Keith v. Henkleman

• Decision Date: 21 April 1898
• Citation: 173 Ill. 137,50 N.E. 692
• Parties: KEITH et al. v. HENKLEMAN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

173 Ill. 137

50 N.E. 692

KEITH et al.

v.HENKLEMAN et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 21, 1898.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Bill by Frederick Henkleman and others against E. G. Keith and others. From a decree of the appellate court affirming a decree for complainants, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

James A. Peterson, for appellants.

Tenney, McConnell & Coffeen, for appellees.

MAGRUDER, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the appellate court affirming a decree of the superior court of Cook county reforming an injunction bond from which the seals of the obligors had been omitted by mistake, and enforcing the bond, so reformed, by assessing the damages recoverable under it. The bond was given upon the issuance of an injunction procured by the appellant John L. Peterson in a bill filed by him against the Brabrook Tailoring Company and others to restrain the sheriff from paying over the proceeds of the sale of the property of that company, which he held under executions in favor of the appellees and others. Upon this injunction bond, Peterson was the principal obligor, and the two other appellants, Keith and Stanton, were sureties. Appellees and certain of the other defendants were obligees in the bond. The case is now here the second time. Our decision in it when it was here before is reported as Henkleman v. Peterson, 154 Ill. 419, 40 N. E. 359. Upon the former hearing we held that the injunction bond, which purports by its terms to be a sealed instrument, might be corrected, as against the sureties, by adding to their signatures seals which had been omitted by mistake, and that the bond should be so corrected; its recital showing that it was the intention of the parties that it should be sealed and made sufficient. The judgment then entered reversed the judgment of the appellate court and the decree of the superior court of Cook county, and remanded the cause to the latter court. When the cause was redocketed in the latter court, testimony was taken in reference to the assessment of damages occasioned by reason of the injunction. A decree was entered fixing the amount of such damages, and apportioning them between the complainants, so as to give judgment against the obligors on the bond for the damages occasioned to each of the complainants separately, and so as to relieve appellants from all damages or other liabilities to the other obligees in the bond. The damages assessed by the court below consist of three items,-one of $1,000, one of $208.29, and the third of $21, amounting altogether to $1,229.29. The sum of $1,000 was allowed for solicitor's fees incurred in procuring a dissolution of the injunction. The sum of $208.25 was for interest on the net proceeds of the sale of the property during the time the injunction was in force; that is to say, from January 1, 1891, to May 5, 1891,-the latter date being the date of the dissolution of the injunction. The sum of $21 represented an unpaid balance on the bill for printing abstract and brief.

1. The first question presented is whether the court, having jurisdiction to reform and correct the bond, had also jurisdiction to enforce the bond by assessing the damages occasioned by reason of the injunction, or whether it was necessary for the court to remit the parties to their actions at law upon the bond to recover such damages. We are of the opinion that the court committed no error in assessing the amount of the damages. It is well settled that, when a court of equity has jurisdiction of a cause for one purpose, it will retain such jurisdiction for all purposes. When the controversy requires any purely equitable relief, such as will give a court of equity the right to act, the court will proceed to a determination of all the matters at issue; and in doing so it may establish purely legal rights and grant legal remedies, which would otherwise be beyond its power. The concurrent jurisdiction of equity may thus be exercised over legal causes of action, in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits. 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 181. This principle has been applied to cases where equity obtains jurisdiction for the purpose of reforming and correcting an instrument on account of some mistake, and then proceeds to ascertain the damages recoverable upon the instrument itself. ‘The court, having acquired jurisdiction for the purpose of reforming the instrument, is not required to stop there, and turn the plaintiff over to a new action to recover his damages, but has the right incidentally to give relief in damages, or in such other mode as justice requires.’ 2 Beach, Mod. Eq. Jur. § 538. In Bidwell v. Insurance Co., 16 N. Y. 263, which was a proceeding to reform an insurance policy in certain particulars, it was held that the court was not obliged to stop with reforming the policy, and turn the plaintiffs over to a new action to recover their damages. It was there said that when a court of equity has acquired jurisdiction, and has the whole merits before it, it can proceed to do complete justice between the parties. In Welles v. Yates, 44 N. Y. 525, a deed was reformed, and a decree entered against the defendant for the damages caused by his cutting timber from the land. It was there said, ‘The court, having jurisdiction to amend the contract, thereby acquired the right incidentally to give relief in damages, or in such mode as justice required.’ In Insurance Co. v. Jaynes, 87 Ill. 199, where a policy of insurance by mistake was made to expire on a day prior to its date, it was held that, in a proceeding by bill in equity to correct the mistake in the policy, it was competent for the court in the same decree to rectify the mistake, and give judgment for the amount due upon the policy as rectified. In Insurance Co. v. Ruckman, 127 Ill. 364, 20 N. E. 77, it was held, in a proceeding where the circuit court decreed the reformation of an insurance policy, that it was proper for the court (the property insured having been destroyed by fire) to enter a decree in favor of the complainant for the amount of his loss. See, also, Insurance Co. v. Gueck, 130 Ill. 345, 23 N. E. 112.

But it is claimed by counsel for appellants that the damages should have been assessed by a jury, upon two grounds: In the first place, it is said that disputed questions of fact in chancery should be tried by a jury. The rule, however, in this state, is that it is discretionary with the chancellor to require the issues of fact arising in equity cases to be tried by a jury before the entry of a decree. The chancellor is the sole judge of the evidence and its weight; and, when he directs an issue of fact to be tried by a jury, to inform his conscience, he may adopt the verdict of the jury, or he may disregard it. It follows that a jury trial is never a matter of right in a chancery case. The verdict of the jury in such cases is advisory, merely, and not binding upon the chancellor. Milk v. Moore, 39 Ill. 584;Russell v. Paine, 45 Ill. 350;Maynard v. Richards, 166 Ill. 466, 46 N. E. 1138;Guild v. Hull, 127 Ill. 523, 20 N. E. 665. In the second place, it is contended that the appellants were entitled to a jury trial as to the amount of damages to be assessed against them, under both the constitutions of the United States and of the state of Illinois. The provision of the federal constitution relied upon is the seventh amendment, which reads as follows: ‘In suits at common law, when the value in controversy shall exceed $20.00, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law.’ This provision is by its very terms limited to suits at law, and does not refer to suits in chancery courts. In addition to this, the first 10 articles of amendment to the federal constitution were not intended to limit the powers of the state governments in respect to their own people, but to operate on the national...