Union Sav. Bank of Boston v. Cameron

• Decision Date: 28 February 1946
• Citation: 65 N.E.2d 313,319 Mass. 235
• Parties: UNION SAV. BANK OF BOSTON v. CAMERON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

319 Mass. 235

65 N.E.2d 313

UNION SAV. BANK OF BOSTON

v.CAMERON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Feb. 28, 1946.

Action of contract by Union Savings Bank of Boston against Frank L. Cameron. The action was commenced by a trustee writ, and the defendant, appearing specially, filed an answer in abatement, which was sustained by trial judge and the action ordered abated. From an order of the Appellate Division dismissing a report, the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Municipal Court of City of Boston; D. J. Gillen, Judge.

Before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, DOLAN, WILKINS, and SPALDING, JJ.

W. R. Morris, of Boston, and E. M. Joyce, of Hyde Park, for plaintiff.

J. Wiggin and F. W. Campbell, both of Boston, for defendant.

SPALDING, Justice.

This action of contract was commenced by a trustee writ. The defendant, appearing specially, filed an answer in abatement in which he alleged that the writ that was served upon him and the trustees named therein was lost; that the writ that was entered in court was not the original but was one which had been substituted without permission of the court immediately before the entry thereof; and that this substituted writ was wholly void. The trial judge, after hearing, sustained the answer in abatement and ordered the action abated. From an order of the Appellate Division dismissing a report the plaintiff appealed.

At the hearing on the answer in abatement the trial judge admitted in evidence, without objection, the document which purported to be the original writ with the officers' returns of service indorsed thereon. This was a trustee writ of the Municipal Court of the City of Boston in the usual form under the seal of the court. The judge then allowed a deputy sheriff, called by the defendant, to testify that the original writ which had been served on the trustees had been lost before the return day, and that after informing the plaintiff's attorney of this fact he made out a new writ on which he indorsed his return of service as though it were the original and returned this to court on the return day. This evidence was objected to by the plaintiff, and upon the overruling of the objection the plaintiff claimed a report on the correctness of the ruling. The judge found the facts to be in accordance with the testimony of the deputy sheriff. The underlying question for decision is whether this evidence was admissible; if it was, then, as the report states, ‘There was sufficient evidence to warrant the findings of fact of the trial judge.’

The plaintiff contends that the judge in admitting this evidence was in effect permitting the officer's return to be controverted. It is undoubtedly true, as the plaintiff argues, that the general rule in this Commonwealth is that, as between the parties and their privies, the return of the officer is conclusive as to all matters which are properly the subject of the return. Slayton v. Inhabitants of Chester, 4 Mass. 478;Simmons v. Richards, 171 Mass. 281, 283, 50 N.E. 617;United Drug Co. v. Cordley & Hayes, 239 Mass. 334, 338, 132 N.E. 56. Compare Brewer v. Holmes, 1 Metc. 288;Bay State Wholesale Drug Co. v. Whitman, 280 Mass. 188, 194, 182 N.E. 361. If the return is false, the remedy of the party injured is against the officer. Slayton v. Inhabitants of Chester, 4 Mass. 478, 479;Davis v. Putnam, 5 Gray 321, 328;Lowery v. Caldwell, 139 Mass. 88, 89, 28 N.E. 451.

But these principles become applicable, we think, only where proper process has issued and it has been returned to court as the law requires. To say, as the plaintiff does, that the officer's return on the document here is conclusive is to reason in a circle. It amounts to saying that the writ is good because the officer's return is conclusive and the officer's return is conclusive because the writ is good. We know of no case where the rule as to the conclusiveness of the officer's return has been applied to a document which was not the writ by which the action was commenced and which, as here, was substituted without leave of court.

It has been held that after a writ is issued and served the parties have no right to alter it without leave of court. Simeon v. Cramm, 121 Mass. 492, 493;Ferguson & Co., Inc., v. Melillo, 266 Mass. 197, 198, 199, 165 N.E. 18. It would seem to follow that, where a writ has been lost after it has been served, a new writ can be substituted only with the court's permission. This was the procedure that was followed in Sturtevant v. Robinson, 18 Pick. 175, 178, 179, where it was held that the lower court ‘properly allowed the motion of the plaintiff's attorney, to supply the loss of the original writ.’ And this appears to be the practice in other jurisdictions where this question has arisen. York & Cumberland Railroad Co. v. Myers, 18 How. 246, 253, 15 L.Ed. 380;Whitcher v. Whitcher, 10 N.H. 440;Smith v. Tallman, 87 N.H. 176, 175 A. 857;Long v. Sutter, 67 Ill. 185;Rardin v. Rardin, 271 Ill. 216, 219, 110 N.E. 834;Gentry...