Ullmannglass v. Oneida, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 23 October 2014
• Citation: 121 A.D.3d 1371,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 07234,995 N.Y.S.2d 776
• Parties: ULLMANNGLASS et al., Appellants–Respondents, v. ONEIDA, LTD., et al., Respondents–Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

?121 A.D.3d 1371
995 N.Y.S.2d 776
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 07234

ULLMANNGLASS et al., Appellants–Respondents,
v.
ONEIDA, LTD., et al., Respondents–Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Oct. 23, 2014

Affirmed.

[995 N.Y.S.2d 777]

Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer, P.C., Burlington, Vermont, (Gary L. Franklin of counsel), for appellants-respondents.

Bond Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Syracuse (Louis Orbach of counsel), for respondents-appellants.

Before: PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, GARRY, ROSE and CLARK, JJ. PETERS, P.J.

Cross appeals from an order of the Supreme Court (Cerio Jr., J.), entered August 13, 2013 in Madison County, which granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Plaintiffs commenced this action against defendants asserting various tort claims based upon defendants' alleged interference with a consulting contract between plaintiff Norbert Ullmann and Inn Crystal Vertriebsg MBH. More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants made disparaging and false remarks about them to principals of Inn Crystal, which caused it to cancel the consulting contract. Prior

[995 N.Y.S.2d 778]

to answering, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations and for failure to state a cause of action. Supreme Court partially granted the motion and dismissed plaintiffs' cause of action for injurious falsehood and business disparagement, but left intact plaintiffs' claims for tortious interference with contractual relations and tortious interference with prospective business relations. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed (86 A.D.3d 827, 927 N.Y.S.2d 702 [2011] ). Defendants then moved for summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims. Supreme Court, while concluding that those claims were not time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4] ), dismissed them based upon a lack of causation between defendants' alleged actions and the cancellation of the consulting contract as well as the ending of plaintiffs' business relationship with Inn Crystal. Plaintiffs appeal,¹ and defendants cross-appeal.²

Causation is an essential element of a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations. Such a cause of action requires proof that, “but for” the defendants' conduct, the plaintiff would not have breached its contract with a third party ( see DiFabio v. Jordan, 113 A.D.3d 1109, 1110, 979 N.Y.S.2d 214 [2014]; Hobler v. Hussain, 111 A.D.3d 1006, 1008, 975 N.Y.S.2d 212 [2013]; Schmidt & Schmidt, Inc. v. Town of Charlton, 103 A.D.3d 1011, 1015, 962 N.Y.S.2d 393 [2013] ).

In opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs submitted a letter—not previously disclosed during discovery—that was...