Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford
| Decision Date | 14 July 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. A95A0465,s. A95A0465 |
| Citation | 218 Ga.App. 248,461 S.E.2d 877 |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,366 UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE COMPANY et al. v. FORD. UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE COMPANY et al. v. FORD. FORD v. UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE COMPANY et al. UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE COMPANY v. FORD et al. UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE COMPANY v. FORD et al. FORD v. UNIROYAL GOODRICH TIRE COMPANY et al. to A95A0470. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
[218 Ga.App. 279] Love & Willingham, Daryll Love, Allen S. Willingham, Robert P. Monyak, Alston & Bird, G. Conley Ingram, R. Wayne Thorpe, Cynthia Counts, Atlanta, for Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company.
Smolar, Roseman, Brantley & Seifter, Yehuda Smolar, James I. Seifter, Barry L. Roseman, Thomas A. Rice, Atlanta, William B. Herndon, Marietta, for the Fords.
Barnes, Browning, Tanksley & Casurella, Roy E. Barnes, Marietta, Elliott & Blackburn, W. Gus Elliott, Walter G. Elliott, II, Valdosta, Neely & Player, Richard B. North, Jr., Lorre J. Gaudiosi, Atlanta, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes & Handler, Terrence B. Adamson, Washington, DC, Brinson, Askew, Berry, Seigler, Richardson & Davis, Robert M. Brinson, Rome, amici curiae.
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, a Delaware corporation, and Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, a New York partnership in which the Delaware corporation is a general partner (referred to as UGTC unless otherwise necessary) appeal from judgments entered against them in these product liability cases, including $25 million in punitive damages.
This case had its genesis in a wreck in August 1989 involving the Fords' 1982 van which was equipped with UGTC-produced tires. Mrs. Ford, Jr. had originally purchased two new SP-7000 tires from NTW, also named as a defendant, in February 1988. One of the tires was returned to NTW and replaced with a new tire because of a vibration noticed by Mr. Ford, Jr., which NTW attributed to the tire being out of round. In August 1989, while returning from vacation on Interstate 85 with their sons, Frank (Ford III) and Doug, Mr. Ford, Jr., who was driving the van, again noticed an intermittent vibration while they were south of the Atlanta airport. Although the Fords discussed the vibration and possible causes, including a tire problem, they continued their trip. Near the North Druid Hills exit on I-85, they heard two thumps, the second of which caused Mr. Ford, Jr. to have to struggle with the steering wheel to control the van. The left rear tire had ruptured, causing the steel belt to wrap around the rear axle, totally immobilizing the van. Because they were in the third lane, one lane from the median, they did not exit the van, but remained in it while Mr. Ford, Jr. attempted to move the van and call for help on his C.B. radio. Several minutes later, the immobilized van was rammed from behind by a car driven by Parsons, who was killed by the impact. Frank Ford, III suffered severe and permanent brain damage and Mrs. Ford a badly fractured leg.
These appeals involve two separate actions which were brought seeking to recover for these injuries. One action (Appellate Case Nos. A95A0468 and A95A0469) was brought against the defendants by Mr. and Mrs. Ford, Jr. for injuries suffered by Mrs. Ford, Jr. in the collision along with Mr. Ford, Jr.'s loss of consortium claim. An identical separate action (Appellate Case Nos. A95A0465 and A95A0466) was filed against the same defendants on behalf of the son, Ford III, for his injuries.
1. UGTC moved for consolidation of the two actions for trial before a single jury pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-42(a). The plaintiffs refused to consent to consolidation, as required under the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-42(a), and the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, citing "the nature of the actions, their complexity, and the time requirements of the actions for trial," the trial court entered an order, sua sponte, ordering that a separate jury be empaneled to try each action and further ordering that both actions be simultaneously tried in the same courtroom with the juries in both actions simultaneously hearing all common evidence. Over UGTC's objection to this procedure, separate trials in both actions were simultaneously conducted in the same courtroom. Virtually all the evidence in the liability phase of both trials was simultaneously presented to both juries.
As the dissent correctly points out, although for the wrong reasons, it was error for the trial court to order this procedure over the objection of UGTC. That error, however, does not require reversal in this case.
