United Aerial Advert., Inc. v. Twp. of Lakewood
| Decision Date | 11 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.:19-14219(FLW) |
| Parties | UNITED AERIAL ADVERTISING, INC., Plaintiff, v. TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD; LAKEWOOD INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION; STEVEN REINMAN; and DOES 1-100, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Township of Lakewood, Lakewood Industrial Commission, and Steven Reinman (collectively, "Defendants"), seeking dismissal of all claims in the Complaint of Plaintiff United Aerial Advertising, Inc. ("UAA" or "Plaintiff") for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; all claims against Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.
For the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes as true the relevant facts derived from Plaintiff's Complaint and the documents attached thereto.
On June 18, 2018, UAA and Defendants entered into a settlement agreement ("Settlement Agreement") resolving the litigation between the parties regarding the disallowance of UAA's banner towing operations from the Lakewood Airport; the Airport was owned by the Township of Lakewood during the relevant periods involved in this case. (Compl. ¶ 13.) The settlement was facilitated by the Magistrate Judge. The Settlement Agreement provides in Paragraph 1B:
Lakewood shall take no further action to disallow, suspend, or otherwise interfere with banner towing operations at Lakewood Airport except for reason of what it believes to be a bona fide emergency related to safety of flight operations. Any such emergency shall be reported immediately to the responsible Flight Standards District Office [("FSDO")]of the Federal Aviation Administration, and to affected towers, including UAA and ASN. Lakewood shall convene a meeting of such affected parties within 24 hours to address same. If the parties cannot agree, operations may not resume until the FAA evaluates and determines whether, when and under what conditions tow operations may resume.
(Compl. ¶ 14.) The Settlement Agreement also stated in Paragraph 13, "[t]he court will retain jurisdiction of this matter for purposes of enforcing the settlement." (Compl. ¶ 16.) The Court's Dismissal Order did not reference the retention of jurisdiction or incorporate the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
After an incident on August 4, 2018, when an UAA plane crashed at Lakewood Airport, Defendant Steven Reinman, Lakewood Airport manager and Executive Director of the Lakewood Township Industrial Commission, determined that Plaintiff was in violation of Standard Operating Procedures ("SOP"). (Def.'s Arg., at 8.) Plaintiff denies any violation of the SOP or any other safety violations. (See Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff maintains that after this incident, UAA's flight operations were unilaterally suspended by Defendants without contacting the Philadelphia FSDO, or convening a meeting of the parties as required by the Settlement Agreement. (See Compl. ¶ 24.) Defendants claim that video footage and photographs of the alleged safety violations were provided to FAA/FSDO leadership in Washington, D.C., who thentold Defendants to "take all necessary actions to stop the dangerous activity in its airport." (Def.'s Arg, at 8-9.) Defendants further claim that a meeting of the parties was convened, and a decision was made to suspend UAA's operations for one day. (Def.'s Arg., at 9). Defendants explain that UAA was permitted to resume its operations after this one-day suspension. (Def's Arg., at 9.)
On June 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint to enforce the Settlement Agreement and recover damages for the alleged breach by Defendants. (Def.'s Arg., at 2.) The Complaint asserts the following claims: (1) Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) Breach of Contract, (3) Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, (4) Fraudulent Inducement; (5) Fraud, (6) Negligent Misrepresentation/Non-Disclosure, and (7) Arbitrary and Capricious Denial of Access (See Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff is seeking declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 to establish Defendants' violations of Plaintiff's rights, privileges and immunities and injunctive relief to cease the alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement by Defendants. (See Compl. ¶¶ 67-79.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of a proceeding for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Once a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge is raised, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is treated as either a "facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction." Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). Under a facial attack, such as here, the movant challenges the legal sufficiency of theclaim, and the court considers only "the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id.
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for deprivation of one's rights under § 1983, the plaintiff must show firstly, "the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of law" and, secondly, that this conduct "deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). The purpose of § 1983 is to "deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
As to the state action requirement, Plaintiff has alleged Defendants acted under color of law as Defendant Township of Lakewood is a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey, Defendant Lakewood Industrial Commission is a commission of the Township of Lakewood, and Defendant Reinman is an employee of Lakewood Township. (See Compl. ¶¶ 4-6.) Indeed, local governments qualify as "person[s]" for the purposes of § 1983 and may be sued under §1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 426 U.S. 658, 700 (1978). In addition, because under the color of law means "under the 'pretense' of law," acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties are also amenable to suit under § 1983. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945). However, glaringly, Plaintiff has failed to aver any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or federal law of which they were deprived. The Complaint simply alleges, generally, to "rights, privilege or immunities" and "financial damage" suffered as a result of Defendants' alleged conduct. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-33.) Since no federal law or constitutionally guaranteed right is identified or thus, implicated, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983.2
Having determined that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1983, what remains are a plethora of state law claims, which all center around the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiff argues, nevertheless, that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to federal question jurisdiction under the Supreme Court's decision in Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). To that end, Plaintiff argues it has pled that "Lakewood's actions in breaching the Settlement Agreement are based on Lakewood's assertions of violations of FAA safety regulations." (Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n, at 10.) Plaintiff also claims the Court retained jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. In response, Defendants argue that federal question jurisdiction does not exist because the state law claims do not raise a substantial issue of federal law. Furthermore,Defendants contend the Court did not retain jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement, as the Court did not include the necessary language in the Order dismissing the original case.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Consistent with that concept, Congress has authorized that federal "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A federal court has jurisdiction over a matter pursuant to diversity or federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. For federal question jurisdiction the federal question must be raised in the complaint, as "a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution." Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Dillard, 88 F. Supp. 3d 399, 401 (D.N.J. 2015) (...
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