UNEMPLOYED WKRS. ORGANIZING COM. v. Batterton

• Decision Date: 11 September 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. M-77-1166.
• Citation: 477 F. Supp. 509
• Parties: UNEMPLOYED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Richard A. BATTERTON et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

477 F. Supp. 509

UNEMPLOYED WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Richard A. BATTERTON et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. M-77-1166.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

September 11, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

C. Christopher Brown, Judith F. Fournelle, and Barbara B. Mello, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

Carolyn I. Polowy, Baltimore, Md., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JAMES R. MILLER, Jr., District Judge.

This action is presently before the court on the plaintiffs' motion for award of attorneys' fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The plaintiffs seek an award of $15,625 as fees for the three attorneys serving as counsel on their behalf in this case.

I

The plaintiffs initiated this action on July 20, 1977 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendant infringed upon their constitutional rights by denying them the right to "distribute noncommercial leaflets to, solicit petition signatures from, engage interested persons in conversation within the public access areas of Baltimore Employment Security Administration (ESA) office in a manner which does not interfere with the normal course of ESA business." On June 12, 1978 the parties filed a settlement agreement in this matter, thereby resolving all issues except for the plaintiffs' claim for attorneys fees. Under the terms of the settlement agreement the defendant agreed to allow UWOC members to enter the ESA building for the purposes of distribution of pamphlets, collection of petition signatures, and conversations with claimants or other members of the public, subject to reasonable limitations on the time, place, and manner of entrance. The plaintiffs presently seek an award of attorneys fees for the reasonable value of the time spent by plaintiffs' counsel in securing this settlement.

The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub.L.No.94-559 (Oct. 19, 1976) was enacted by Congress in large part to bridge the gap created by the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), which limited cases in which a court could award attorneys' fees to those in which (1) a party acted in bad faith, (2) counsel helped secure a fund for the common benefit of a class, or (3) a statute specifically provided for attorneys' fee awards. The Act specifically provides for attorneys' fees in Civil Rights cases as follows:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

The legislative history of the Act stresses the fact that civil rights laws depend heavily on private enforcement, thus making fee awards an important impetus to encourage private citizens to pursue appropriate relief under these laws. S.Rep.No.1011, 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1976). The standard under the Act is to be the same as that under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Accordingly, the party seeking relief provided by civil rights laws, if successful, should "ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). Further, under this standard a plaintiff should not be deterred from filing an action by requiring payment of fees to the defendant when unsuccessful, absent a showing that the litigation was frivolous, vexatious or for purposes of harassment. Pao v. Board of Trustees of Prince Georges Community College, Civ. No. M-76-574 (D.Md.1977); Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 389 F.Supp. 84 (D.Md.1975); Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34 (2nd Cir. 1978). The focus is on the provocative role of the plaintiff's suit, not the motivation of the defendant. Thus the defendant's good faith is not controlling. The basic rationale behind the Act, as recently stated by the Fourth Circuit, is that:

"enforcement of civil rights legislation can best be achieved by encouraging the public to act as private attorneys general." Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979).

The issue presently before the court is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under this standard. Initially it must be shown that the plaintiffs are a "prevailing party" in this action. The word "prevailing" has been liberally construed by the courts. It is not necessary that the plaintiffs achieve all their objectives, or that the matter go to a full trial on the merits; rather it is sufficient that the plaintiffs accomplished the major objectives of the litigation. As stated by the Fourth Circuit, "A plaintiff need not prevail on all issues if a significant one is resolved so as to achieve some of the benefit sought through litigation." Bonnes v. Long, supra at 1318 (citing Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978); See also, McManama v. Lukhard, 464 F.Supp. 38 (W.D.Va.1978); NAACP v. Bell, 448 F.Supp. 1164 (D.D.C., 1978). A party may "prevail" at any of the various stages of the litigation before final judgment. Bonnes v. Long, supra at 1318. The plaintiff may also prevail through a consent judgment or without obtaining formal relief. Bonnes v. Long, Id.

In the present case, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to allow them to distribute leaflets, solicit petition signatures, and engage in conversation with persons in public access areas of the ESA offices. The consent decree filed by the parties in this action grants the plaintiffs access to ESA public areas for the purposes of these functions, subject to limitations on the time and manner of entrance to the facilities. Given this result, the plaintiffs have clearly "prevailed", as required by the Act, as they have essentially achieved the objectives set out in the prayer for relief in the complaint.

The defendants, however, contend that the unsettled state of the law in the area of First Amendment rights concerned in this case make it uncertain that the plaintiffs would have prevailed on the merits and thus an award of attorneys fees is unwarranted. This argument must fail, as the test is not whether the plaintiffs would have prevailed had the case gone to trial, but rather whether the plaintiffs did in fact prevail in whatever outcome resulted. In this instance the plaintiffs clearly prevailed under the terms of the consent decree. The defendants, after agreeing to a settlement substantially granting plaintiffs' demands, cannot now assert that the defendants would have prevailed in a hearing on the merits.

Given that the plaintiffs have "prevailed" in this action, it is within the scope of the court's discretion to grant attorneys' fees under the Act. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, supra; Bonnes v. Long, supra; Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1978). Fees should generally be awarded, absent unusual circumstances, and it is an abuse of discretion to deny fees to a successful civil rights plaintiff, without specifically stated grounds for denial. Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427, 93 S.Ct. 2201, 37 L.Ed.2d 48 (1973).

In the present case, defendants contend that "unusual circumstances" exist which should preclude the award of fees to the plaintiffs. This assertion is based on the contention that the plaintiffs' behavior prior to the litigation constitutes a basis upon which recovery should be denied. The defense brief cites numerous instances in which the conduct of plaintiffs was both unruly and hostile. The defense asserts that this history of behavior should bar the award of attorneys fees on a "clean hands" theory, and cites Castleberry v. Langford, 428 F.Supp. 676 (N.D.Tex.1977) and Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 436 F.Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa.1977) in support of this position. In response, the plaintiffs argue that this behavior, even if found to be improper, presents no basis for a denial of fees.

In analyzing this issue, it should first be noted that the Act does not approve an equitable theory for awarding attorneys fees; rather it provides a statutory basis for their award, largely as an incentive to plaintiff litigation under the civil rights laws.

The Castleberry case cited by the defendants, although decided after the enactment of the Act, bases its denial of attorneys fees on equitable doctrine without even citing the applicable statute. Thus this case provides no insight on the present issue.

The Skehan, case, which defendants also rely heavily upon, does purport to deny an award of fees to a prevailing party under the Act based on equitable principles. The reasoning of this case has not only been questioned in later decisions (see, e. g. Lund v. Affleck, 442 F.Supp. 1109 (D.R.I.1977)), but on appeal the Third Circuit specifically held that an award of attorneys fees in that case may be proper, and the issue has been remanded to the district court. In remanding, the court of appeals specifically referred to the legislative history of the Awards Act which states that a party, if successful, should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470, 496 (3rd Cir., 1978). Thus, the legislative history and the weight of case law support a liberal construction of the Awards Act to grant attorneys fees, unless unusual circumstances would render such an award unjust. S.Rep.No.1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1976); Bonnes v. Long, supra; McManama v. Lukhard, supra; Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U, Inc., supra; Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1978). The disruption alleged by the defendants in this action falls short of the special circumstances contemplated by this standard, and thus fails to provide an adequate basis for denying attorneys fees properly sought under the Act. Therefore, the plaintiffs...