Contrary to the dissent's conclusion, the trial court's order was not controlled by OCGA § 9-11-42(a). Section 9-11-42(a), which was adopted from Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governs consolidation of separate cases on the court's docket, or of issues within those cases, for trial before a single jury or trier of fact. This section and its provision that "the court may order a joint hearing or trial ..." has never been interpreted as authority for ordering simultaneous trials before multiple juries in the same courtroom. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 9, Chap. 7, §§ 2381, 2382 (1995).
However, the consolidation provisions of OCGA § 9-11-42(a) do provide guidance in addressing this issue. The primary purpose for consolidating separate actions for trial is the promotion of convenience and judicial economy in cases involving common questions of law and fact. Even in proper cases where judicial economy would be promoted, OCGA § 9-11-42(a) clearly departs from the otherwise identical provisions of federal Rule 42(a) by providing that consolidation may be ordered only if the parties consent. Robinson v. Hall, 177 Ga.App. 181, 338 S.E.2d 699 (1985), disapproved on other grounds, Stenger v. Grimes, 260 Ga. 838, 839, 400 S.E.2d 318 (1991). Similarly, the simultaneous trial of these actions before two juries, as ordered by the trial court, was prompted solely by considerations of judicial economy. This so-called dual or multiple jury procedure has been approved in numerous criminal cases in other jurisdictions as a means to avoid problems arising under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), and other general prejudice problems in joint criminal trials and as an economy measure. See Velez v. State, 596 So.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (Fla.App. 3 Dist.1992); United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1366-1367 (11th Cir.1982); Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.1985). In one civil case, the trial court ordered the simultaneous use of two juries in a complex air crash case as an economical means to apply the law of two different states to the evidence. Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654 (D.Colo.1980).
Without condoning its use as an economy measure in a case of this type nor condemning it in general, we conclude that, like consolidation, the procedure should not be forced on any party in a civil case who does not consent to it. Accordingly, the trial court erred by ordering the procedure over the objection of UGTC. Nevertheless, since harm as well as error must be demonstrated to warrant a reversal, it must be shown how the procedure prejudiced the defendants in this case.
The defendants claim that, due to the dual jury procedure, one jury was deprived of continuous access to the blown tire during its deliberations while the tire was being used by the other jury. Even though the tire could not be used by both juries at once, there is nothing in the record showing that this prejudiced the defense. Both juries had access to the tire at one time or another during their deliberations, and there is no indication that either jury requested and was denied access to the tire. Moreover, the defendants made no claim in the trial court that lack of continuous access to the tire by both juries was error.
The defense claim that they were prejudiced by being deprived of the chance to employ different strategies before separate juries in separate trials is unpersuasive. Once again, the defendants did not make this claim during the trial so that the trial judge could consider allowing the presentation of any such defenses to one jury at a time. And the defendants were apparently not concerned with possible conflicting defenses when they moved for consolidation of the two cases for trial before a single jury.
The defendants' allegations of "logistical difficulties" caused by the dual jury procedure, without any detailing of such difficulties or resulting prejudice, present nothing for review.
Lastly, the defendants claim that the inconsistent verdicts reached by the two juries with respect to punitive damages demonstrate that they were prejudiced by the dual jury procedure and require reversal. Although the inconsistency of the two verdicts was perhaps more dramatic because it occurred during the simultaneous trials of both cases, rather than in sequential trials before separate juries, two separate juries hearing the same evidence on the same issue may legally render inconsistent verdicts. Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259, 297 S.E.2d 270 (1982).
Since the defendants have not shown they were prejudiced as a result of the dual jury procedure ordered by the trial court, no reversal is required on this ground.
2. UGTC's fourth enumeration alleges that it was reversible error for the trial court to order the addition of new party defendants in both cases three days prior to trial without service of process and over the objections of the added defendants. We concur.
In the case brought on behalf of the son, Ford III, the plaintiffs concede that in October 1990, pursuant to a consent order, the B.F. Goodrich Company was dropped as the defendant and Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company, a partnership ("the partnership" for purposes of this division), was substituted as the party defendant. The...
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