Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Riggs

• Citation: 166 P.2d 926,66 Idaho 677
• Decision Date: 15 February 1946
• Docket Number: 7279
• Parties: UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOISE G. RIGGS, Commissioner of Law Enforcement of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

166 P.2d 926

66 Idaho 677

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOISE G. RIGGS, Commissioner of Law Enforcement of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent

No. 7279

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 15, 1946

(Rehearing Denied March 25, 1946.)

1. Statutes

Statutes in pari materia must be construed together.

2. Licenses

Taxation

The motor vehicle fuel tax is not a tax for general purposes, but is a privilege tax enacted from those who use the highways in proportion to the use, for the construction and maintenance of highways. (Sess. Laws 1933, chap. 46, sec. 10 as amended by Sess. Laws 1945, chap. 194; secs. 12, 18, as amended by Sess. Laws 1945, chap. 163.)

3. Licenses

The intent of the motor fuel excise tax statute that cost of construction and maintenance of highways should fall primarily on those who use them, in proportion to the use was not changed by amendment imposing an additional emergency tax of 1 cent per gallon. (Sess. Laws 1933, chap. 46, sec. 10, as amended by Sess. Laws 1945, chap. 194; secs. 12, 18, as amended by Sess. Laws 1945, chap. 163.)

4. Licenses

Railroad was entitled to refund of the 1 cent per gallon additional tax paid by it under amended motor fuel excise tax statute on motor fuel purchased and used in the operation of its railroad, for non-highway purposes. (Sess. Laws 1933, chap 46, sec. 10 as amended by Sess. Laws 1945, chap. 194; secs. 12, 18, as amended by Sess. Laws 1945, chap. 163.)

5. Constitutional law

An intent to deny refunds to all non-highway users, including railroad operating in interstate commerce, of the 1 cent per gallon additional tax imposed by amended motor fuel excise tax statute would not be attributed to Legislature since so holding would impute to Legislature an intent to violate commerce clause of Federal Constitution by placing a direct burden on interstate commerce. (Sess. Laws 1933, chap. 46, sec. 10 as amended by Sess. Laws 1945, chap. 194; secs. 12, 18, as amended by Sess. Laws 1945, chap. 163; U.S. C. A. Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3.)

On Petition for Rehearing.

6. Licenses

The distribution of excise taxes collected under the Motor Fuels Law is not changed by amendment of 1945. (Sess. Laws 1933, chap. 46, sec. 12, as amended by Sess. Laws 1945, chap. 163.)

Rehearing Denied March 25, 1946.

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada. Hon. Chas. F. Koelsch, Judge.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

H. B. Thompson, L. H. Anderson and A. U. Miner for appellant.

The motor fuels tax is to be exacted from those who actually use the highways by operating motor vehicles thereon, and for whose particular benefit the highways are constructed and maintained. (Chapter 46, Idaho Session Laws 1933; Chapter 194, Idaho Session Laws 1945; Independent School Dist. v. Pfost, 51 Ida. 240, 4 P.2d 893, 898; Oregon Short Line R. R. Co. v. Pfost, 53 Ida. 559, 27 P.2d 877; State v. Boise City, 57 Ida. 507, 66 P.2d 1016.)

All parts of the Motor Fuel Act are to be regarded as in pari materia, and the Act must be construed in its entirety and as a whole so as to effectuate its objects and purposes. (50 Am. Jur. 350, Sec. 352; Oregon Short Line R. R. Co. v. Pfost, 53 Ida. 559, 27 P.2d 877; Lebrecht v. Union Indemnity Co., 53 Ida. 228, 22 P.2d 1066, 89 A.L.R. 640; Meyers v. City of Idaho Falls, 52 Ida. 81, 11 P.2d 626, 629.)

The legislature in amending Sections 10 and 18 of the Motor Fuel Act, at the 1945 session, is presumed to have had in mind the laws that existed at the time the statute was enacted, and the construction which the court had placed upon the purpose and intent of the motor fuel tax became as much a part of the statute as if written into it. (Oregon Short Line R. R. Co. v. Pfost, 53 Ida. 559, 27 P.2d 877; Idaho Mutual Benefit Ass'n. v. Robison, 65 Ida. 793, 154 P.2d 156; Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co. v. Gates (Ark.), 21 S.W.2d 406, 408; 25 R.C.L. 1063, Sec. 287.)

The tax on motor fuels is a tax in the nature of a privilege for the use of the highways and under the provisions of the Motor Fuel Act appellant cannot operate its interstate gasoline propelled motor cars or import or use motor fuels unless it first procures a permit, pays a fee therefor, posts a bond, and may be enjoined if it does not do all of these things. Therefore, so far as interstate carriers are concerned the tax constitutes a direct burden on interstate commerce and is invalid unless the purpose of the tax is construed to be for the use of the highways. (Chapter 46, 1933 Session Laws of Idaho, Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 8; Chapter 136, 1941 Session Laws of Idaho; George B. Wallace, Inc. v. Pfost, 57 Ida. 279, 65 P.2d 725, 727; Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 73 L. ed. 683; Varney Air Lines v. Babcock (Ida.), 1 F.Supp. 687; Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 75 L. ed. 953.)

