Ufw v. Dutra Farms

• Decision Date: 27 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. H019659.,H019659.
• Citation: 83 Cal.App.4th 1146,100 Cal.Rptr.2d 251
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. DUTRA FARMS et al., Defendants and Appellants.

100 Cal.Rptr.2d 251

83 Cal.App.4th 1146

UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. DUTRA FARMS et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. H019659.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District.

September 27, 2000.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing October 25, 2000.

Review Denied December 20, 2000.^*

Terrence R. O'Connor, Salinas, for Defendant and Appellant Dutra Farms.

Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy and Mathiason and Randolph C. Roeder, Philip L. Ross, San Francsco, and Tracy L. Parola; and Terrence R. O'Connor, Salinas, for Defendant and Appellant Clint Miller Farms, Inc.

Robert P. Roy for Ventura County Agricultural Association as Amicus Curiae in support of Defendants and Appellants.

Altshuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Berzon & Rubin and Stephen P. Berzon and Scott A. Kronland, San Francisco, Marcos Camacho,

Keene, and Annabelle G. Cortez, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

ELIA, J.

The United Farmworkers of America, AFL-CIO and associated individuals ("UFW") sued appellants Dutra Farms and Clint Miller Farms, Inc. for unfair business practices and for violating Labor Code section 1155.4, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 1155.4(c)).¹ The UFW moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, entered judgment for the UFW, and declared that appellants violated section 1155.4(c). The court also enjoined appellant Clint Miller Farms from violating the statute in the future.

On appeal, the main issue is the applicability of section 1155.4(c). In essence, section 1155.4(c) prohibits agricultural employers from giving anything of value to employee groups for the purpose of causing such employee groups to influence other employees regarding their collective bargaining rights. Like the trial court, we conclude that section 1155.4 applies to these circumstances. We will therefore affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts are as follows.

In 1996, the UFW announced an ongoing campaign to organize strawberry pickers into a union. Subsequently, the "Pro Workers Committee" (PWC) was formed to oppose the UFW. Several Miller employees and several Dutra employees participated in the initial PWC meetings. In January 1997, PWC changed its name to Ag Workers of America (AWA). AWA incorporated as a non-profit corporation. Its president, vice president, secretary and treasurer were all either Miller or Dutra employees. In June of 1997, AWA was, in essence, replaced by the Agricultural Workers Committee (the AWC), a nonprofit corporation with the same officers, address, telephone numbers, and logo as the AWA.

Hereafter, we refer to PWC, AWC, and AWA as "the Committee."²

The Committee "held weekly evening meetings during the growing season in a rented hall in Watsonville, held smaller board meetings, and organized public activities such as marches and demonstrations." One such march, held in August 1996, included thousands of farm workers from at least 14 employers other than Miller or Dutra. Employees of "dozens" of different agricultural employers "belonged to" the Committee "and/or" actively participated in its activities.

Dutra paid $1,163 for rental of portable toilets used in the August 1996 march. On two occasions in early 1997, Miller donated $250 to the Committee, for a total contribution of $500.

The UFW then sued Dutra, Miller, and others for violating section 1155.4(c). The UFW also alleged that appellants' violation of section 1155.4 constituted an unfair business practice. (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200.) The UFW moved for summary judgment.³ The trial court granted the motion.

In its summary judgment order, the trial court stated:

"[T]he Court finds that there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether defendants Clint Miller Farms and Dutra Farms violated California Labor Code § 1155.4, in that the evidence is uncontroverted that Clint Miller Farms and Dutra Farms are agricultural employers; that Clint Miller Farms paid or delivered money or other things of value by delivering two checks to the Ag Workers of America; that Dutra Farms paid or delivered money or other things of value by paying the bill for rental of latrines for the August 10, 1996 Pro Workers Committee march; and that such payments or deliveries of money or other things of value were to committees of employees of defendant agricultural employers for the purposes of influencing employees in the exercise of their rights to organize and bargain collectively through representatives."⁴

The trial court then entered a separate final judgment against appellants. (Code Civ. Proa, § 579.) In the judgment, the trial court declared that appellants had violated section 1155.4(c) and also enjoined appellant Clint Miller Farms from violating the statute in the future. The trial court declined to enter an injunction against Dutra Farms. Because Dutra had committed only one undisputed violation, the trial court decided that the declaratory judgment would be sufficient to prevent future violations of the law.

This appeal ensued.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is granted when there are no triable issues as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proa, § 437c, subd.(c).) When reviewing a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment, we must identify the issues framed by the pleadings, and determine whether the moving party has established facts which negate the opposing party's facts and justify a judgment in the moving party's favor. When the moving party's facts prima facie justify a judgment, we determine whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1252-1253, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022.)

DISCUSSION

I. Section 11554(c)

The UFW argues that section 1155.4 applies to these circumstances. Appellants disagree.⁵ As we will explain, we conclude that the statute applies and that the trial court properly entered summary judgment for the UFW.

A. Language of Section 11554(c)

We begin with the statutory language. Section 1155.4 provides, in relevant part, "It shall be unlawful for any agricultural employer or association of agricultural employers, or any person who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an agricultural employer, or who acts in the interest of an agricultural employer, to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value to any of the following: [¶] ... [¶] (c) Any employee or group or committee of employees of such employer in excess of their normal compensation for the purpose of causing such employee or group or committee directly or indirectly to influence any other employees in the exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."

B. Contentions of Parties

According to appellants, section 1155.4(c) does not apply when one or more employers, who do not constitute an association of employers, give things of value to employee committees that consist of employees of more than one employer. Appellants emphasize that section 1155.4 refers to "any agricultural employer or association of agricultural employers or any person who acts as a labor relations expert ..." while subdivision (c) refers to employees "of such employer ...." Relying upon the words "of such employer," appellants believe that subdivision (c) does not apply because the Committee consisted of employees from several different employers, rather than consisting primarily of appellants' employees.

Disagreeing, the UFW states that appellants' construction of section 1155.4(c) is plainly inconsistent with the statute's purpose and would permit employers to easily evade the statutory prohibition by, for example, simply including one non-employee member on a committee. The UFW emphasizes that the statute must be construed to achieve the legislative objective and that therefore section 1155.4(c) is meant to prohibit the conduct occurring in this case.⁶

C. History of Section 11554

In addressing this issue, we first consider section 1155.4's legislative history. Section 1155.4 was enacted as part of the Alatorre-Zenovich-Dunlap-Berman Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975 (ALRA). (§ 1140 et seq.) In enacting that legislation, the Legislature stated that "It is hereby stated to be the policy of the State of California to encourage and protect the right of agricultural employees to full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of their `employment, and to be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." (Stats.1975, 3d Ex.Sess., ch. 1, § 2, pp. 4013-4014.)

The California Act was in large measure modeled upon the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). (Vista Verde Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 307, 311-312, 172 Cal.Rptr. 720, 625 P.2d 263.) Section 1155.4 is virtually identical to a provision of the federal Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, which is popularly known as the Taft-Hartley Act (hereafter Taft-Hartley). The primary difference between section 1155.4 and the provision in Taft-Hartley is that section 1155.4 adds the words "agricultural" in appropriate places to make plain that, unlike Taft-Hartley, it applies to agricultural employers and employees. (See Taft-Hartley, § 302(a), 29 U.S.C., § 186(a).) The fact that section 1155.4 was modeled upon 29 United States Code section 186 is also indicated by express statutory references to the federal act. (See e.g. §§ 1155.6; 1140.4.)

The parties agree that the Legislature adopted section 1155.4 with no particular intent other than to extend the protections of...