Ullom v. Miller

• Decision Date: 23 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 34864.,34864.
• Citation: 227 W.Va. 1,705 S.E.2d 111
• Parties: Debbie L. ULLOM, Petitioner Below, Appelleev.Joe E. MILLER, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Defendant Below, Appellant.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

227 W.Va. 1

705 S.E.2d 111

Debbie L. ULLOM, Petitioner Below, Appellee

v.Joe E. MILLER, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 34864.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted March 9, 2010.Decided Nov. 23, 2010.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained in W. Va.Code § 29A–5–4(a) and reviews questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.” Syllabus Point 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

2 “In cases where the circuit court has amended the result before the administrative agency, this Court reviews the final order of the circuit court and the ultimate disposition by it of an administrative law case under an abuse of discretion standard and reviews questions of law de novo.” Syllabus Point 2, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W.Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

3. “Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article III, Section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. The exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there must be a showing by those who seek exemption that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.” Syllabus Point 1, State v. Moore, 165 W.Va. 837, 272 S.E.2d 804 (1980), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Julius, 185 W.Va. 422, 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991).

4. “Police officers may stop a vehicle to investigate if they have an articulable reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is subject to seizure or a person in the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime....” Syllabus Point 1, State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428, 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994).

5. “When evaluating whether or not particular facts establish reasonable suspicion, one must examine the totality of the circumstances, which includes both quantity and quality of the information known to the police.” Syllabus Point 2, State v. Stuart, 192 W.Va. 428, 452 S.E.2d 886 (1994).

6. The “community caretaker” doctrine is a widely recognized exception to the general warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

7. For an encounter to come within the “community caretaker” doctrine exception to the warrant requirement, the State must establish that: (1) given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable and prudent police officer would have perceived a need to promptly act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaker duties; (2) Community caretaking must be the objectively reasonable, independent and substantial justification for the intrusion; (3) the police officer's action must be apart from the intent to arrest, or the detection, investigation, or acquisition of criminal evidence; and (4) the police officer must be able to articulate specific facts that, taken with rational inferences, reasonably warrant the intrusion.

8. “In administrative proceedings under W. Va.Code, 17C–5A–1 et seq. , the commissioner of motor vehicles must consider and give substantial weight to the results of related criminal proceedings involving the same person who is the subject of the administrative proceeding before the commissioner, when evidence of such results is presented in the administrative proceeding.” Syllabus Point 3, Choma v. West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles, 210 W.Va. 256, 557 S.E.2d 310 (2001).

Darrell V. McGraw, Esq., Attorney General, Scott E. Johnson, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Appellants.Jason M. Glass, Esq., Todd F. La Neve, Esq., La Neve Law Offices, Jane Lew, WV, for Appellee.Marvin W. Masters, Esq., Richard A. Monahan, Esq., The Masters Law Firm, LC, Charleston, WV, for Amicus Curiae, West Virginia Troopers' Association, Inc.

BENJAMIN, Justice:

The respondent below and appellant, Joe E. Miller, Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles (“the Commissioner”), appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Marshall County, West Virginia, entered on November 12, 2008. In its order, the circuit court reversed the Commissioner's administrative order revoking appellee's license to operate a motor vehicle in West Virginia following appellee's arrest for driving under the influence of an intoxicating substance (“DUI”). In reversing the Commissioner, the circuit court found that the arresting officer did not have the “requisite reasonable suspicion” to detain the appellee, Ms. Debbie Ullom (“appellee”), and that the appellee was later acquitted of the related criminal charges arising from this arrest. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments, the briefs of the parties,¹ the record designated for our consideration, and relevant authorities, we reverse the decision of the circuit court.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This appeal is brought on behalf of the Commissioner and seeks review of the November 12, 2008, order of the Circuit Court of Marshall County, which reinstated the driving privileges of the appellee. Ms. Ullom's driving privileges were at risk because of her arrest on June 26, 2006, for driving under the influence of an intoxicating substance. After Ms. Ullom's arrest on criminal charges, the Commissioner initiated license revocation proceedings pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C–5A–1(c).² Ms. Ullom timely requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge. This hearing was commenced on September 29, 2006. At the hearing on this matter, the arresting officer, West Virginia State Trooper R.J. Buskirk testified about the facts and circumstances giving rise to the appellee's arrest. The trooper stated that while he was on routine patrol at dusk around 8:39 p.m. on June 26, 2006, he observed a white Subaru parked off the side of the road, clearly off the roadway, with its parking lights on. The location of the car was not in the way of oncoming traffic and the car was parked in front of a chain gate blocking what appeared to be a dirt road leading to a field. The vehicle's emergency flashers were not engaged. There was no indication, in the form of a light, towel, scarf or other physical object hanging from the driver's side window, that there was a need for assistance. The car's engine was not running. Trooper Buskirk testified at the revocation hearing that he did not observe the operator of the Subaru driving in any unacceptable manner. He testified that he initiated a road safety check of the vehicle by stopping his cruiser and approaching the vehicle. He determined that the appellee was the only occupant of the car. As he was talking to the appellee, the trooper noted that the keys were in the ignition and the driver's seat was “in an upright manner that would corroborate with” the appellee's height. The officer noted that appellee had glassy, bloodshot eyes and was speaking with slurred speech. The appellee's motor skills were unsteady. The officer also detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. The trooper requested that the appellee perform a series of field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus, one-leg stand and walk-and-turn. At the hearing, the officer stated the appellee failed all these tests as well as a preliminary breath test. The appellee was then placed under arrest for driving under the influence and was transported to the Marshall County Sheriff's Office. While a secondary breath analysis was attempted, the appellee failed to provide sufficient samples and thus, no testing was completed. While in police custody, the appellee admitted to drinking approximately four beers and to driving the Subaru on a public highway.

After the arrest, the trooper completed and filed with the Commissioner a document entitled “Statement of Arresting Officer,” triggering the start of the administrative driver's license revocation proceeding. By letter dated July 13, 2006, the Commissioner suspended the driving privileges of the appellee effective August 17, 2006. The appellee timely filed a request for a hearing five days later on July 18, 2006.

In the subsequent administrative hearing, the hearing officer found that while the arresting officer did not observe the appellee driving, “all of the surrounding circumstances indicate that the white Subaru could not otherwise have been in its location unless driven there by the petitioner [appellee].” In terms of a justification for the stop, the hearing examiner found that “a vehicle in such a position off a rural roadway, with its parking lights engaged, would reasonably lead a police officer to initiate a road safety check.” Therefore, the hearing officer found that any observations made by the arresting officer following his initial contact with the appellee were properly a part of the record upon which the revocation was based.

By order dated December 18, 2006,³ the appellee's driver's license was suspended for a period of six months effective with the date of the order. The appellee thereupon filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court of Marshall County on November 13, 2006.

In its November 8, 2008, order reversing the DMV's revocation, the circuit court ruled that “the Arresting Officer did not have reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop and make a lawful arrest of the petitioner [Appellee] for driving under the influence of alcohol. The facts in the instant case and the testimony of the Arresting Officer provided indicate that the petitioner [Appellee] did not commit, was not committing, and was not going to commit a crime pursuant to the requirements for reasonable suspicion.” The circuit court found that there was insufficient admissible evidence presented to show by...