Ullman v. Brunswick Title Guar. & Loan Co

• Decision Date: 12 August 1895
• Parties: ULLMAN. v. BRUNSWICK TITLE GUARANTY & LOAN CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

24 S.E. 409

96 Ga. 625

ULLMAN.

v.BRUNSWICK TITLE GUARANTY & LOAN CO.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Aug. 12, 1895.

Corporations— Transaction with Decedent-Director as Witness—Widow's Support —Priority Over Debts.

1. There is nothing in the evidence act of 1889, or the amendments thereto, which excludes a director or other agent of a corporation from testifying as a witness in a case to which the corporation is a party, concerning transactions had between such director or agent in behalf of the corporation and a person since deceased, whose executor or administrator is the other party to the case.

2. A widow's claim to a year's support out of the estate of her deceased husband is as to personal property belonging to such estate superior to the claim of a creditor for an unpaid balance of purchase money due by the deceased for such property.

3. Where personal property was pledged as collateral security for the payment of a promissory note, and the pledgor died, the legal title to the property pledged was so far vested in his estate as to render such property liable for the payment of the widow's year's support as against the claim of the creditor holding the note secured by the pledge.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Glynn county; J. L. Sweat, Judge.

Petition by Prances Ullman, executrix, against the Brunswick Title Guaranty & Loan Company for injunction. There was a decree for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

Crovatt & Whitfield, for plaintiff in error.

Goodyear, Kay & Brantley, for defendant in error.

SIMMONS, C. J. 1. The only cases Id which persons are incompetent to testify in the courts of this state as to transactions or communications with deceased persons are those specified in the act of October 29, 1889, amendatory of section 3854 of the Code. Subsection c of the act deals with suits instituted or defended by a corporation, and declares that in such cases "the opposite party shall not be admitted to testify in his own behalf to transactions or communications solely with a deceased or insane officer or agent of the corporation, and not also with surviving and sane persons, officers, or agents of said corporation"; but no provision is made as to cases in which the suit is between a corporation and the representative of a party who has since died, and the testimony sought to be introduced Is that of an officer or agent of the corporation as to transactions or communications with such deceased person. That this statute is not to be extended by construction so as to embrace cases not strictly within its letter is made clear by the act itself, it being declared therein that "there shall be no other exceptions allowed under this paragraph by any court [i. e. exceptions to the general rule of competency laid down in the section amended] than those herein set forth." See Woodson v. Jones, 92 Ga. 663, 664, 19 S. E....