Union County v. Warner Brown Hosp.

• Decision Date: 17 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-255,88-255
• Citation: 297 Ark. 460,762 S.W.2d 798
• Parties: UNION COUNTY, Arkansas and Daniel Emery Wilson, Appellants, v. WARNER BROWN HOSPITAL, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 798

762 S.W.2d 798

297 Ark. 460

UNION COUNTY, Arkansas and Daniel Emery Wilson, Appellants, v. WARNER BROWN HOSPITAL, Appellee.

No. 88-255.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Jan. 17, 1989.

John D. Lightfoot, El Dorado, for appellants.

David F. Guthrie, El Dorado, for appellee.

HAYS, Justice.

When officers of the Union County Sheriff's Department attempted to serve a warrant for the arrest of Daniel Wilson, Wilson refused to submit to arrest and was wounded in a shoot-out with the deputies. An ambulance was called and Wilson was taken to the Warner Brown Hospital in El Dorado where medical services costing $9,724 were rendered.

Eventually the hospital filed suit against Wilson and the county for the amount claimed. Union County moved for summary judgment, contending that its only responsibility was to transport Wilson to a facility where medical services were available, and, having done that, the county was under no further obligation. City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983).

The hospital also moved for summary judgment and the trial court took the motions under advisement. ¹ Judgment was later awarded to Warner Brown Hospital against Union County and the county has appealed upon the contention there are material issues of fact remaining and, therefore, it was error to grant summary judgment. The county also asserts that the trial court's conclusions of law were clearly erroneous. We reject the arguments and affirm the judgment.

The remaining issues of fact asserted by Union County have to do with the conditions surrounding the delivery of Wilson to the hospital. It is contended that there should be a determination, for example, of whether the decision to bring him there was that of police officials or was solely that of the ambulance driver. It is also argued that there are issues concerning whether Wilson's condition was negligently caused by the county through the use of excessive force. We reject these contentions because they were not made before the trial court, and we need not consider them for the first time on appeal. Sun Gas Liquids Co. v. Helena National Bank, 276 Ark. 173, 633 S.W.2d 38 (1982).

As to the second point, appellant argues that there is no law imposing liability on Union County for the medical services furnished by the hospital, hence, for the trial court to rule as a matter of law for the hospital was clearly erroneous. We disagree. From the affidavits filed in support of the motions for summary judgment the following facts can be taken as undisputed that Wilson was wounded by deputies of the Sheriff of Union County as they attempted to arrest Wilson for aggravated assault; that the ambulance which transported Wilson to Warner Brown Hospital was called by the deputies; that Union County had on numerous previous occasions utilized Warner Brown for emergency medical treatment of prisoners and had paid for such medical services; that Union County owned and operated a medical facility in El Dorado (Union Medical Center) capable of providing medical care to county prisoners. Those circumstances were sufficient for the trial court to hold, as it did, that Union County had an obligation to furnish emergency medical care to Wilson and a corresponding duty to pay for such care.

The appellant points out that the trial court did not rely on any of our statutes dealing with payment of costs of services to persons held in county jails. For example, Ark.Code Ann. § 12-41-504 (1987), provides that the quorum court in each county shall prescribe the method and procedure for finding and keeping prisoners confined in the county jail "and shall provide for payment for food and services." Section 12-41-505 provides that every person committed to the common jail for "any criminal offense or misdemeanor," if convicted, shall pay the expenses of carrying such person to jail and for his support while he remains there. The provision subjects property of a prisoner to payment...