Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Board of Bond Trustees of Special Road and Bridge Dist. No. 1 of Alachua County

• Decision Date: 13 April 1926
• Citation: 91 Fla. 612,108 So. 689
• Parties: SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. BOARD OF BOND TRUSTEES OF SPECIAL ROAD AND BRIDGE DIST. NO. I OF ALACHUA COUNTY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

108 So. 689

91 Fla. 612

SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. v. BOARD OF BOND TRUSTEES OF SPECIAL ROAD AND BRIDGE DIST. NO. I OF ALACHUA COUNTY.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

April 13, 1926

Rehearing Denied June 2, 1926.

Suit by the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company against the Board of Bond Trustees of Special Road and Bridge District No. 1 of Alachua County for an injunction. From an order denying a motion to strike portions of the answer to the original bill and portions of the answer to the amended bill of complaint complainant appeals.

Reversed with directions.

Whitfield J., dissenting in part.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Proper execution of trust imposed in state as to swamp lands granted by Congress cannot be questioned by private party corporation, or subordinate governmental agency (Swamp Land Grant Act of Congress, Sept. 28, 1850 [U. S. Comp. St. §§ 4958-4960]). The proper execution of the trust imposed in the state of Florida by the act of Congress (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 4958-4960), vesting in it title to swamp and overflowed lands and other lands for internal improvement purposes, cannot be questioned by a private party, corporation, or subordinate governmental agency.

Legislative grant of 200-foot right of way to railroads is conclusive determination of reasonable and necessary quantity, and on performance of conditions carried right to possession (Laws 1854-55, c. 610). The grant by the Legislature of a right of way 200 feet wide to different railroad companies along routes indicated, and with specific conditions attached thereto, is a conclusive determination of the reasonable and necessary quantity of land to be dedicated to such use, and, on the performance of the conditions therein named, carried with it the right of possession in the grantee.

Construction of federal grant by state court is necessarily controlled by federal decisions on same subject-matter. The construction of a federal grant by a state court is necessarily controlled by the federal decisions on the same subject-matter.

Grants of land to railroad companies for right of way held not subject to acquisition by adverse possession (Laws 1854-55, c. 610). Grants of land to railroad companies for right of way purposes, as provided by chapter 610, Laws of Florida, are not subject to acquisition by adverse possession.

To establish title by adverse possession, it must be shown that for seven years claimant or his predecessors in title held hostile possession, with or without color or title, and such possession must be actual, continuous, exclusive, open, and notorious (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 2935, 2936). To establish title by adverse possession in this state, it must be shown that for a period of seven years the claimant or his predecessors in title held hostile possession, with or without color of title, for said period and that such possession must be actual, continuous, exclusive, open, and notorious. Sections 2935, 2936, Revised General Statutes of Florida 1920.

General rule is that dimensions of legislative grants for railroad rights of way is not open to judicial investigation, regardless of new or unexpected conditions subsequently arising. Unless modified by statute, the general rule is that the area or dimensions of legislative grants for railroad rights of way is not open to judicial investigation and determination, that such questions were concluded by the authority providing the grant, and that it was intended to secure the grantee the permanent enjoyment of the granted right of way so long as the railroad of the required character should be operated upon it, regardless of any new or unexpected conditions that may subsequently arise.

Where no controlling statutes intervene, parts of railroad right of way not inclosed or covered by tracks or erections may generally be acquired by adverse possession. In states where no controlling statutes intervene, the courts have generally held that such parts of a railroad right of way as were acquired by private grant, purchase, gift, condemnation, or prescription, and are not inclosed or covered by the tracks of the railroad company and its erections, may be acquired against it by adverse possession.

