provide for appeals from sentencing decisions."15 This means that sentences imposed by district courts must be reasonable given the factors set forth in the Act. One of those factors is the recommended Guidelines sentence. Specifically, 16
In sum, Booker held that while the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the rest of the Sentencing Reform Act is. And the remaining provisions of the Act require the court to consider the Guidelines as one factor in crafting a "reasonable" sentence.
To comply with Booker, this court must now determine how to consider the Guidelines in determining the appropriate a sentence. As Booker held, "the district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing."17 The critical question then becomes how much weight should the Guidelines carry in crafting a sentence.
In his dissent in Booker, Justice Scalia stated that "logic compels the conclusion that the sentencing judge, after considering the recited factors (including the Guidelines) has full discretion, as full as what he possessed before the Act was passed, to sentence anywhere within the statutory range."18 As a general statement of a sentencing judge's legal authority, Justice Scalia's description appears accurate. The wise exercise of that discretionary authority, however, requires a judge to consider how the legal and factual background has changed since the Act was passed. When imposing a sentence today, a district judge has clear congressional directives that a sentence must achieve. Accordingly, the court's discretion is limited to imposing a sentence that satisfies these congressional mandates. In all but the most unusual cases, the appropriate sentence will be the Guidelines sentence.
In imposing sentence, the court is of course circumscribed by any statutory maximum or minimum sentence. In this case, for example, defendant Wilson has pled guilty to armed bank robbery.19 The statutory maximum for this offense is twenty-five years in prison; there is no mandatory minimum sentence, so the lowest possible sentence is probation, without prison time. The court's discretion must operate within these statutory boundaries.
This discretion, however, must also be exercised so as to comply with additional congressional mandates. Even as modified by Booker, the Sentencing Reform Act continues to direct that "[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth" in the Sentencing Reform Act.20 Those purposes are:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner ....21
In light of the congressional command that the court "shall" impose a sentence that is sufficient "to...
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