United Clerical Employees v. County of Contra Costa

• Decision Date: 22 December 1977
• Citation: 76 Cal.App.3d 119,142 Cal.Rptr. 735
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2705 UNITED CLERICAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2700, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 39641.

Page 735

142 Cal.Rptr. 735

76 Cal.App.3d 119, 97 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2705

UNITED CLERICAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2700, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 39641.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 22, 1977.

John B. Clausen, County Counsel, Contra Costa County, E. V. Lane, Jr., Deputy County Counsel, Martinez, for defendants and appellants.

Gillin & Jacobson, Ralph L. Jacobson, Berkeley, for plaintiffs and respondents.

ROUSE, Associate Judge.

Defendants, County of Contra Costa, et al. (hereinafter appellants or County), appeal from the trial court's judgment granting a permanent injunction in favor of respondents. The facts leading to the controversy are relatively simple and may be stated as follows:

Pursuant to County Ordinance No. 70-17 (Ordinance), ¹ United Clerical Employees (UCE) requested recognition of a supervisory clerical unit of employees of the County and districts governed by the board of supervisors of the County. On October 24, 1972, the board of supervisors designated a supervisory clerical unit which was to include the classifications of supervising clerk I, supervising clerk II, supervising account clerk, and hospital reception center supervisor. Subsequently, an election was held. UCE won the election and was established as the sole representative of the bargaining unit. The representation by UCE was not limited to the supervisory clerical unit, but extended to other nonmanagement employees as well.

Respondents Ethel Brown and Edith Davison were employees of the County in positions designated as supervising clerk I. On May 15, 1973, both were selected by UCE to serve as representatives of the supervisory clerical unit in the 1973 meet and confer sessions with the County. In a letter dated May 16, 1973, appellants notified UCE that Davison and Brown were management employees and thereby precluded from representing UCE in relations to county management (Gov.Code, ² § 3507.5; Ordinance, §§ 34-4.030, 24-7.710 (now § 34-8.010 ³ ). On this basis, appellant refused to meet and confer with respondents Brown and Davison as representatives of the supervisory clerical unit.

Thereupon respondents brought an action against appellants seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctions and declaratory relief. The trial court first issued a temporary restraining order enjoining appellants from enforcing Ordinance section 24-7.710 and from refusing to recognize Brown and Davison as representatives of their unit. The order was followed by a preliminary injunction which, in effect, kept in force the temporary restraining order previously issued. On November 22, 1974, the matter went on trial. After receiving both oral and documentary evidence, and after considering the legal arguments of the parties, the trial court, sitting without a jury, found inter alia that the persons classified as supervising clerk I did not in fact exercise and possess the supervisory authority which would have rendered them management employees within the meaning of the Ordinance, and that the employees in the supervisory clerical unit of the County were not management or confidential employees within the purview of section 3507.5. Accordingly, the trial court issued a permanent injunction enjoining appellants from designating all employees exercising supervisory authority as management employees and from refusing to recognize persons in the position of supervising clerk I as representatives of UCE in matters concerning wages, hours and other conditions of employment.

Before discussing and analyzing the issues raised by the parties, we first set out the essential statutory and regulatory provisions upon which the principal issues are predicated. To start with, section 3507.5, the pivotal section of the MMB Act, provides that "In addition to those rules and regulations a public agency may adopt pursuant to and in the same manner as in Section 3507, any such agency may adopt reasonable rules and regulations providing for designation of the management and confidential employees of the public agency and restricting such employees from representing any employee organization, which represents other employees of the public agency, on matters within the scope of representation. Except as specifically provided otherwise in this chapter, this section does not otherwise limit the right of employees to be members of and to hold office in an employee organization." (Emphasis added.)

A "Management employee" who is proscribed from representing the union in labor disputes of the County (see Ordinance, § 34-8.010, supra, fn. 3), is defined by the Ordinance as follows: " 'Management employee' means the County Administrator, Assistant County Administrator-Director of Personnel, Assistants to the County Administrator, department heads, assistant department heads, heads and assistant heads of departmental divisions, programs or districts and employees exercising supervisory authority." (§ 34-4.030; emphasis added.)

Finally, pursuant to Ordinance, section 34-4.050, " 'Supervisory authority' means authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances or effectively to recommend such action, if the exercise of such authority is not merely routine or clerical in nature but calls for the use of independent judgment."

Appellants' primary contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that none of the persons with title of supervisory clerk I did in fact exercise supervisory authority as spelled out in section 34-4.050 of the Ordinance, and that employees within the supervisory clerical unit failed to qualify as management employees within the meaning of section 3507.5. Respondents, in turn, argue that the definition of the Ordinance is overbroad and that it unreasonably designates supervisors as management employees thereby depriving the supervisory members of the union of important rights. It thus appears that, aside from the evidentiary problem, the crucial issue lying at the heart of the controversy is whether the challenged provisions of the Ordinance which do include employees exercising supervisory authority in the management are reasonable, and/or whether such provisions delineate the scope of management employees as used in the statute too broadly, thereby rendering them invalid.

At the outset, we must recognize a well established principle of law which governs our conduct in the determination of this matter, namely, that where a legislative action by a local government agency is attacked as unreasonable, the burden of proof is on the attacking party. Such regulations are presumed to be reasonable in the absence of proof. (Fillmore Union High School Dist. v. Cobb (1935) 5 Cal.2d 26, 33, 53 P.2d 349; Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control v. Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Board (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 785, 792-793, 338 P.2d 50.) Moreover, if reasonable minds may differ as to the wisdom of the action of the local board or agency, its action is conclusive and the courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the local authority. (Organization of Deputy Sheriffs v. County of San Mateo (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 331, 338-339, 122 Cal.Rptr. 210.)

The state labor relations law (MMB Act) does not identify that class of persons which constitutes "management employees" and no California case has been cited to us which delineates the scope of activities of a management employee. In passing upon the crucial question of whether the supervisory personnel here in dispute were reasonably categorized as management, we observe that the MMB Act does not use the term "supervisor," nor does it designate "supervisory personnel" as a species of management. Apparently, as a class, supervisors are not prohibited from membership and active participation in employee organizations, since section 3501 defines an "employee" within the broadest possible terms, excluding only elected officials and those appointed by the Governor. ⁴

Section 3507.5 empowers a public agency to "adopt reasonable rules and regulations providing for designation of the management and confidential employees of the public agency and restricting such employees from representing any employee organization, which represents other employees of the public agency, on matters within the scope of representation. . . ." Thus, Contra Costa County, as the public agency involved, was authorized to enact the ordinance here in controversy, provided that the designation of certain employees as management thereunder was reasonable.

In the absence of controlling state law in this field of labor relations it is generally agreed that we may look to the federal law for guidance in seeking to interpret state provisions whose language parallels that of the federal statutes. (Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 382, 391, 113 Cal.Rptr. 461, 521 P.2d 453; see, to the same effect: Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 617, fn 10, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507, 526 P.2d 971; Englund v. Chavez (1972) 8 Cal.3d 572, 589-590, 105 Cal.Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457; Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, etc., Local No. 88 (1960) 53 Cal.2d 455, 459, 2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76.) In this instance, the language of section 34-4.050 of the County Ordinance, which defines supervisory authority, is virtually identical to the language used in the federal statute. (29 U.S.C., § 152, subd. (11).) ⁵ The federal law makes it very clear that a supervisor is not an employee, but belongs to the management. (29 U.S.C., § 152, subd. (3); ⁶ International Union of United Brewery etc. v. N.L.R.B. (1961) 111 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 298 F.2d 297.) This attitude was explained by the court in the case of Beasley...