Union Indem. Co. v. Saling
| Decision Date | 19 September 1933 |
| Docket Number | 23873. |
| Parties | UNION INDEMNITY CO. v. SALING et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1933.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The State Industrial Commission of the state of Oklahoma is an administrative body exercising quasi judicial powers in connection with the administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
2. The provision of chap. 30, Sess. Laws 1929, section 13363, O. S 1931, requiring the execution of a bond as a condition precedent to obtaining a judicial review of an award of the Industrial Commission favorable to claimant, is constitutional and is not unjust or unreasonable restraint upon the right of a party adversely affected by such award to obtain a review of the proceedings by a strictly judicial body.
3. Where there is sufficient uncertainty concerning the meaning of a legislative enactment to render two different constructions possible, one conforming to the requirements of the Constitution, the other rendering the act unconstitutional or creating grave doubts concerning its validity, the construction rendering the act valid will be adopted by the courts.
4. The bond required by chapter 30, Sess. Laws 1929, section 13363 O. S. 1931, renders the sureties thereon conditionally liable for the payment of the award sought to be reviewed in the proceeding in connection with which the bond is executed or such award as may be properly entered by the State Industrial Commission upon receipt of the mandate from this court, in case such award sought to be reviewed should be affirmed, in whole or in part, by the decision herein rendered. But such sureties are not liable for a future award by the commission of an entirely different character.
5. Awards of the State Industrial Commission partake of the nature of judgments of courts, and an award which is wholly void, the invalidity of which affirmatively appears from an inspection of the proceedings, may and should be declared a nullity on motion of any party affected thereby.
6. The rule that the jurisdiction of the State Industrial Commission to vacate or modify its judgments or decisions on any ground except a change of condition of the claimant expires 30 days after the sending of a copy of such award to the parties affected thereby, has no application to decisions or awards which are void upon their face.
7. While pleadings before the Industrial Commission should be liberally construed, yet an award or decision rendered which is entirely beyond the issues tendered by the pleadings, and which undertakes to impose liability on a party against whom the jurisdiction of the commission was not invoked by the pleadings filed, is void.
8. The State Industrial Commission is an administrative body exercising quasi judicial powers, and its jurisdiction is limited to those matters which are expressly or by necessary implication delegated to it by proper legislative enactment.
9. The Workmen's Compensation Act contemplates a speedy and prompt administration of claimants' rights through the State Industrial Commission, and by necessary and proper implication confers upon that body the power to determine liability on the bond required to be executed by section 13363, O. S. 1931.
Original proceeding by the Union Indemnity Company to review an adverse order of the State Industrial Commission, composed of Thomas H. Doyle and others, in favor of Monroe Saling employee.
Order vacated, and cause remanded, with directions.
Ames, Cochran, Ames & Monnett, of Oklahoma City, for petitioner.
W. W. Pryor and Hugh M. Sandlin, both of Holdenville, for respondents.
S. J. Clay, Thurman, Bowman & Thurman, and T. Raymond Higgins, all of Oklahoma City, amicus curiæ.
This is an original proceeding instituted in this court to obtain a review of an order of the State Industrial Commission.
There are three principal questions involved: First, the constitutionality of the amendment to section 7297, C. O. S. 1921, enacted by chapter 30, Sess. Laws 1929 (O. S. § 13363), providing, in substance, for the execution of a bond as a condition precedent to instituting a proceeding in this court to review an award favorable to a claimant before the commission; second, the extent of the liability of the surety on such a bond; third, the jurisdiction of the State Industrial Commission to determine the amount of the liability on such a bond.
The questions presented have not previously been decided by this court, and the answers to them by judicial determination will, in addition to settling the issues between the parties involved in this proceedings, serve as a guide for future proceedings before the State Industrial Commission and in the various courts of original jurisdiction in the state, as well as settle a number of controversies now pending in this court.
The facts in this case are not disputed. A proper consideration of the questions involved, however, requires a comprehensive review of the history of the controversy as disclosed by the record.
On the 12th day of September, 1928, Monroe Saling, who will be referred to as the claimant, received an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, while engaged in one of the hazardous occupations for which compensation is provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state. At the time of his injury he was employed by the Oklahoma Company. The compensation insurance risk of this company was carried by the Federal Surety Company.
In due time Saling filed a claim for compensation with the State Industrial Commission. After proper notice hearings were held upon this claim, and on the 22d day of August, 1929, the State Industrial Commission entered its order and award finding that since the date of the injury and up to and including the date of the hearing the claimant had been and was suffering from a temporary total disability which had not then terminated. In accordance with this finding the claimant was awarded compensation, accrued and accruing at the rate of $18 per week, the same to continue "until the termination of the disability or until otherwise ordered by the commission." While the commission in that order determined the existence of temporary total disability, it did not then determine the duration thereof other than that the same was still existing at the time of the hearing. Neither did the commission in its order make any finding determining the existence or nonexistence of permanent disability, either partial or total. While the order does not say so in specific language, it was obviously the intention and purpose of the commission to reserve for future decision the time of termination of the temporary total disability as well as the existence or nonexistence of any permanent disability that may have been sustained by the claimant as a result of his injury.
In order to institute a proceedings in this court for the purpose of procuring a review, of the order above mentioned, and in compliance with the provisions of section 7297, C. O. S. 1921, chapter 30, Sess. Laws 1929, the employer, the Oklahoma Company, and the insurance carrier, Federal Surety Company, as principals, and the Union Indemnity Company, as surety, executed the bond involved in the present proceedings. The claimant was named in the bond as the obligee, and the conditions of the liability on the bond were expressed in the language of the statute. We quote the applicable portions of the bond:
Subsequent to the execution of the bond an original proceeding was instituted in this court wherein the order of the Industrial Commission was reviewed and affirmed. Oklahoma Company et al. v. State Industrial Commission et al., 149 Okl. 18, 298 P. 1051. (Opinion May 5, 1931.)
On the 18th day of May, 1931, an order was entered by the commission purporting to be in compliance with the above-mentioned opinion of this court, which order need not be considered in detail, for the reason that it was vacated by a subsequent order of the commission entered on the 13th day of June, 1931.
Subsequent to the revocation of the order mentioned, hearings were had for the purpose of determining the extent of the disability of the claimant, at which hearings testimony was introduced resulting in an order made on the 7th day of July, 1931, determining that the claimant was still suffering from temporary total disability and awarding him compensation until the expiration of the 30 days subsequent to the time of the order, within which time the claimant was given the option of accepting an operation which had been tendered by the insurance carrier. This tender of operation was accepted by the claimant within the time allowed. The operation was performed accordingly.
A receipt was later filed, which bore the signature of the claimant and acknowledged receipt of compensation payments in the sum of $2,631, representing payments of weekly compensation up to and including August 2, 1931.
On the 25th of August, 1931, an order (apparently ex parte on a motion of the employer and insurance carrier) was entered in which the payment of the $2,631 above mentioned was declared to be a satisfaction of the obligation which the bond was given to secure, and the sureties on the bond were declared exonerated and relieved from further liability.
It appears that the Federal Surety Company failed about September, 1931. Subsequently, and on or...
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