United Electric Coal Companies v. Rice

• Decision Date: 18 February 1938
• Docket Number: No. 4655.,4655.
• Citation: 22 F. Supp. 221
• Parties: UNITED ELECTRIC COAL COMPANIES v. RICE et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Illinois

22 F. Supp. 221

UNITED ELECTRIC COAL COMPANIES v. RICE et al.

No. 4655.

District Court, E. D. Illinois.

January 13, 1938.

On Rehearing February 18, 1938.

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William M. Acton, of Danville, Ill., and Ralph F. Lesemann, of East St. Louis, Ill., for plaintiff.

George W. Dowell, of DuQuoin, Ill., Nobel Y. Dowell, of East Peoria, Ill., and C. C. Dreman, of Belleville, Ill., for defendants.

Haight, Goldstein & Hobbs (by George I. Haight), of Chicago, Ill., also for defendants on motion for rehearing.

WHAM, District Judge.

This case is now before the court on plaintiff's motion for damages. A review of its history discloses that the case was begun on November 15, 1934, as a suit to restrain defendants from interfering with and preventing by force, violence, threats, and intimidation the operation of plaintiff's mine known as the Red Ray, or Freeburg, mine and for other relief. The bill of complaint set forth in great detail the alleged facts relied upon by plaintiff concerning the happenings at the mine from the beginning of the strike at said mine on April 1, 1933, the efforts made by plaintiff to reopen and operate the mine, the wrongful conspiracy and conduct thereunder of defendants preventing and continuing to prevent such reopening, the injury and damage caused plaintiff prior to date of suit by defendants' wrongful conduct, and the injury and damage that would be caused in the future if defendants were not restrained. The prayer for relief was specifically for injunctive relief, and for general relief as follows: "That the plaintiff be granted such other and further relief in the premises as equity may require and to the Court may seem meet." The answer of the defendants having been filed, the cause was heard before the court upon the issues of plaintiff's right to injunctive relief and, if such right was established, the jurisdiction of this court to grant such relief in view of existing federal legislation. The question of recoverable damages and plaintiff's right to recover damages in the suit was not mentioned or considered during the trial or in arguments or briefs of counsel or in the findings and conclusions of the court or in the decree. For reasons appearing in said findings and conclusions and in the court's opinion (D.C., 9 F.Supp. 635), it was held in substance that while the plaintiff, under the evidence, had suffered and would suffer irreparable damage if defendants were not restrained and, under the evidence, was entitled to injunctive relief, this court was without jurisdiction to grant such relief in view of the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115, and the bill was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

On appeal the case was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for reasons set forth in the opinion of that court. 7 Cir., 80 F.2d 1. This court was held to have jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court (297 U.S. 714, 56 S.Ct. 590, 80 L.Ed. 1000) and on the filing of the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this court a decree was entered pursuant thereto on January 20, 1936, enjoining the defendants from interfering with the operation of plaintiff's mine and further providing as follows: "It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that this court retain jurisdiction of this cause to the end of entertaining and hearing any application for any modification or extension of the above and foregoing provisions of this decree or for any other relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled under the allegations and prayer of the bill of complaint herein, the findings of this Court, and said decree and opinion of said United States Circuit Court of Appeals; provided * * *."

On March 30 following, plaintiff filed its original motion herein for an assessment and allowance of damages based on the record. Defendants filed their motion in opposition thereto, and after a number of motions, countermotions, rulings by the court, and two appeals by the defendants, the cause came to an issue on plaintiff's amended motion for damages and for judgment and defendants' motion in opposition. This court, in its various rulings in disposing of the motions aforesaid, has held in substance that it has power and jurisdiction in equity to render a decree for damages in a suit brought for injunctive and other relief even though a decree for damages is not specially prayed for, if the allegations of fact in the bill are sufficient to sustain such decree and such allegations are sustained by the proof; that the allegations of the bill in this suit are sufficiently broad to sustain a decree for damages; that plaintiff's motion therefor was filed in apt time; that the findings and conclusions of the court filed at the conclusion of the original trial during which the sole issue being considered by the court was the right of the plaintiff for injunctive relief are not conclusive upon the court on the issue of recoverable damages and the liability of defendants and each of them to the plaintiff for such damages; also, that plaintiff and the defendants had the right to introduce further evidence on the issues of the amount of damages suffered by plaintiff and the liability of defendants, upon which additional evidence, if any, with the evidence heard at the original trial the court would base its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of damages.

The case came on for further hearing on the issue of damages, and additional evidence offered by plaintiff and defendants was received and the entire record is now before the court on arguments and briefs of counsel.

