Union Pacific Railroad Company v. George Snow

• Decision Date: 01 December 1913
• Docket Number: No. 682,682
• Citation: 231 U.S. 204,34 S.Ct. 104,58 L.Ed. 184
• Parties: UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. GEORGE A. SNOW and Robert W. Burton (Said Burton Doing Business as an Individual under the Name and Style of Byers Mercantile Company)
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

231 U.S. 204

34 S.Ct. 104

58 L.Ed. 184

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v GEORGE A. SNOW and Robert W. Burton (Said Burton Doing Business as an Individual under the Name and Style of Byers Mercantile Company).

No. 682.

Submitted October 14, 1913.

Decided December 1, 1913.

Messrs. N. H. Loomis, C. C. Dorsey, and E. I. Thayer for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Milton Smith, Charles R. Brock, and W. H. Ferguson for defendants in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 205-207 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

This case was submitted at the same time as No. 570, just decided [231 U. S. 190, 58 L. ed. ——, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 101]. It is ejectment for lands, part of the right of way granted to the Leavenworth, Pawnee, & Western Railroad Company by the act of 1862 [12 Stat. at L. 489, chap. 120], to which right of way plaintiff in error (designated herein as plaintiff) is the successor. The action was brought in the district court of Arapahoe county, state of Colorado.

The sufficiency of the complaint is not questioned, and it is enough to say that it is, in legal effect, the same as in case No. 570, with only such differences as are necessary.

The answer of defendants in error (called herein defendants) set up three defenses and a counterclaim. The first answer admits the incorporation of plaintiff, and denies all other allegations of the complaint. The second defense alleges that under certain acts of Congress, subsequent to the act of 1862, and prior to the incorporation of the companies, the right of way of the companies was made 200 feet wide instead of 400 feet; that is, 100 feet from the center line of the railroad track. That the land sued for, which is in possession of the defendants, is more than 100 feet from such center line; that neither plaintiff nor any of its predecessors have been in possession of any portion thereof, and have not used the same, nor has it needed to use the same for railroad purposes. That defendants, and those under and through whom they claim title, acquired the title under and by virtue of a patent from the United States, issued November 5, 1878, and various mesne conveyances, and have been in the adverse possession of all of the property described continuously since the patent was issued, which is more than the full period of seven years next before the institution of the action; have paid and caused to be paid taxes thereon, and that defendants now plead and rely upon the statute of limitations of the state of Colorado.

The third defense alleges that the right received by the corporation which was created by the act of Congress of 1862, or by its successors or assigns, was, at most, the grant of a limited fee, and made on the condition that the property should revert to the United States if it should not be appropriated and used for a railroad within a reasonable time, or should cease to be used for railroad purposes. That thereafter, before the land was used for such purposes, the right of reverter which was retained by the United States was conveyed by the United States to defendants and their grantors by a patent which was issued by the United States to the Vendor of defendants in 1878. That neither plaintiff nor any of its predecessors used or occupied the land for railroad purposes or for any purposes whatever; and on account thereof lost any and all right thereto, and the property reverted to the United States and to defendants; that neither plaintiff nor any of its predecessors ever needed the property or any part thereof for railroad purposes, and can never use the same for such purposes. That on account of failure to use or occupy the land for a period which now approximates fifty years next ensuing after the approval of the act of 1862, the limited fee which may have been granted to plaintiff ceased and determined, and the property reverted to the United States and its grantees.

The counterclaim repeats some of the allegations in regard to the width of the right of way and defendants' adverse possession of the land outside of the 100 feet on either side of the center of the railroad track, alleges the value of improvements made thereon by defendants at $1,500, and claims the reimbursement thereof in case of recovery by plaintiff.

Plaintiff demurred to the second and third defenses and to the counterclaim. The demurrer was sustained. The case was subsequently tried on the issues made by the complaint and the first answer thereto.

At the trial the defendants objected to any testimony being introduced, and moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no right of way was granted to plaintiff 'at the place in dispute,' or no grant of right of way in excess of 100 feet on either side of the center line of plaintiff's track. The objection was overruled and defendants excepted.

It was then stipulated that witnesses would testify to the various steps in the title of plaintiff, that the railroad was constructed over the right of way described in the complaint, and that the railroad and the main track thereof are now in the same location in which they were at the time of the original construction; that the predecessors in title of plaintiff complied with all of the requirements of the various acts of Congress in the complaint mentioned, and that plaintiff is the owner of the lands, if any, conveyed to its predecessor companies under and by virtue of the said acts of Congress; that the land described in the complaint lies within 200 feet of the center of the main track of the railroad, but outside of a line of 100 feet; that the railroad is part of the railroad constructed from the Missouri river at the mouth of the Kansas river, westward to a connection with the main line of the Union Pacific, as authorized by the acts of Congress, and has been, since its construction, continuously operated as a railroad in connection with the main line of the Union Pacific at Cheyenne, Wyoming. That defendants withhold possession of the lands from plain- tiff, and that possession was demanded before the commencement of the action.

Judgment of nonsuit was moved on the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss; also judgment for defendants. Both motions were denied, and plaintiff was adjudged owner in fee of the lands, and that defendants had no right, title, or interest therein. Judgment was entered accordingly. The judgment was reversed by the supreme court of the state. 133 Pac. 1037.

The supreme court decide that the Kansas Pacific became vested by the acts of 1862 and 1864 [13 Stat. at L. 356, chap. 216] with title to a right of way 400 feet wide through the land, and that the Union...