General law for incorporation of railroads and canals held not to affect prior statute granting railroad rights of way (Laws 1855, c. 610; Acts 1874, c. 1987, § 10; Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 4354, pars. 2, 3). Paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 4354, Revised General Statutes of Florida 1920, being part of section 10 of chapter 1987, Acts of 1874, Laws of Florida, have no bearing whatever on chapter 610, because the act of 1874 was 'an act to provide a general law for the incorporation of railroads and canals' in this state, while chapter 610 was 'an act to provide for and encourage a liberal system of Internal Improvement in this state.' Chapter 1987 was enacted 20 years subsequent to chapter 610, was prospective in its effect, dealt with another subject-matter, made no reference to, nor was it in any way connected with, chapter 610, and every right of the railroad companies under chapter 610 had accrued long before chapter 1987 was enacted.

Legislative grant is equal in dignity to patent, and all those acquiring title to public lands over which right of way to railroad has been granted take subject thereto. In its conclusiveness, there is no better evidence of title than a legislative grant. The granting act is equal in dignity to a patent, and all those acquiring title to public lands over which a right of way has been granted take subject to such grant.

Grants of rights of way and grants in aid of railroad are grants in praesenti, but right of way grant takes effect on definite location of road as of date of grant. The courts have repeatedly recognized a marked distinction between grants of rights of way and grants in aid of railroad construction. Both are grants in praesenti, but the right of way grant is unlike the grant in aid of construction, in that it takes effect on the definite location of the road as of the date of the grant.

In granting right of way 200 feet wide for railroad, Legislature had in mind furture development, and such right of way cannot be adversely acquired, except by abandonment or by virtue of operation of intervening statutes (Laws 1854-55, c. 610). In granting a right of way 200 feet wide in aid of internal improvement, the Legislature must have had in mind future needs and development of the roads, and to hold that it could be adversely acquired except by abandonment or by virtue of the operation of intervening statutes would be inconsistent with the interest of the public therein. It could not have been contemplated that at the time the grant was made a right of way 200 feet wide was then necessary for railroad purposes, and no particular date could have been named when such necessity would arise.

Mere nonuser by railroad company of part of right of way granted by state parallel with and contiguous to that in actual use did not cause it to revert to public (Laws 1854-55, c. 610). The construction of tracks and other erections throughout the entire length of the right of way was, in the nature of conditions there existing, ample assertion on the part of the railroad company of title to the entire grant, and the act itself was notice to the world of the grant. It would, therefore, be unreasonable to hold that the mere nonuser of a part of the grant parallel with and contiguous to that in actual use would revert to the public because the public had enjoyed a permissive, and not a hostile, use of it.

Highways and paths along right of way granted to railroad cannot ripen into title against railroad company by adverse possession or permissive user; after long use of railroad right of way for highway, such use will not be restrained, unless it is inconsistent with grant for railroad purposes, or part so used is necessary for purpose of grant. It is a well-known fact that beaten paths and highways may be found in daily use along almost every railroad track in the country. Where such highways traverse public grants like the one in question, they cannot ripen into title against the railroad company by adverse possession or permissive user; but, after long indulgence under the circumstances of this case, they will not be restrained, unless it can be shown that their use is inconsistent with the grant for railroad purposes, or that the part so used by the public is necessary for the purpose of the grant.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Alachua County.

COUNSEL

James F. Wright, of Norfolk, Va., Fleming & Fleming and W. E. Kay, all of Jacksonville, and Hampton & Hampton, of Gainesville, for appellant.

W. S. Broome, E. G. Baxter, and S. L. Scruggs, all of Gainesville, for appellee.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

In April, 1922, appellant, hereinafter called the railway company, filed its bill of complaint against the appellee, hereinafter called the bond trustees, seeking to restrain them from taking possession of, and constructing, a hard-surface road over certain lands in Alachua county, Fla., forming the right of way of the railway company to it by virtue of chapter 610, Acts of 1854-55, Laws of Florida.

The bond trustees filed their answer to the bill of complaint and motion of the railway company to strike portions of the answer was denied in May, 1922. By leave of the court first obtained the railway company filed its amended bill of complaint instanter, the bond trustees filed their answer to the amended bill in June, 1922, and a motion on the part of the railway company to strike portions of the answer to the amended bill was promptly denied by the trial court. Appeal was taken from the order denying the motion to strike, both as to the original and amended bills...