It may be well to advert briefly to certain principles of law, equity and procedure which have been presented for determination by the preliminary motions above mentioned, as well as to certain other principles of importance in making proper disposition of plaintiff's motion for damages.

A court of equity having properly obtained jurisdiction over a cause and the parties thereto, and this applies to a suit for injunctive relief, will retain jurisdiction for all purposes in order to do complete justice between the parties even though in so doing it becomes necessary to litigate incidental issues legal in character which, standing alone, would be determinable only in a suit at law. Equity Rule 23 of the United States Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., vol. 1, §§ 181, 236, 237, and 242; 21 C.J. 138; 10 R.C.L., title Equity, § 120; 4 Cyc.Fed.Proc. § 1057; Hughes Fed.Prac. § 1002; Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530, 551, 552, 33 S.Ct. 785, 57 L.Ed. 1317; McGowan v. Parish, 237 U.S. 285, 296, 35 S.Ct. 543, 59 L.Ed. 955; Zenith Carburetor Co. v. Stromberg Motor Devices Co., 7 Cir., 270 F. 421, 424; Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 48 S.Ct. 580, 72 L.Ed. 961; Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 7 Cir., 45 F.2d 299, 301, certiorari denied, 283 U.S. 843, 51 S. Ct. 489, 75 L.Ed. 1452; Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corporation, 2 Cir., 65 F.2d 332, 335; Peale v. Marion Coal Co., C.C., 172 F. 639; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. of Idaho v. United States, 9 Cir., 218 F. 288, affirmed by Supreme Court 244 U.S. 351, 37 S.Ct. 625, 61 L.Ed. 1184.

The propriety of applying the principle stated in the preceding paragraph in a suit in equity for injunctive relief where plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law and in which, to administer complete relief, it becomes necessary to assess damages and render a money judgment therefor, is generally recognized and is now the established rule. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed. vol. 1, §§ 236, 237; 21 C.J. 141, 142; 32 C.J. 382; 10 R.C.L. p. 370, 371; Cyc.Fed.Proc. § 3291; Omaha Horse Railway Co. v. Cable Tramway Co., C.C., 32 F. 727; United States v. Guglard, C.C., 79 F. 21; The Salton Sea Cases, 9 Cir., 172 F. 792, certiorari denied California Development Co. v. New Liverpool Salt Co., 215 U.S. 603, 30 S.Ct. 405, 54 L.Ed. 345; United States v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., C.C., 190 F. 825; Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 48 S.Ct. 580, 72 L.Ed. 961; Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 7 Cir., 45 F.2d 299, certiorari denied 283 U.S. 843, 51 S.Ct. 489, 75 L.Ed. 1452; Winola Lake & Land Co. v. Gorham, D.C., 13 F.Supp. 721; American Hide & Leather Co. v. Andersen, 153 Ill.App. 79; McGuire v. Boyd Coal & Coke Co., 236 Ill. 69, 86 N.E. 174; Fox et al. v. Lete et al., 278 Ill.App. 636, mem.

In such case the question of damages being incidental to the principal issue which brings the suit into equity, and inseparably bound up therewith, it is neither practicable nor is it required by the constitutional provision for jury trials in law cases that the question of damages be submitted to a jury. The Salton Sea Cases, 9 Cir., 172 F. 792, 799-803. To submit the question of recoverable damages to a jury in the case before the court would practically require a complete retrial of the case to determine an incidental issue. It is to avoid such multiplicity of trials that "a court of equity, if obliged to take cognizance of a cause for any purpose, will ordinarily retain it for all purposes, even though this requires it to determine purely legal rights that otherwise would not be within the range of its authority." Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530, at page 552, 33 S.Ct. 785, 793, 57 L.Ed. 1317. See, also, Greene v. Louisville Ry. Co., 244 U.S. 499, 520, 37 S.Ct. 673, 61 L.Ed. 1280, Ann.Cas.1917E, 88; McGowan v. Parish, 237 U.S. 285, 296, 35 S.Ct. 543, 59 L.Ed. 955; American Hide & Leather Co. v. Andersen, 153 Ill.App. 79; McGuire v. Boyd Coal & Coke Co., 236 Ill. 69, 86 N.E. 174; Kieth v. Henkleman, 173 Ill. 137, 50 N.E. 692.

If the facts pleaded in the plaintiff's bill are sufficient to support such relief, damages may be allowed under the prayer for general relief though there be no special prayer for damages. Omaha Horse Ry. Co. v....