Ugolini v. States Marine Lines

• Decision Date: 15 June 1967
• Docket Number: No. 38193,38193
• Citation: 71 Wn.2d 404,429 P.2d 213
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Dominick UGOLINI, Respondent, v. STATES MARINE LINES, Appellant.

Page 404

71 Wn.2d 404

429 P.2d 213

Dominick UGOLINI, Respondent, v. STATES MARINE LINES, Appellant.

No. 38193.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

June 15, 1967.

Bogle, Gates, Dobrin, Wakefield & Long, Robert V. Holland, Seattle, for appellant.

Farris, Bangs & Horowitz, Donald Horowitz, Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Judge.

July 30, 1962, Dominick Ugolini suffered a heart attack while on board the SS. Beaver State, owned by the States Marine Lines. This injury was not attributable to his employment. At the time in question, the ship was en route from the east coast of the United States to Yokohama, Japan, and had passed through the Panama Canal.

Immediately after suffering the heart attack, Mr. Ugolini was taken to the quarters which he shared with two other seamen. The room was small, hot, stuffy, and crowded. Mr. Ugolini could have been taken to the ship's hospital which was larger, not crowded, and better ventilated. The ship's captain contacted the medical officer in charge of the United States Public Health Service Hospital at San Francisco, and followed his advice in treating Mr. Ugolini. On the second day after his heart attack, Mr. Ugolini was taken ashore at Acapulco, Mexico, and admitted to the Sacred Heart Hospital, where he was treated for approximately 14 days and then released.

Upon being released from the hospital and while awaiting air transportation to Seattle, Mr. Ugolini was taken to the LaPlaza Hotel in Acapulco by the shoreside representative of States Marine Lines. He was assigned a room on the third floor. There were no elevators in the hotel, and Mr. Ugolini was required to use three flights of stairs. During his stay in the hotel, he complained to the shoreside representative that the room was hot; that it was necessary for him to walk up and down three flights of stairs; that no one in the hotel spoke English, and that he could not make himself understood. The shoreside representative did not remedy these conditions.

Three days later, the shoreside representative arranged for air transportation to Seattle. Upon his arrival at Seattle, Mr. Ugolini made application and was admitted to the United States Public Health Service Hospital where he was treated for approximately 30 days as an in-patient, and thereafter as an out-patient.

This action was instituted by Mr. Ugolini, under the provisions of the general maritime law and the Jones Act, to recover damages for an alleged aggravation of his heart condition caused by the alleged negligent treatment of Mr. Ugolini while on board the ship and after his release from the Sacred Heart Hospital at Acapulco, Mexico. He did not claim damages for the heart attack, but for aggravation only. Mr. Ugolini also sought compensation for maintenance and cure at the rate of $8 a day, commencing with the day of his release from the hospital in Seattle and ending when he was cured as far as possible, alleging further that he is now incapacitated for work. States Marine Lines denied liability.

The cause was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $45,500 for breach of the obligation to provide care, and $3,280 for maintenance and cure.

From the judgment entered on the verdict, States Marine Lines has appealed.

The appellant's first two assignments of error are directed to the court's failure to dismiss the respondent's cause of action on the grounds (1) that the respondent failed to prove a prima facie case of negligence, and (2) that respondent failed to establish a causal relationship between the alleged negligent acts and his alleged aggravated heart condition.

A motion to dismiss involves no element of discretion. The evidence and all inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant party. Sullins v. Sullins, 65 Wash.2d 283, 285, 396 P.2d 886 (1964), and cases cited. The cause should be taken from the jury only if it can be held, as a matter of law, that there is no substantial evidence to sustain a verdict in favor of the nonmovant party. Pearsall v. Paltas, 48 Wash.2d 78, 80, 291 P.2d 414 (1955), and cases cited.

The record before us establishes that the room in which Mr. Ugolini was placed immediately following his heart attack was small, poorly ventilated, and hot; that the ship's hospital room was available; also, that the room in the LaPlaza Hotel at Acapulco was hot; that the respondent was required to walk up and down three flights of stairs, and that his inability to communicate with others in the hotel caused anxiety. Respondent's doctor testified that this combination of circumstances constituted improper care and probably aggravated his condition. This evidence, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligence.

With reference to the allegation that the respondent failed to prove a causal relationship between the alleged negligent acts of the appellant and the alleged aggravated heart condition, the record establishes that, in the opinion of his doctor, Mr. Ugolini's condition could have been cured with proper treatment; that the treatment he received both on board the ship and in the hotel 'must have had an adverse effect on his condition,' and that 'He would have probably less chance of returning to good health and work in view of this.'

The rule of law in this state is settled with respect to the sufficiency of medical testimony to carry a case to the jury and support a jury verdict. In recent years, it has been repeated many times. It was clearly stated in Orcutt v. Spokane Cy., 58 Wash.2d 846, 364 P.2d 1102 (1961). In that case, we held that the medical testimony as to a causal relationship between the liability-producing situation and the claimed injuries or subsequent condition must be, 'that the injury 'probably' or 'more likely than not' caused the subsequent condition, rather than that the accident or injury 'might have,' 'could have,' or 'possibly did' cause the subsequent condition. Bland v. King County, 1959, 55 Wash.2d 902, 342 P.2d 599, 351 P.2d 153; Clevenger v. Fonseca, 1959, 55 Wash.2d 25, 345 P.2d 1098.'

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss.

Appellant next assigns error to the court's refusal to permit it to establish the status of its shoreside representative to be that of an independent contractor. The appellant contends that its...