Frank Langley, Attorney General; and P. J. Evans and Thos. Y. Gwilliam, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.

The purpose of the Motor Fuels Act is not primarily to make refunds, but to raise revenue, so it must be construed so as to effect that purpose. (Sec. 1, Chapter 194, 1945 Session Laws of Idaho, p. 309.)

All statutes pertaining to revenue are to be construed most strictly in favor of the object of the statute; that is, in favor of the purpose of the statute. Statutes of exemption are to be strictly construed against exemption and in favor of revenue. (Salisbury v. Lane, 7 Ida. 375, 63 P. 383; Lewiston Orchards Irrigation Dist. v. Gilmore, 53 Ida. 383, 23 P.2d 22; Intermountain Ac. Assn. v. Payette County, 54 Ida. 311, 31 P.2d 267.)

The parts of the Motor Fuels Act are to be regarded in pari materia, and the Act must be construed in its entirety and as a whole so as to effectuate its objects and purposes. (50 Am. Jur. 350, Sec. 352; Lebrecht v. Union Indem. Co., 53 Ida. 228, 22 P.2d 1066, 89 A.L.R. 1640; Meyers v. City of Idaho Falls, 52 Ida. 81, 11 P.2d 626-629; State v. State Board of Education, 33 Ida. 415, 196 P. 201-205; State v. Bowman, 40 Ida. 470, 235 P. 577-578.)

Holden, J. Ailshie, C. J., and Budge, Givens and Miller, JJ., concur.

OPINION

Holden, J.

Appellant is a Utah corporation and for many years prior to the levy of an excise tax on motor fuel was and still is engaged as a common carrier of freight and passengers for hire in the operation of a standard gauge steam railroad, extending, among other places, from Council Bluffs, Iowa, through Idaho to the Pacific Northwest, and from Los Angeles, California through Idaho to points in Montana, together with numerous branch lines both within and without the State of Idaho. Over and upon said line of railroad, particularly in the State of Idaho, appellant operates gasoline-electric propelled motor cars over its rails in the transportation of persons and property for hire, other gasoline propelled motor cars over its rails for the purpose of transporting its employees and supervisors in the performance and supervision of work of construction and maintenance of said line of railroad, and maintains and operates stationary gasoline engines for pumping water and for other purposes incidental to the operation of the railroad, including gasoline propelled tractors on its premises and right-of-way for grading, excavating and other purposes, and for the purpose of operating the aforesaid gasoline propelled gasoline-electric motor cars in the transportation of persons and property, motor cars in the transportation of laborers and supervisors, stationary engines, tractors and other gasoline motor equipment on the premises, rails and right-of-way of appellant (but not upon any of the public highways maintained either in whole or in part by the State of Idaho or any municipality or subdivision of government thereof) it purchases and for many years has purchased from points of production outside the State of Idaho, and used and uses, gasoline and motor fuels in excess of fifty gallons. Appellant, however, does not sell and has never sold motor fuel.

The record discloses appellant was at all times and still is "duly authorized to do business in the State of Idaho and is a motor fuel dealer within the definition set forth in Section 1 of Chapter 46 of the 1933 Session Laws, as amended by Chapter 136 of the 1941 Session Laws and is a holder of Motor Fuel Dealer Permit No. 35, issued to it by defendant (respondent) and which permit is now in full force and effect." It appears that up until the effective date of Chapter 194, enacted in 1945, refunds were paid on all motor fuel purchased by appellant and used by it in motor propelled cars, tractors and other vehicles moving upon its tracks, including stationary gasoline engines, and other gasoline motor equipment on the premises, rails and right-of-way of appellant.

This action is prosecuted by the railroad company under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Act (Chap. 70, S. L. 1933, p. 113), to obtain a declaration of the rights of the parties.

The facts were stipulated in the trial court substantially as hereinbefore stated, findings of fact and conclusions of law being waived. Upon such stipulation of facts, the court rendered and entered judgment in favor of respondent and against appellant. The appeal to this court is from the judgment.

In 1923, the legislature enacted a Motor Fuel Excise Tax Statute (Chap. 172, S. L. 1923, p. 264). It was amended in 1929 (Chap. 283, S. L. 1929, p. 680) and again in 1931 (Chap. 68 S. L. 1931, p. 117). It was later incorporated in and became a part of Title 48, Chap. 7, 1932 I.C.A. Following that, the 1933 session of the legislature (Chap. 46, S. L. 1933, p. 60), repealed Chapter 7, supra, and enacted a more comprehensive statute...