Union Starch, Division of Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 23 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 45783,45783
• Citation: 307 N.E.2d 118,56 Ill.2d 272
• Parties: UNION STARCH, DIVISION OF MILES LABORATORIES, INC., Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Lloyd E. Curtis, Appellee.)
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 118

307 N.E.2d 118

56 Ill.2d 272

UNION STARCH, DIVISION OF MILES LABORATORIES, INC., Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Lloyd E. Curtis, Appellee.)

No. 45783.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 23, 1974.

James V. Gallen, of Evans & Dixon, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Lance Callis, of Callis & Filcoff, Granite City, for appellee.

DAVIS, Justice.

The claimant, Lloyd E. Curtis, received an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the circuit court of Madison County confirmed the award. This is an appeal from that judgment. The issue before this court is whether the injury arose out of and in the course of Curtis's employment.

The material facts are not in dispute. Curtis had been employed by Union Starch, Division of Miles Laboratories, Inc., and its predecessor companies, for about 15 years. On the date in question, he was working the 3:00 P.m. to 11:00 P.M. shift, in the refinery building. There was no set time for the evening meal or a break period. Workers sometimes asked permission from their foreman before leaving their work site. Curtis left his work site at about 5:30 P.M. to get a soft drink from a machine located in another building which adjoined the one in which he worked, by a tunnel way at the third-floor level. After going to the soda machine, he went to a nearby window located approximately two feet above the floor, opened it and stepped out on an adjoining roof, which was about five inches below that window. Curtis stated that he went on the roof to get fresh air and that it was a practice to go out on roofs and fire escapes to get fresh air.

Curtis testified that he took a few steps on the roof when it gave way, and he fell to the ground below and suffered injuries. This particular roof was constructed of corrugated compressed sheets of cement and fiber material, and covered a shed which protected tank cars from inclement weather while they were being washed. The roofs, other than the one in question, were over brick structures, and were covered with conventional tar-type roofing, and it was on these roofs that employees had customarily ventured to get fresh air. Prior to the day in question, Curtis had not seen anyone on the particular roof through which he fell; however, there were no signs warning anyone to stay off of this roof. Curtis had no personal knowledge as to its composition.

If undisputed facts upon any issue permit more than one reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, the determination of such issue presents a question of fact, and the conclusion of the Commission will not then be disturbed on review unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, but if the undisputed facts are susceptible of but a single inference, then the issue becomes one of law, to be determined by this court. Henn v. Industrial Com. (1954), 3 Ill.2d 325, 121 N.E.2d 492; Ceisel v. Industrial Com. (1948), 400 Ill. 574, 586, 587, 81 N.E.2d 506; Orr v. Industrial Com. (1970), 47 Ill.2d 242, 243, 265 N.E.2d 109.

The appellant argues that under the factual setting of this case the question of whether the injuries arose out of and in the course of employment becomes a question of law, for our determination. The injury must both 'arise out of' and 'in the course of' employment to be the basis for an award. (Loyola University v. Industrial Com. (1951), 408 Ill. 139, 143, 96 N.E.2d 509; Scholl v. Industrial Com. (1937), 366 Ill. 588, 592, 10 N.E.2d 360.) An injury 'arises out of' one's employment if its origin is in some risk connected with or incidental to the employment so that there is a causal connection between the employment and the accidental injury. (Material Service Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1973), 53 Ill.2d 429, 433, 292 N.E.2d 367; Chmelik v. Vana (1964), 31 Ill.2d 272, 277, 201 N.E.2d 434.) The words 'in the course of' relate to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place; an injury occurring within the period of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties, and while fulfilling those duties or doing something incidental thereto. Wise v. Industrial Com. (1973), 54 Ill.2d 138, 142, 295 N.E.2d 459; Ceisel v. Industrial Com. (1948), 400 Ill. 574, 580, 81 N.E.2d 506.

The critical question here is whether this injury was sustained 'in the course of' Curtis's employment. It seems reasonably clear to us that the Commission could find that the evidence established that the injury 'arose out of' his employment--that is, there was a causal connection between the employment and the injury. The working premises were warm; Curtis apparently was seeking relief from the heat and stuffy air, and was injured because of the particular place on the premises where he chose to do so. The Commission could reasonably infer that the cause of the injury was related to the employment environment and not to a hazard to which Curtis would have been equally exposed apart from his employment. Material Service Corp. v. Industrial Com. (1973), 53 Ill.2d 429, 433, 292 N.E.2d 367.

The court in Material Service Corp. found an injury 'arose out of' the employment when caused by a hazardous condition in the parking lot. It noted that a claimant need not establish that the hazard to which he was exposed by reason of his employment was the sole cause of the injury; it need establish 'only that it was A causative factor in the resulting injury.' (53 Ill.2d at 434, 292 N.E.2d at 370, citing City of Chicago v. Industrial Com. (1970), 45 Ill.2d 350, 352, 259 N.E.2d 5.) The court distinguished two cases--one where an employee was injured while attempting to repair a wheel he had removed from his personal car, and one, where an...