Ueland v. Bd. of Park Com'rs of City of Minneapolis (In re Improvement of Lake of the Isles Park)

• Decision Date: 21 April 1922
• Docket Number: No. 22718.,22718.
• Citation: 188 N.W. 59,152 Minn. 39
• Parties: In re IMPROVEMENT OF LAKE OF THE ISLES PARK. UELAND v. BOARD OF PARK COM'RS OF CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

152 Minn. 39

188 N.W. 59

In re IMPROVEMENT OF LAKE OF THE ISLES PARK.UELAND

v.BOARD OF PARK COM'RS OF CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS.

No. 22718.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 21, 1922.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Chas. S. Jelley, Judge.

Proceeding by the Board of Park Commissioners of the City of Minneapolis for the improvement of the Lake of the Isles Park, etc. From an order confirming the report of the Commissioners appointed to assess his property, Andreas Ueland appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Special benefits to lands in the locality of a tract acquired and dedicated to the public as a park may result from such acquisition and dedication although the land is left in its natural state, and there may be an immediate assessment of such benefits.

Successive special assessments may be levied if they are not for the same improvement. The power to levy them is continuous and coextensive with benefits received.

Under chapter 185, Laws 1911, as amended (Gen. St. 1913, Gen. St. Supp. 1917, § 1566 et seq.), curbs and gutters along the side of a street upon which a park borders may be included in a special assessment for benefits resulting from the improvement of the park, and the concurrence of the city council in the resolution of the park board authorizing the improvement is not necessary.

Whether or not the public interests will be served by a public improvement is a political and not a judicial question. Ueland & Ueland, of Minneapolis, for appellant.

James D. Shearer, of Minneapolis, for respondent.

LEES, C.

This is an appeal by a property owner from the order reviewed in Re Improvement, Appeal of Beltz, decided herewith, 188 N. W. 54, in which many of the questions raised on this appeal are disposed of. We shall refer only to those which were not there involved.

1. In 1890 the park board purchased and designated as a park 25 acres of land south of Lake Calhoun. The purchase price was $113,000. The board resolved to assess that amount upon lands specially benefited. Appellant's property was accordingly assessed $3,320, and the assessment was paid. In 1908 the board acquired additional land on the shore of the lake for a parkway, and another assessment of $498 was levied on appellant's property and paid. About 10 acres of the tract first purchased was low, marshy ground, not then in condition to be used for any purpose. The second tract was not passable for vehicles. The park board now proposes to improve both tracts of low land, and to assess two-thirds of the cost upon private property specially benefited, including appellant's property already assessed as above stated. He strenuously objects, on the ground that this will be a second assessment for the same benefit. If that be true, the assessment cannot be sustained. State v. District Court, 66 Minn. 161, 68 N. W. 860. Prior to the enactment of the Elwell Law, the special acts applicable to Minneapolis provided that, as soon as the amount required for the purchase and condemnation of land selected for a park or parkway had been ascertained with reasonable certainty, the park board should determine what percentage, if any, of the amount so ascertained should be assessed upon the lands benefited by such park or parkway. Chapter 281, Spec. L. 1883, and chapter 30, Spec. L. 1889. Assessments were limited to a percentage of the cost of the land. No authority was granted to assess for benefits from the improvement of the land. The resolution for the first assessment contained the explicit statement that it was for 100 per cent. of the cost of the land. Clearly no assessment was authorized and none was levied for benefits which might result from subsequent improvements. The conclusion would seem to follow that the assessment now levied is for new benefits. Appellant vigorously combats this conclusion. He insists that it is absurd to say that his land was benefited by having the marsh in front of it owned by the city instead of by private individuals; that there could be no valid assessment except for actual benefits, which could only accrue when the unsightly spot was transformed into a park or parkway, and that the previous assessments included the cost of the land and benefits resulting from putting it to the use for which it was acquired. The argument is plausible, and is reinforced by a dictum in the opinion of Mr. Justice Mitchell in State v. District Court, 66 Minn. 161, 68 N. W. 860, and by the definition of ‘park’ and ‘parkway’ in Kleopfert v. Minneapolis, 90 Minn. 158, 95 N. W. 908, but we are unable to give it our approval. When land is acquired for and designated as a public park, the owners of adjoining lands have the assurance that an open plot of ground, either in its natural state or with such additions as are appropriate for parks and parkways, will be permanently maintained. They are assured against the uses to which it may be put while privately owned, uses which not infrequently are detrimental to the value of adjacent lands.

The first step in the establishment of a park is to acquire the land and dedicate it to public use. This alone may enhance the value of property in the neighborhood, although the land is left in a state of nature. It may even confer greater benefits than the subsequent improvement or adornment of the land, and an immediate assessment of such benefits may be made. Thus in State v. District Court, 75 Minn. 292, 77 N. W. 968, an assessment to cover part of the purchase...