Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Sprague

• Decision Date: 20 May 1903
• Docket Number: 13,131
• Citation: 95 N.W. 46,69 Neb. 48
• Parties: UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. F. K. SPRAGUE, TREASURER OF MERRICK COUNTY, NEBRASKA, ET AL., APPELLEES
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

95 N.W. 46

69 Neb. 48

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. F. K. SPRAGUE, TREASURER OF MERRICK COUNTY, NEBRASKA, ET AL., APPELLEES

No. 13,131

Supreme Court of Nebraska

May 20, 1903

APPEAL from the district court for Merrick county: CONRAD HOLLENBECK, DISTRICT JUDGE. Reversed.

REVERSED.

John N Baldwin and Edson Rich, for appellant.

John C Martin, contra.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, C. J.

This action was brought by the Union Pacific Railroad Company against the treasurer of Merrick county and the school district of Central City to enjoin the collection of school taxes and for other purposes. The trial court found the issues in favor of the defendants and rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The plaintiff appeals.

The principal question discussed by counsel is: Whether chapter 70, laws of 1897, was adopted in accordance with constitutional procedure and became a valid law. The contention on behalf of the company is that the legislative journals impeach the enrolled bill by showing that it passed the house and senate under a title different from the one which it bore when it was presented to the governor for approval. Without conceding this point, we dispose of it on the assumption that there is in the journals conclusive evidence that the title was altered as alleged. The title of the act as shown by the enrolled bill is: "An act to amend section twenty-four (24), chapter seventy-nine (79) subdivision fourteen (14) of the Compiled Statutes of 1895, to provide for the exclusion of school bond taxes in the computation of the aggregate school taxes under the provisions of this act, and to repeal section twenty-four (24), chapter seventy-nine (79), subdivision fourteen (14) of the Compiled Statutes of 1895." According to plaintiff's theory, which is provisionally accepted, the title of the bill when introduced in the senate, and at the time it passed both branches of the legislature, and at all times prior to its enrollment was: "A Bill for an act to amend section twenty-four, chapter seventy-nine, subdivision fourteen, of the Compiled Statutes of 1895, to provide for the exclusion of school bond taxes in the computation of the aggregate school taxes under the provisions of this act, and to repeal all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith."

The first section of the act of 1897 declares:

"That the aggregate school tax, exclusive of school bond taxes, shall in no one year exceed twenty-five mills."

The provision in the original section limiting the taxing power of school boards was:

"That the aggregate school tax shall in no one year exceed two per cent."

Clearly the only purpose of the legislature was to enlarge the taxing power of school boards, and this purpose was as distinctly evidenced by one title as the other. Each was well calculated to apprise the members of the legislature and the public generally that section twenty-four was to be amended in a certain way and that the original section was to be repealed. Whether this thought was conveyed by one form of expression or another is, of course, immaterial. The constitution regards substance rather than form; it requires that the subject of legislation shall be clearly expressed in the title of every bill, but beyond this it does not go; the form of the expression is at all times a matter of legislative choice. We believe it has never been held that the subject of legislation must be expressed in the title of a bill in exactly the same language when the bill receives final legislative assent and executive approval. It may be further remarked that the expression in the title of an intention on the part of the legislature to repeal the amended section, or all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the new law, was altogether unnecessary. That part of the title served no useful purpose; it had no function to perform; it was a mere redundancy and might have been stricken out of both titles without changing their meaning or legal effect. An amendatory act can not become effective without expressly repealing the amended statute and repealing by implication all repugnant or inconsistent laws, hence an intention to repeal is always necessarily implied and need not be expressed in order to apprise the members of the legislature and the public that the new law, if adopted, will take the place of the old one.

Another ground upon which it is claimed the act of 1897 was unconstitutional is that the provision authorizing a...