UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS, ETC. v. Sperry

• Decision Date: 06 December 1948
• Docket Number: No. 3654.,3654.
• Citation: 170 F.2d 863
• Parties: UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT COUNCIL OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, AND VICINITY, A. F. OF L., et al. v. SPERRY, for and on Behalf of NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

170 F.2d 863 (1948)

UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, DISTRICT COUNCIL OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, AND VICINITY, A. F. OF L., et al. v. SPERRY, for and on Behalf of NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

No. 3654.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

November 2, 1948.

Rehearing Denied December 6, 1948.

Clif Langsdale, of Kansas City, Mo. (Clyde Taylor and John J. Manning, both of Kansas City, Mo., and Chauncy B. Little, of Olathe, Kan., on the brief), for appellants.

Dominick L. Manoli, of Washington, D. C. (Robert N. Denham, General Counsel, David P. Findling, Associate General Counsel, Winthrop A. Johns and Albert Dreyer, all of Washington, D.C., on the brief), for appellees.

Before BRATTON, HUXMAN and MURRAH, Circuit Judges.

BRATTON, Circuit Judge.

Section 1 of the act approved June 23, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., commonly called the Taft-Hartley Act, and hereinafter referred to as the act, contains a declaration of policy in which it is recited that industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and with the full production of articles and commodities for commerce can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees, and labor organizations each recognize under law one another's legitimate rights in their relations with each other; and further, that it is the purpose of the act, in order to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employers and employees in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce. In conventional language, section 2(6) defines the term "commerce" to mean trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country. In equally conventional language, section 2(7) defines the term "affecting commerce" to mean in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce. Section 8(b) (4) (A) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization or its agents to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services, where the object thereof is to force an employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person. Section 8(c) provides in effect that the expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of the act, if it contains no threat of reprisal, or force, or promise of benefit. Section 10(a) empowers the National Labor Relations Board, as thereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice listed in section 8 affecting commerce. Section 10(b) provides that whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for that purpose, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect; that the person shall have the right to file an answer to the complaint; and that a hearing shall be had, conducted so far as practicable in accordance with the rules of evidence in the district courts of the United States. Section 10(c) provides that if upon the preponderance of the testimony taken, the Board shall be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, it shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring him to cease and desist, and to take such affirmative action including the reinstatement of employees with or without back pay as will effectuate the policies of the act. Section 10(e) authorizes the Board to petition the Circuit Court of Appeals of the circuit in which the unfair labor practice occurred, or the circuit in which the person committing such unfair labor practice resides or transacts business to enforce such order. And section 10(l) provides that when it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (A), (B), or (C) of section 8(b) of the act, a preliminary investigation shall be made forthwith; that if after the making of such investigation the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition the district court of the United States of the district where the unfair labor practice occurred, or is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to the matter; and that upon the filing of such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper. It contains a provision relating to notice, but that has no present material bearing. And it further provides that for the purpose of the subsection, district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office or in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests of employee members.

Wadsworth Building Company, Inc., a corporation hereinafter referred to as Wadsworth, was engaged in the manufacture of prefabricated houses at its plant in Overland Park, Kansas. During the year immediately preceding the institution of this action, it purchased raw materials in excess of $100,000, of which approximately ninety-five per cent were shipped into Kansas; and it sold finished products in excess of $100,000, of which approximately fifty per cent were sold to customers outside of Kansas. A controversy arose between Wadsworth and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, affiliated with American Federation of Labor, hereinafter referred to as Carpenters. As the result of the controversy, some or all of the union employees of Wadsworth went out on strike and pickets were placed around the plant. Klassen and Hodgson, Inc., a corporation hereinafter referred to as Klassen, was engaged in the business of constructing residences in Overland Park. Sometime prior to the strike at the plant of Wadsworth, Klassen entered into an arrangement with Wadsworth for the purchase of ten to fifteen prefabricated houses which it planned to erect on foundations in Overland Park. Sometime after the strike at the plant of Wadsworth began, Walter A. Said, an agent of Carpenters, came to the premises where Klassen intended to erect one of the prefabricated houses and inquired whether Klassen was union or otherwise. He was advised that Klassen was just starting in business and that it intended to use union employees. A few days later Said again came to the premises. One of the prefabricated houses had been received and Klassen was engaged in its erection. One union carpenter, one non-union carpenter, and one other non-union employee were engaged in the work. Said inquired whether it was a Wadsworth house and whether Klassen knew that the union employees of Wadsworth were on strike. The spokesman for Klassen replied that he had just recently learned of the strike, and that arrangements had been made for the purchase of the houses long prior to the beginning of the strike. He further stated that Klassen intended to employ union labor exclusively and asked whether Said could furnish union carpenters. A day or two later, Said and representatives of several other unions came to the premises, discussed with the spokesman for Klassen the matter of its purchasing prefabricated houses from Wadsworth while the strike was in progress, and urged that Klassen use its influence in forcing Wadsworth to come to terms with the unions. While there, Said suggested to the union carpenter employed on the job that he call him that night. The employee did call Said that night; Said asked the employee if he knew the conditions at the Klassen project; the employee said that he did and that it would be his last day there; and he did quit the following day. A few days later, on the recommendation of Said and representatives of other unions, the Building Trades Council of Kansas...