United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corporation v. Delaware Liquor Commission
| Decision Date | 14 August 1940 |
| Citation | 15 A.2d 442,41 Del. 74 |
| Court | Court of General Sessions of Delaware |
| Parties | UNITED CIGAR-WHELAN STORES CORPORATION, a corporation of the State of Delaware, v. DELAWARE LIQUOR COMMISSION |
Court of General Sessions for New Castle County, May Term, 1940.
Appeal from determination of Liquor Commission in refusing license to sell alcoholic liquor in a cigar store.
In this case it is agreed that the appellant, United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corporation, conducted a cigar store at 927 Market Street in the City of Wilmington. The appellant made application to the Delaware Liquor Commission for a license to sell alcoholic liquor in such store.
On May 6, 1940, the Liquor Commission informed the appellant (the former petitioner) in part, as follows:
The statute cited by the Liquor Commission was passed April 21 1939, and is known as Chapter 186, Vol. 42, Laws of Delaware and, so far as material, appears as follows:
From the refusal of the Liquor Commission to grant the license this appeal has been taken, and the appellant contends that the statute relied upon by the Liquor Commission as the basis of its action is unconstitutional, as being in violation of
(a) Art. 2, Sec. 16 of the Constitution of the State of Delaware, which provides that no bill or joint resolutions, except bills appropriating money for public purposes, shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.
(b) The 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which, in general, provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of its laws."
These questions shall be considered in their order.
Appeal dismissed, and the action of Delaware Liquor Commission sustained.
John W. Huxley, Jr., for appellant.
William S. Potter for Delaware Liquor Commission.
OPINION
It being admitted that the petitioner-appellant conducted a cigar store at the premises for which a license was sought we shall not, of course, consider what does, in fact, constitute a cigar store.
1. As to the first objection we shall but briefly consider the question that the cited act is violative of the constitutional provisions that the subject of the act must be embraced in its title. It will be readily seen that the title of the act prohibits the sale of alcoholic liquor "in Grocery Stores, Delicatessen Shops, or Cigar Stores" and it is contended that the purview or body of the statute is much broader and prohibits the sale of alcoholic liquor in the State of Delaware by any owner, lessee or manager of a grocery store, delicatessen shop or cigar store.
So often has the quoted provision of the Constitution been considered by this court that it is unnecessary to again restate its purpose or effect. It is sufficient to say that, under the Constitution, the title acts as a limitation on otherwise uncontrolled provisions of the body of the act, and any provisions of the purview clearly beyond or extraneous to the title cannot be valid. If we were now forced to consider the effect of sales of alcoholic liquor by owners, lessees or managers of cigar stores at places other than the cigar stores themselves, we might also have to consider as to whether this question could be raised by the appellant, for it is a general principle of law that only that person can raise a constitutional question who is, himself, affected by it. We turn, however, to the body of the act to determine its scope and meaning.
We think the words "conducting a grocery store, delicatessen shop or cigar store" are equally applicable to each of the stated relations of "owner, lessee or manager," and as we are given to understand that the present applicant is a lessee of a cigar store we shall confine our consideration to those facts.
We thus find that the statute says "on and after July 1, 1940, it shall be unlawful for any * * * lessee * * * conducting a * * * cigar store to sell or dispense alcoholic liquors in the State of Delaware." It must be admitted that the language used is not as clear as might be desired, but our only duty is to ascertain the legislative intent. To ascertain this intent there may be called into play various rules of construction, including the rule that, if possible, some meaning must be attributed to all of the language of the statute. Now the question to be determined is whether the legislature intended to prohibit a lessee conducting a cigar store from selling or dispensing alcoholic liquor anywhere in the State of Delaware, or whether the sale or dispensing of such liquor was intended to be prohibited solely in the cigar stores so conducted by such lessee. If it was intended that the prohibition of sale should be state-wide in character it is very difficult, if not quite impossible, to attribute any reasonable meaning to be given to the qualifying word "conducting." It is quite impossible for us to conceive that any valid objection to an otherwise legal right to sell liquor could be based solely on the fact that such person conducted a cigar store in another county, and perhaps many miles from the place where the liquor is to be sold.
For the clarifying of the ambiguity in the statute resort may be had to many sources, including the title of the act itself, and the relation of the title to the purview of the statute may be briefly considered.
Originally, at common law, the title of the act was no part of the act and, indeed, it is said that early English statutes had no titles until such titles were framed for clerical reference. At an early date Chief Justice Marshall said in United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch. 358, 386, 2 L.Ed. 304:
"Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of consideration."
There can be no question that the uniform current of authority today is that when any ambiguity exists in the purview of a statute the title may be resorted to as an aid in ascertaining the legislative intent.
Crawford on Statutory Construction, p. 357; 1 Cooley's Const. Lim. 291; 25 R. C. L. 1031; 59 C. J. 1005.
The foregoing principle finds support in almost all jurisdictions including those, like the United States Government, where the Constitution does not require that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title. The title of an act has often been accorded additional and particular significance in considering ambiguities in statutes in those jurisdictions where, by reason of constitutional provisions, the subject of the act must be expressed in its title and the act can contain nothing not so expressed in the title and not germane to such expression. The cases are too numerous to require citation. 59 C. J. 1005; 25 R. C. L. 1031; American Digest System, Statutes, 211. See 37 A. L. R. 948, in which is an exhaustive note.
If the purview of the act could be capable of two constructions, one of which would be violative of the title and render the act void, and the other construction would be in conformity with the title, the first construction must be rejected.
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