Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.
| Citation | 373 A.2d 204 |
| Parties | UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL BOARD, Appellant, v. The WILMINGTON MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Appellee. |
| Decision Date | 11 January 1977 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.
Jay H. Conner, Wilmington, for appellant.
Max S. Bell, Jr., of Richards, Layton & Finger, Wilmington, for appellee.
Before HERRMANN, C.J., and DUFFY and McNEILLY, JJ.
In this appeal from the Superior Court the issue is whether, under our Unemployment Compensation Act, the statutory language 'attributable to service in the employ of such nonprofit organization,' 19 Del.C. § 3345(c)(3), * makes a nonprofit employer electing the reimbursement method of assessment chargeable for unemployment compensation payments made to former employees leaving such employ without entitlement to compensation. We agree with the Superior Court that such payments are not chargeable, for the reasons stated in that Court's opinion in this case, Wilmington Medical Center v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, Del.Super., 346 A.2d 181 (1975), and those stated below.
Appellant, Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, contends that 'attributable to service' requires a nonprofit reimbursement employer to reimburse for unemployment compensation given former employees, even though no entitlement existed when the employment terminated. An examination of the Federal Statute mandating unemployment coverage for nonprofit employers, 26 U.S.C. § 3309 (1970), and legislative history pertinent thereto, 2 U.S.C.C.A.N. pp. 3606--49 (1970), impels the conclusion that such compensation was not intended to be chargeable to a nonprofit employer. As no statutory definition of 'attributable to service,' nor relevant Delaware legislative history exists we apply the mode presently used for calculating other employer assessments, which excludes payments to employees leaving without entitlement, from calculation of the assessments. See 19 Del.C. §§ 3315(1)--(2), 3350. Whether the period of employment with the nonprofit reimbursing employer is used in the calculation of benefits is not determinative of the amount assessed.
We find the case of Mann Home v. Morgan, 19 Or.App. 853, 529 P.2d 964 (1974), which held that similar payments were chargeable to a nonprofit reimbursement employer, unpersuasive for several reasons: (1) in that case there was no intervening employer, as there was here; (2) the Mann Home Court found a state legislative intent that the...
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...cases we have located are Carleson v. Cal. Unemployment, 64 Cal.App.3d 145, 134 Cal.Rptr. 278 (1976); Unemp. Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Wilm. Medical Center, 373 A.2d 204 (Del.1977); Baptist Hospital, Inc. v. White, 313 So.2d 106 (Fla.App.1975), and the somewhat analogous case of City of Stuart v. ......
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