Uboh v. Reno

• Decision Date: 18 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 95-8557,95-8557
• Citation: 141 F.3d 1000
• Parties: 23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1394 George N. UBOH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Janet RENO, Head of U.S. Dept. Of Justice and Attorney General of the United States, Robert C. Bonner, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Admin., Janis C. Gordon, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mary P. Gholson, Agent, Drug Enforcement Admin., Brian Sullivan, Drug Enforcement Admin., Frank Smith, Agent, Drug Enforcement Admin., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1000

141 F.3d 1000

23 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1394

George N. UBOH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Janet RENO, Head of U.S. Dept. Of Justice and Attorney General of the United States, Robert C. Bonner Administrator, Drug Enforcement Admin., Janis C. Gordon Assistant U.S. Attorney, Mary P. Gholson, Agent, Drug Enforcement Admin., Brian Sullivan, Drug Enforcement Admin. Frank Smith, Agent, Drug Enforcement Admin., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-8557.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

May 18, 1998.

Michael L. Brown, Andrew C. Hall, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Richard H. Deane, Jr., U.S. Atty., Amy Berne Kaminshine, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and O'KELLEY ^*, Senior District Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

This case requires that we decide whether a prosecutor's unilateral decision to dismiss some counts of an indictment following a defendant's conviction on other counts of the same indictment constitutes favorable termination for purposes of the defendant's subsequent Bivens ¹ action for malicious prosecution. Further, we must determine, in light of the particular facts presented in this case, when the causes of action alleged in the complaint accrued and whether these claims are time-barred. The district court dismissed this case after finding that the plaintiff had failed to file the complaint within the time dictated by the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

For purposes of this appeal, the following facts as alleged in the complaint are undisputed: In 1992, federal agents sought and obtained authorization to wiretap George Uboh's telephone. The application for the wiretap was based in part on affidavits provided by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), indicating Uboh's possible involvement in the importation of heroin and cocaine. Uboh subsequently was indicted, along with nineteen co-defendants, for charges related to credit card fraud. Unlike any of his co-defendants, however, Uboh was also indicted on three counts related to the importation of narcotics. Of the nineteen defendants charged in the indictment, Uboh also was the sole defendant denied bond; specifically, a district court judge denied bond initially on February 20, 1992, and on appeal on May 14, 1992. The federal prosecutor based the request for detention without bond on the drug charges set forth in the indictment.

The district court severed the drug-related charges from those counts of the indictment alleging credit card fraud. On February 1, 1993, a jury convicted Uboh of credit card fraud. On July 20, 1993, the district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the drug charges.

Uboh filed this Bivens action ² and alleged, inter alia, that DEA agents Mary P. Gholson, Brian Sullivan, and Frank Smith falsified affidavits for Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Janis C. Gordon, who knowingly used the false affidavits to obtain authorization for a wiretap on Uboh's telephone. Uboh further alleged that Gordon intentionally sought his indictment on fabricated charges of conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine and heroin, and that the district court denied him bond solely due to Gordon's assertion that Uboh was involved in illegal drug activity.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the claims were time-barred, the federal defendants were entitled either to absolute or qualified immunity, and the allegations were insufficient to state a constitutional violation. The district court granted the motion to dismiss exclusively on the basis of the statute of limitations. The court reasoned that the statute of limitations for a Bivens claim was analogous to Georgia's two-year personal injury statute of limitations and that, under our Bivens case law, an action accrued at the time the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of his claims. The court explicitly rejected Uboh's assertion of a malicious prosecution cause of action on the ground that this type of claim arose only under state law. The court further determined that, because Uboh became aware of his claims at the time of his indictment or, at the latest, when his bond was denied on appeal, the statute of limitations barred his claims. Uboh filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that, consistent with the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), his claims did not accrue until the criminal charges against him were dismissed. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, Uboh argues that, although the district court properly determined that the claims presented are subject to a two-year statute of limitations, the court erroneously failed to treat his allegations as akin to the federal constitutional tort of malicious prosecution and, as a result, erred in determining the date on which the causes of action accrued. The defendants originally asked that we affirm the district court's decision for the reasons discussed in that court's opinion; in a supplemental brief, however, the defendants appear to have shifted gears entirely and argue, instead, that because Uboh has failed to establish the elements of a Bivens, malicious prosecution claim, the general rule regarding the accrual date of a Bivens cause of action should obtain and the claims should be deemed time-barred. ³

II. DISCUSSION

We independently review the district court's ruling concerning the applicable statute of limitations. Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157, 159 (11th Cir.1992). Federal courts apply their forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; similarly, we have held that the application of the state personal injury statute of limitations period obtains in the context of Bivens actions as well. See Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir.1996). It is undisputed in this case that Georgia's two-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to Uboh's constitutional claims.

A statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. Id. The question of when the limitations period begins to run, however, is one of federal law. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-71, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942-44, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Here, the district court construed Uboh's claim of malicious prosecution solely as a state law cause of action and noted that "the plaintiff ignores that [sic] fact that he is not suing the defendants for violation of any state law; indeed, Bivens creates a cause of action only for a violation of federally created rights." R1-20 at 3. The district court went on to find that the plaintiff had failed to show that he was unaware of the alleged injury caused by the wiretaps, the indictment, and the denial of bond at the time those events transpired. Consequently, because even the last of those events occurred more than two years prior to the filing of this action, the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. See id.

In the first instance, the district court erred in failing to recognize in Uboh's complaint the assertion of an established, federally-protected constitutional right. Indeed, there has been a remarkable divergence of opinion among the circuit courts as to both the extent to which the claim of malicious prosecution gives rise to a federal cause of action and, assuming that such a claim is cognizable, its constitutional source; our court, however, unequivocally has identified malicious prosecution to be a constitutional tort that is cognizable under § 1983. ⁴ In Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581 (11th Cir.1996), for instance, we observed that

[l]abeling ... a section 1983 claim as one for a "malicious prosecution" can be a shorthand way of describing a kind of legitimate section 1983 claim; the kind of claim where the plaintiff, as part of the commencement of a criminal proceeding, has been unlawfully and forcibly restrained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and injuries, due to that seizure, follow as the prosecution goes ahead.

Id. at 584; accord Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2nd Cir.1995) ("The Fourth Amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person--i.e., the right to be free of unreasonable or unwarranted restraints on personal liberty."); Smart v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Illinois, 34 F.3d 432, 434 (7th Cir.1994) ("If malicious prosecution or abuse of process is committed by state actors and results in the arrest or other seizure of the defendant ... we now know that the defendant's only constitutional remedy is under the Fourth Amendment...."). Preliminary to our discussion of the merits of Uboh's challenge to the district court's final disposition with respect to the statute of limitations, therefore, we note that the district court erred in failing to treat the claims asserted in this case as premised on a theory of malicious prosecution pursuant to the Fourth Amendment; contrary to the district court's stated justification for its decision, such a cause of action does constitute a cognizable Bivens claim. ⁵

Having determined that the complaint presented in this case must be construed as setting forth allegations that comprise a malicious prosecution claim, we next must decide whether the causes of action asserted are barred by the statute of limitations. As noted, the issue of whether the district court properly applied Georgia's two-year statute of limitations regarding personal injury causes of action is undisputed; the contested point, rather, is when Uboh's claims accrued. Uboh argues that, consistent with the jurisprudence of this circuit and ...